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Vivid dreams, visions, hearing voices, premonitions, kinaesthetic 
sensations, relationships with invisible entities have long been the 
subject of anthropological inquiry, as for example, in studies of 
shamanism and spirit possession. Most such studies are carried out 
in societies unlike our own located in faraway locales. This book 
looks at such phenomena as they are experienced in contemporary 
modern settings where they are not generally considered legitimate 
sources of knowledge. Those who experience them often never share 
them with anyone but close friends or family. In modern contexts – 
understood as those where rationalism and a scientific world view 
predominate – they have received relatively little attention from 
anthropologists; indeed, some have found that studying them close to 
home may be risky for their reputation as researchers (Meintel 2007; 
Neitz 2002). However, the winds have shifted in recent decades, and 
we believe that the time is ripe for bringing anthropological 
perspectives to bear on experiences of the extraordinary in contexts, 
that by their very modernity, resemble those in which 
anthropologists normally dwell. 
 
In this book, we speak of “extraordinary” experiences without 
limiting them to a particular domain, such as religion or for that 
matter, mental health. As several of the chapters to follow show, the 
extraordinary in the form of spirits, voices, etc., may present itself in 
contexts where it is completely unexpected. Historically, though, 
until the Protestant Reformation and the Long Reformation within 
the Catholic Church (McGuire 2008), extraordinary experiences 
were part and parcel of religious life. After that, Protestantism 
associated ghostly apparitions with the devil and generally ceased to 
acknowledge them (Hufford 2005). The Catholic Church hung onto 
the notion of miracles, but only as authenticated by institutional 
authority. Saints were capable of miracles, but now had to be 




recognized by a long formal process of the centralized Church rather 
than by popular acclaim. Nonetheless, a tradition of popular piety 
kept alive the devotion to homegrown saints and belief in their 
miracles.1  
 
As science based on a naturalist ontology became ever more 
hegemonic, religion and extraordinary experience came to be seen as 
non-cognitive and irrational (Hufford 2005). Evans-Pritchard noted 
that the prevailing rationalism of the discipline in his day was so 
strong that his own conversion to Catholicism in 1954 was seen as 
something of a betrayal by his anthropology colleagues at the 
London School of Economics, as was the case with Victor and Edith 
Turner’s in 1958 with their friends and colleagues at Manchester 
(Larsen 2014). More recently, Ronald Hutton, an historian and 
tenured professor at the University of Bristol, published a history of 
Wicca in England (2001), only to find himself professionally 
ostracized for some years. 
 
This disparaging response did not derive from concerns about 
Hutton’s methodology or the accuracy of his conclusions and 
arguments, none of which raised serious concern among his peers. 
Rather, it stemmed from the fundamental prejudice against Wicca 
and other forms of alternative spirituality that permeate much of the 
academy. This sentiment holds that beliefs in magic or forms of 
occultism are essentially irrational and that those who study them 
must therefore share in this fundamental irrationality (Ferraro and 
White 2019: 9). 
 
However, as the authors add, things have changed, and Hutton's 
work has since been given the recognition it deserved (2019: 9-10).  
 
 
1 We note that Pope Francis has given recognition to popular piety in recent 









At present, few anthropologists feel compelled to declare the falsity 
of religious beliefs as does Lett (2003). It seems more common to 
approach the beliefs of others in a rationalist framework while 
“bracketing out” the issue of the truth or falsity of their beliefs – 
only to find that such beliefs “work” in their context and that 
misfortunes from invisible sources may even affect the 
anthropologist himself or herself. Such events are often profoundly 
challenging to the fieldworker’s sense of self and his/her notions of 
the real, at least temporarily; as Bowie notes (2006: 7-8), the 
anthropologist usually manages to find rationalist explanations for 
her/his experience; e.g., Favret Saada (1977, 1981). We take 
inspiration, rather, from anthropologists such as Stoller (2004) and 
others whom we mention further on who are ready to learn from, not 
just about, the multifaceted lifeworlds of others.  
 
In an interesting critique of the axiomatic secularism in our 
discipline, Charles Stewart (2001) points out the biases it carries and 
notes that it is common these days for anthropologists to invent 
strategies to enter the experience of belief without in any way 
committing themselves. For example, it is acceptable to be “initiated 
as a shaman or other sort of religious practitioner so long as one does 
not really believe in such a religious system, or so long as one 
renounces such belief later” (p. 327). To do otherwise, he adds, is to 
invite suspicion, citing van Binsbergen (1991) as an example. As 
André Mary has noted (2000), those whom anthropologists study 
often read their works. They take offence when an anthropologist 
who had seemed to share their point of view during fieldwork then 
uses of quotation marks (or other discursive strategies) in 
publications so as to signify distance from such beliefs. 
 
Studying extraordinary experiences close to home makes such 
distancing manoeuvres much more difficult to sustain. Tanya 
Luhrmann’s (1989) pioneering study of modern-day witchcraft in 
London, England inspired considerable resentment in Wiccan 
circles. Though she had been initiated into a coven, she declared in 
her book that she had never believed in magic (p. 18). A later 
researcher, Jo Pearson, found that Wiccans felt betrayed by 
Luhrmann’s disavowal, and were wary about trusting another 




anthropologist (Pearson 2001).2 More recently, Ferraro and White 
(2019) noted that Wiccans were also offended “by her book’s 
suggestion that, due to “interpretative drift3,” magicians and Wiccans 
underwent a form of self-delusion …" (Ferraro and White 2019: 8). 
Indeed, Luhrmann sees witches as "recreating a childhood world" 
(1989: 18). Significantly, later scholars of Wicca and similar 
currents (e.g., Pearson 2001; Salomonsen 2002), situate themselves 
in ways that are less distanced, more nuanced and more respectful of 
their subject's beliefs and practices than what Luhrmann's 
ethnography conveyed.  
 
The postmodernist current that has marked anthropology since the 
1980s has shaken up the classic polarity between science and 
religion, while bringing to the forefront the fact that scientific 
models are constructed in particular social and political contexts (see 
Droogers 2002: 60). In recent years, the notion of a postsecular 
anthropology has gained significant traction; for example, Fountain 
(2013) and Merz and Merz (2015, 2017). Fountain holds that a 
postsecular anthropology does not yet actually exist. However, he 
believes that its contours are beginning to emerge in critiques of 
methodological atheism and in discussions of secularism and its 
effects on how knowledge is constructed in anthropology. Some now 
argue that religiously engaged scholars have an important 
contribution to make to the study of religious faith; among them 
Robbins (2015); others see that they can also contribute to debates 
around other themes such as violence (Meneses et al. 2014). 
Willerslev and Suhr posit that reason alone is an insufficient basis 
for anthropology:  
 
2 Pearson criticizes Lurhmann on other grounds as well; i.e., giving the 
impression that the Wiccans she studied in London were representative of 
Wiccans in all of England; moreover, she holds that Luhrmann "perpetuated 
the customary reductionist approach used to portray the occult, magic, 
witchcraft, Paganism, indeed, even religion, as irrational" (2001:53). 
3 Luhrmann defines this as "the slow, often unacknowledged shift in 
someone's manner of interpreting events as they become involved in a 
particular activity. As the newcomer begins to practice, he becomes 
progressively more skilled at seeing new patterns in events, seeing new sorts 
of events as significant, paying attention to new patterns" (1989: 312). 





Sometimes a qualitative shift in perspective is required by which the 
fieldworker is forced to embrace what otherwise appears to be 
logically impossible or absurd" (2018:  65). 
 
While their own research focuses on "disruptive" (read: 
"extraordinary") experiences of those such as themselves who study 
religious, magical or spiritual practices, the authors suggest that they 
may be important for those working on themes other than religion (p. 
65). This is relevant in the present context, since, as we have noted, 
extraordinary experience can be found in non-religious contexts. In 
various ways that are too complex to unpack in this context, 
postsecularism has marked such fields as urban studies (Beaumont 
and Baker 2011), gender and feminist studies (Vasilaki 2015) and 
philosophy (Blond 1998). 
 
The emergence of a postsecular anthropology, at least in the study of 
religion, coincides with an ongoing focus on experience and 
subjectivities in other fields of anthropology, such as migration 
(Giordano 2008), tourism (Sather-Wagstaff 2008) and archaeology 
(Joyce 2004). Moreover, social and cultural anthropologists are 
increasingly directing their attention to their own societies. All this 
suggests that taking a fresh look at extraordinary experiences in 
contemporary contexts offers the potential of contributing to a 
fruitful rethinking of some of the foundations of our discipline that is 
already underway.  
 
Contemporary spiritualities in late modern contexts generally focus 
on experience, often with a bodily dimension, personal 
transformation and healing, rather than on dogmas and doctrines; 
experience is now a prominent focus in the study of religion in such 
contexts. It is noteworthy that as early as 1973, in God is Red, Vine 
Deloria Jr. characterized Native religions as experience-based as 
opposed to Christianity’s privilege of dogma. Western esotericism is 
now constituted as an academic field of study in several European 
universities (e.g., the University of Amsterdam, the University of 
Exeter, the Warburg Institute, associated with the University of 
London, the Sorbonne). There is an emerging body of 




anthropological literature on extraordinary experience in 
contemporary Western Europe and North America; for example, 
Favret-Saada (1977) on modern-day witchcraft in the Bocage 
(Normandy, France), Hunter and Luke (2014) on spirit contact, 
Hufford (2005, 2010) on sleep paralysis, near-death experiences and 
bereavement visits, Laplantine (1985) on clairvoyance, Bowie 
(2011) and Meintel (2011) on contact with the spirits of the 
deceased. 
 
This recent literature presents a series of new challenges stemming 
from the fundamental differences between the epistemology and 
ontology to which academic disciplines have long subscribed and 
those generated by the experience of the extraordinary. How can we 
take such experiences seriously? How can we render them 
ethnographically? How to do them justice? Those questions are 
addressed in varying ways by a number of authors, including some 
contributors to this book (Béguet 2006; Bowie 2013, 2011, Dubisch 
2008; Glass-Coffin 2009, 2010; Goulet 2007; Goulet and Miller 
2007; Hufford 2010; Koss-Chioino and Hefner 2006; Koss-Chioino 
2010; Meintel 2007, 2011; Tedlock 1991, 2011; Turner 1992, 1996; 
Young and Goulet 1994). We would also mention the Afterlife 
Research Centre, an international network of researchers committed 
to developing ethnographic methodologies “without explaining 
away” the effects of beliefs and practices around the afterlife, such 
as trance, mediumship, spirits and so on.4 
 
Ultimately, researchers studying extraordinary experience face an 
ethical issue: “In the end, we owe it to ourselves and to those we try 
to represent, to produce an ethnography that makes 'sense' not only 
to us but to them” (Wilkes 2007: 76). This book is an effort to 
highlight some of the challenges of giving account of extraordinary 
experiences among those living in societies like our own, if not our 
own, where such experiences are not usually granted legitimacy. In 
so doing, we seek to contribute to a shift of paradigm that is already 
underway. The chapters that follow offer an array of approaches to 
 
4 http://www.afterliferesearch.co.uk/ 




the issues that arise when ethnographers attempt to understand and 
give account of the extraordinary experiences of those they study.  
 
Béguet examines extraordinary experiences among Canadians who 
have experienced contact with the invisible, and whose accounts 
reveal distinct configurations of the world and ways of inhabiting it. 
The ontological approach was initially applied in studies of 
indigenous hunters and gatherers, with few exceptions, such as 
works by Clammer (2004), Schwimmer (2004), Béguet (2006). 
Certain authors hold that it imposes “radical alterity” on the 
ethnographic Other and makes their experience incommensurable 
with our own (Bessire and Bond 2014). However, in Béguet’s hands, 
the ontological approach makes the extraordinary experiences of her 
Canadian informants comprehensible to the reader and brings them 
closer to everyday sensory perception.  
 
Hufford’s chapter tackles the modernist chasm between spiritual 
belief and science and in the process attacks the conventional 
polarity between modernity and spirit belief or (worse), spirit 
presence. He calls for dissolving the hermeneutic boundary that 
encapsulates spirit beliefs in other (non-modern) cultural traditions 
through what he terms “methodological symmetry”, calling for both 
“first person” science and “third person science”. As he puts it, 
science is not the problem; rather scientism is. He calls for rational, 
non-biased investigation of spirit encounters, and leads by example, 
using his own experience of sleep paralysis and that of many other 
North Americans, showing that in this case, “belief” arises out of 
actual experience, not the other way around. 
 
The challenges that extraordinary experiences pose for the rationalist 
mind are the central theme of the chapters by Hanks and Habkirk. 
Scott Habkirk looks at how well-educated skeptics in Taiwan and 
Canada (including the anthropologist himself) reconcile spirit beliefs 
and experiences with scientific perspectives. He argues further that 
there is a need for developing clear intersubjective measures for 
sharing experiences with spirits. In a similar vein, Hanks explores 
the epistemological struggles of paranormal investigators in England 
who are striving “to convert their embodied experiences of ghosts 




and hauntings into what they understand as verifiable, objective 
knowledge”. On the one hand, they are imbued with scientism (the 
notion that science can explain everything in the world), and are 
skeptical of scientists’ objectivity as well as that of mediums. At the 
same time, they are also the victims of scientism in that no matter 
what they do, there is no evidence they can gather that will satisfy its 
demands.  
 
Methodological and epistemological issues concern several of the 
chapter authors. Mossière discusses “embodied” participant 
observation among Pentecostalists in Montréal and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Drawing on Scheper-Hughes and Lock’s 
concept of embodied knowledge, she observes that “a 
phenomenological perspective that puts senses, emotions and affect 
at the core of embodied knowledge” allows the anthropologist to 
grasp unexplainable experience. As her chapter shows, 
ethnographers’ personal openness can allow them to access and 
share in an embodied way – not necessarily in an identical way to 
their informants - experiences that are culturally labelled as 
extraordinary.  
 
Jack Hunter shows by example how taking extraordinary experience 
seriously can lead to fundamental questioning of basic 
anthropological categories. In his close examination of spirit contact 
among Spiritualist mediums, he shows that it entails an experience 
of the self that our culture has no framework for understanding 
except as the outcome of intoxication or pathology. Thus, neophyte 
mediums, including the author, are somewhat shocked initially when 
they experience the expansion and porosity of the self in contact 
with spirits that runs counter to conventional cultural notions of the 
self as bounded and impermeable.  
 
This also recalls Habkirk’s example of Michelle, a Canadian woman 
who found her early experiences of spirit contact upsetting, as she 
had no framework for understanding them except as a stigmatizing 
occurrence. Hunter brings us back to Hufford’s position that beliefs 
can arise out of experience rather than the reverse. Paying attention 
to how mediums experience the self shows how they develop notions 




of the self that are different from the dominant model and allows us 
to raise the question as to what kind of self-conception should be 
considered ‘normal’.  
 
Meintel pursues the question of intersubjectivity and looks at how 
participating in some of the subjective experiences of those she 
studied affects the totality of her fieldwork on the religious 
experience of Spiritualists in Montreal. As she points out, even the 
participative researcher is imbued with the skepticism fostered by 
the predominant scientism of our era as are, to some degree, 
Spiritualists themselves. 
 
Finally, Jean-Guy Goulet’s epilogue offers a synthesis of the issues 
raised in the various chapters and outlines directions for future 
research and theoretical discussions opened by the work presented in 
this book. Here he returns to questions of epistemology as they 
appear in three different anthropological traditions (structuralist, 
interpretive and experiential) while taking up other themes such as 
the encounter with the Other, reflexivity and membershipping.  
 
The epilogue opens up a series of questions that inevitably return us 
to classical issues in anthropology that run through all the chapters 
of this book: how we do fieldwork, how we produce knowledge, and 
how we represent this process – including the Other and ourselves –
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Extraordinary Experience  








Extraordinary experience is a term that covers a broad range of 
experiences, including voices, visions, kinesthetic sensations, vivid 
dreams, strong intuitions, out-of-body experiences, and relationships 
with sentient, invisible entities, to name a few. This range of 
experience has been called many things: exceptional, spiritual, 
mystical, esoteric, extra-sensorial, parapsychological, hallucinatory. 
All these designations put this experience outside the realm of 
normality and reveal the uneasiness that it provokes. 
 
Indeed, deeply embedded in a dominant mechanistic, materialistic 
and naturalist ontology that excludes the possibility of their 
existence, the invisible, spiritual dimensions of the world reveal 
themselves to some people through visions, voices, feelings, 
intuitions, premonitions. Such experiences have led some to 
psychiatric facilities while, for others, they have become the 
foundation of an alternative contemporary spirituality, understood 
here as loose and complex networks of people, many of them 
associated with the New-Age movement––which in turn is part of 
the continuity and the transformation of 1960s counterculture, 
Western esoterism and Eastern and Indigenous traditions. For these 
people, unseen––spiritual––dimensions of the world offer 
themselves up to be seen, perceived, smelled and felt, even foreseen, 
through extraordinary experiences. In this chapter, I am focusing on 
this second group of people.  
 
Typically, these experiences are considered as social, cultural or 
psychological products in the post-Enlightenment intellectual and 
academic culture when they are not associated with brain 




dysfunction. Hufford’s critique of the “cultural hypothesis” 
associated with spirits applies to extraordinary experiences as well:  
 
… in the “disenchanted” modern world, belief in the existence of 
spirits came to be seen as a nonrational and nonempirical product of 
culture. Psychological and anthropological theorizing explained 
naïve, non-modern spirit encounter experiences as culturally loaded 
imaginative events. Among modern populations such experiences 
were assumed to be pathological and relatively rare. [...] It has been 
assumed that a belief in the reality of any sort of spirit encounter 
could not be held by any well-educated and sane, modern person 
(Hufford 2010: 142). 
 
In a study I carried out on Iban animism (2006), I declined to read 
spirits as a product of Iban culture, as the villagers I interviewed did 
not provide a monolithic view of invisible beings. However, none of 
them considered the said spirits as a cultural product. Whatever the 
relationships with them, they were talked to as part of the real 
(although I should note that this was 20 years ago and might have 
changed). Treating spirits as a sociocultural product is a subtle way 
to dismiss their existence and to reinstate the material world as the 
only true reality. It is very much part of a political battle about what 
is real and what is not. 
 
In anthropology, there were for a long time only two positions 
around the issue of the reality of spirits. At one extreme, Lett (1997) 
brings up the basic qualities of science (its rationality, process of 
verification and falsification) and considers it an ethical duty to 
denounce the irrationality at the heart of religious beliefs and their 
lack of scientific basis. Lohman (2003a, 2003b) is largely 
sympathetic to this position but holds that this kind of irrationality is 
too widespread to simply be brushed aside. He seeks to scientifically 
explain what he calls supernaturalism. Other authors have provided a 
combination of biological or psychological and cultural 
explanations, using neuroscience and modern theory of cognition 
(for instance Laughlin with neuroscience, 1994, 2011; Greenfield 
2003, with his transduction of cultural expectations via the nervous 
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system, and Lurhmann’s “sensory overrides”, 2011, to explain non-
pathological hallucinations).5 
 
Cultural relativism has predominated in anthropology. Those 
subscribing to this approach criticize the rationalists for their alleged 
ethnocentrism, and refuse to judge the truth of religious propositions 
or decide on their “rational” (and thus unverifiable by science) 
character. Instead, they take a middle ground that sees these 
propositions as social and cultural products with their own 
rationality. This rationality should be brought to light by researchers, 
along with their importance and meaning for local cultures. This 
posture, though à priori more empathetic toward local cultures, is 
generating increasing malaise. Behind its apparent neutrality, it often 
holds an implicit judgment as to the empical impossibility of such 
phenomena. This judgment is flagrantly obvious in certain writings, 
in the “if”, “like”, “because they believe, hold that”, whenever 
practices or phenomena that challenge rationalism and materialism 
appear.  
 
Such skepticism also flourishes in the rewriting of such practices and 
phenomena in terms different from those given by the groups 
concerned. For example, by treating what is real for those who 
experience them as symbolic or cultural products (B. Tedlock 2011; 
Béguet 2006; Henare et al. 2006; Rose 2007; Turner 2006). When 
analysts treat such experiences as illusions, they psychologize them 
or rationalize them into more acceptable form (Dubisch 2008; Glass-
Coffin 2009). Hufford and Bucklin (2006) point out that spirituality 
is approached from a very psychological angle, as a “feeling” of the 
divine, whereas for many Americans (and Canadians, we might add), 
it is a matter of belief and personal experiences with spirits. For the 
Dene Tha, the source of waking dreams is exterior to humans; 
Goulet (1994: 32) sums up the gap between what these dreams mean 
 
5 I am not suggesting that Tanya Lurhmann (2011) defends a rationalist 
position as put forth by Lett or Lohman. However, she is caught, as are 
many anthropologists working with people of their own culture, with the 
impossibility of using cultural relativism as a convenient way to avoid the 
issue. In this predicament, she provides a rational explanation. 




for them and how doctors see them: “With my mind I know,’’ say 
the Dene Tha. ‘‘With your mind you hallucinate,’’ answer the 
physicians.” Crépeau (1997: 7) sees a similar gap between Lévi-
Strauss’ interpretation of the shaman’s efficacy and that of Quesalid, 
a principal informant of Franz Boas. For the former, Quesalid did 
not become a great shaman because he healed the sick who came to 
him; he healed them because he had become a great shaman. In 
Quesalid’s own view, he became a great shaman because he had an 
animal guide who helped him heal his patients. Koss-Chiono (2010) 
and Hufford (2010, 2005) remind us that what anthropologists treat 
as beliefs comes out of the experience of these groups. A re-
examination of ethnographic work in general would show how the 
unease evoked by “irrational” practices, phenomena and beliefs is 
distorted, masked, rationalized, obliterated and always at the expense 
of local propositions to which very little credence is given. 
 
This unease also arises from ethical considerations. Miller (2007) 
gives the example of an Amerindian intellectual who felt betrayed 
when, long after his fieldwork, an anthropologist declared himself an 
atheist and presented a number of practices of his community as 
improbable fantasies. A village inhabitant in northern Alaska pressed 
Edith Turner (1996) to say that his community’s practices and spirits 
were real. By what right, asks the author, do anthropologists decide 
whether a phenomenon is real or not? 
 
I faced this ethical issue while writing my thesis about Iban animism 
and I decided to avoid any rewriting or reinterpretation about the 
existence of invisible, sentient beings. I located the existence of 
invisible beings at the core of my interpretation of animism: my 
thesis raises the vexing question of the real, instead of shovelling it 
under a convenient, paternalistic cultural relativism. This attracted 
many negative comments, but my ethical argument stands at the very 
core of the entire anthropological endeavour. I received some hints 
that I should perhaps disclose any experience of my own that might 
have led me to believe in the existence of invisible beings. But the 
flat truth, apparently extremely hard to believe, is that I didn’t. My 
position was entirely based on the necessity to do justice to the 
people, to the data that I collected. At first, I was writing an analysis 
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that went from feeling wrong, to taking another direction, only to be 
faced with this same feeling; again and again. Until one day (and I 
can describe exactly when and where), it suddenly hit me: my 
interpretation was not truthful because it relied entirely on a hidden, 
implicit assumption about the non-existence of invisible beings. This 
was very much my unquestioned personal assumption, but most 
importantly an integral part of the basic conceptual toolbox of 
anthropology; i.e., the notion that spirits (and all irrational practices 
and beliefs) are a social and cultural construct, i.e. not part of “real 
reality”. I removed this assumption and could finally write my thesis, 
which ended up taking a cosmocentric approach. That is, an 
approach that posits the cosmos (including invisible beings) as the 
unit of analysis. 
 
I brought this background to the study of extraordinary experiences 
in non-indigenous, Canadian context. I was now faced with another 
challenge: I could not simply endorse any particular position of 
people on invisible beings (or other highly controversial notions) as 
being the norm. In a highly materialistic, rationalistic dominant 
context, extraordinary experiences never ceased to exist. But they 
are certainly not easily dealt with, neither among our institutions, 
media, psychiatry or more broadly, health disciplines, nor within the 
social sciences. People who have such experiences have to deal with 
this general denial, and occasionally, outright hostility. I think that at 
the very core of this tension lies a political battle over what is real. It 
is an ontological issue. My intention is neither to solve this issue 
(who could?), nor to take sides. Here I acknowledge my debt to 
cultural relativism, although I am appropriating it in a different way, 
without brushing aside the vexing question of the real. Rather, I seek 
to explore it. 
 
When working with such a topic, the anthropologist is summoned to 
clarify his or her position. Or more precisely, to consent to a position 
that most of the time is actually assumed to be true. When an 
anthropologist is drawn to this topic through personal experience, it 
should be made clear. This has happened to some eminent 
anthropologists whom I respect, but is not my experience, nor my 
position. I do not have a particularly clear position to defend; beyond 




this, I do indeed believe that the materialistic world of natural 
sciences, although extremely useful and fascinating in many aspects, 
is limited. Beyond this, I have many questions—far more questions 
than answers!—that I would like to explore in a serene way, outside 
of political battles. 
 
I thus enter the field of extraordinary experiences with a 
sympathetic, albeit perplexed approach. Hanegraaff (2013) 
approaches Western esoterism with perplexity; he recommends 
suspending judgement in an anthropological way. In my case, this 
means being perplexed and open to questioning, as well as 
sympathetic to what people’s experiences might tell us and how they 
might enrich our world. In this chapter, I will propose that we 
consider the extraordinary experiences lived by the Canadians I 
interviewed – most of them Québécois – not as belief systems, 
systems of representations, or visions of the world, but as ways of 
being in the world and accessing different dimensions of that world. 
In short, to consider them as an ontological experience, which calls 
into question the nature of the real.  
 
In the following section, I will draw upon ontological anthropology, 
a current that has been developing over the past two decades and is 
known mainly for revisiting animism. I will apply it to the field of 
extraordinary experience and will support this with concrete 
examples from two research projects conducted between 2009 and 
2013 where I examined extraordinary experiences, the meaning 
given to them, and the ways in which they are integrated by the 
Canadians, most of them Québécois whom I interviewed. Following 
this, I will address the question of the real. 
 
The Ontological Turn in Anthropology 
 
In the last few decades, we have seen the emergence of an 
“ontological turn” in anthropology (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastel 
2006). This “turn” derived initially from studies of hunter-gatherer 
societies and from the necessity of re-thinking animism; 
Schwimmer's 2004 and Clammer’s 2004 works are exceptions; mine 
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(2006) is about shifting agriculturists of Borneo. As defined by 
Clammer et al. (2004: 4): 
 
… No ontology is simply a system of knowledge; it is equally, as 
the term itself implies, an account of a way of being in the world and 
a definition through practice (and not only through cognition) of 
what that world is and how it is constituted. 
 
In other words, it is both a configuration of the world and a way of 
being in the world. In this chapter, I am mainly focusing on the first 
component of the definition of ontology: ways of inhabiting the 
world through extraordinary experience. 
 
The “ontological turn” (Henare et al. 2006) is in keeping with the re-
examination of the nature-culture dichotomy and its corollaries 
(dualisms of society-nature; animate-inanimate; humanity-animality; 
natural-supernatural; body-mind; subject-object; reason-instinct; 
perception-representation etc.) that was prominent in the 1980s, 
notably in the work of feminist authors (for instance Ortner 1974; 
Strathern 1980, 1991; Haraway 1991). It problematizes the first term 
of the nature-culture dichotomy and takes a radical shift in 
perspective as regards the second. “Nature” becomes an object of 
inquiry, and some authors call into question the predominant 
epistemological stance of “culture.” There is then an opening to 
explore “ways of being in the world”. Nevertheless, most of these 
approaches exhibit an uneasiness with any “spiritual” dimensions of 
“nature”, a far stretch from Western dominant ontology. 
 
A radical distancing from epistemology 
and a questioning of “nature” and its corollaries 
 
In general, the ontological turn posits itself against an anthropology 
centred around “worldviews”, which constitutes the contemporary 
anthropology of culture (Clammer et al. 2004). Viveiros de Castros 
(2009) expresses his frustration with the dominant trend whereby 
many ontological issues are treated as epistemological questions, as 
points of view or perspectives. 
 




Two authors put forward a very similar critique of the trap of 
cultural relativism, again, the dominant position in anthropology in 
relation to the nature-culture dichotomy. Ingold’s (1996, 2000) 
argument is now well known. It posits that a relativist, 
epistemological position presents itself as a way of respecting 
cultural diversity, while in fact ratifying Western naturalism. It 
champions the idea of a single nature – the object of study of natural 
sciences - on the basis of which a cultural plurality – the object of 
anthropology – has developed: 
 
It is apparently necessary, therefore, to distinguish between two 
kinds of versions of nature: ‘really natural’ nature (the object of 
study for natural scientists) and ‘culturally perceived’ nature’ (the 
object of study for social and cultural anthropologists). [...] In the 
formula ‘nature is culturally constructed,’ nature thus appears on 
two sides: on one as the product of a constructional process, on the 
other as its precondition (Ingold 1996: 118-119). 
 
Hence, cultural relativism “does not undermine but actually 
reinforces the claim of natural sciences to deliver an authoritative 
account of how nature really works” (Ingold 2000:15).  
 
Mol   (2002) puts forth a similar argument in a different field. She 
reminds us that the social sciences of medicine first granted 
medicine exclusivity over the body and disease, carving out a space 
of specific competence: illness; that is, the representation of the 
disease by the patient. Later on, researchers began to investigate 
disease as a medical construct, placing it in the realm of 
representations. This second step is what leads us to the current state 
of social studies of medicine, dominated by meanings and organized 
around what Mol calls perspectivalism6, the multiplicity of 
perspectives on disease. In perspectivalism, the words “disease” and 
“illness” are no longer used to contrast physical facts with personal 
experiences. “Instead, they differentiate between the perspectives of 
 
6 This should not be confused with Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism, i.e. 
the different points of view of the world from various human and non-
human subjects/persons (in connection with their bodies). 
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doctors, on the one hand, and those of patients on the other” (Mol 
2002, p. 10). But, as the author explains: 
 
In a world of meaning, nobody is in touch with the reality of 
diseases, everybody “merely” interprets them. There are different 
interpretations around, and “the disease” — forever unknown — is 
nowhere to be found. [...] In talk about meaning and interpretation 
the physical body stays untouched. All interpretations, whatever 
their number, are interpretations of. Of what? Of some matter that is 
projected somewhere. Of some nature that allows culture to attribute 
all these shapes to it. This is built into the very metaphor of 
“perspectives” itself. This multiplies the observer—but leaves the 
object observed alone. All alone. Untouched. (Mol 2002: 12) 
 
The first, fundamental shift in perspective introduced by ontological 
anthropology could be to question the unmarked and untouched pole 
of the nature-culture dichotomy and all it involves: nature, the body, 
illness…Several authors add a theoretical proposition to their 
position in regard to the nature-culture dichotomy. Clammer et al. 
suggest that ontological references (to nature, to the human being’s 
place in the universe, to notions of the self and the body, etc.) 
underlie the cultures that they inform, and are more fundamental 
than these cultures themselves (2004: 5-7). Thus, distinct ontological 
premises are the foundation for different systems (societal or 
cultural) and configurations of the world that are potentially 
conflicting. The work of the anthropologist is to shed light on these 
premises and open a space of dialogue between them (op. cit.). In the 
domain of re-readings of animism, Viveiros de Castro (1998) puts 
forward perspectivism, Ingold (2000) develops his dwelling 
perspective and Descola (2005) offers a typology of four ontologies 
based on their treatment of interiority/physicality. Mol (2002) 
suggests a praxeological ontology in the social sciences of medicine, 
whereas Straight (2007) proposes a semiotic ontology of miracles 
and extraordinary experiences. Hanere, Wastel and Holbraad (2006) 
argue for a methodology they call radical essentialism, which adopts 
local ontological premises. More recently, Latour (2016) proposed 
envisioning Gaia as animated by multiple agents. In short, a variety 
of streams form the core of this “ontological” anthropology. Beyond 
their diversity, all emphasize the necessity of questioning “nature” 




and its corollaries as a space that is mechanistic, neutral and inert, “a 
realm beyond human influence, a realm where, from a human 
perspective, events occur spontaneously” (Tanner 2004: 206). 
 
However, even though re-readings of animism emphasize (and 
rightly so) the necessity of problematizing nature, none of them 
applies this reasoning to invisible entities. In my work on Iban 
animism (Béguet 2006), I raised this issue: even though invisible 
entities are considered cultural constructs in the eyes of the 
anthropologist, they are seen by certain populations as empirical 
phenomena of the real. This disparity raises the question of the real, 
which is, it seems to me, the necessary corollary of an ontological 
approach. Henare et al. (2006) are of the same opinion, and propose 
that we take local propositions literally, such as “power is power.” 
Still, they tend to limit this suggestion to objects and categories of 
thought. Straight (2007) takes her own path via semiotics and offers 
an ontological approach that situates extraordinary experience in the 
real, beyond human cultural, psychological, and neurological 
products. 
 
Thus, ontological anthropology gives us the conceptual foundations 
to address the “natural” pole of the culture-nature dichotomy. Here, I 
will specifically focus on the mind-body dimension. Even if this 
road is seldom taken, it allows us to confront the question of the real, 
and at the same time, tackle the problem of taking other ontological 
premises into account, without betraying them – in particular, those 
that destabilize prevailing Western ontology. This chapter builds 
upon these thoughts, beginning with the example of contemporary 
alternative spiritualities. 
 
Ways of Inhabiting the World 
 
As Clammer and his collaborators note, to adopt an ontological 
approach is to move away from epistemology, from cultural 
representations and from what people think in order to explore, 
through practices not just cognition, the world in which they live and 
the ways they inhabit it. Poirier (2004) illustrates ways of inhabiting 
the world where ontologies are lived out and open on to “varieties of 
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true experiences”. She contrasts her experience of the wind in the 
Western Australian Desert, as an object exterior to her physical 
being, with that of her Aboriginal friend who “seems to be walking 
‘with’ the wind,” (a non-human entity), consubstantial to her as they 
both share a common ancestral essence. Poirier’s argument is in line 
with Ingold’s dwelling perspective.  
 
Ingold is specifically interested in going beyond the nature-culture 
dichotomy and explores the organism-person (both biological and 
cultural) as it is constituted through “progeneration,” i.e. “the 
continual unfolding of an entire field of relationships within which 
different beings emerge with their particular forms, capacities and 
dispositions” (Ingold 2000: 142). In this continual unfolding, contrary 
to the constructivist perspective:  “Apprehending the world is not a 
matter of construction but of engagement, not of building but of 
dwelling, not of making a view of the world but of taking up a view in 
it” (Ingold 1996: 121). 
 
 
The dwelling perspective is a fertile approach for exploring 
extraordinary experiences. The latter constitute modes of dwelling in 
the world indeed, as well as means of “taking up a view in it.” But, 
as we shall see, in the case of contemporary alternative spiritualities, 
they are part of a continual engagement with invisible dimensions of 
the world, within a universe made up of energy and vibrations and 
inhabited by invisible beings. 
 
Although they may not be anchored in an ontological anthropology, 
different bodies of literature can help tackle the question of 
inhabiting the world. The first is the literature on embodiment, which 
emerged as a response to anthropological theories overlooking the 
body (see Strathern 1991 for example), and proposes to reach 
beyond the body-mind dichotomy (Scheper-Hughes and Locke 
1987). It proposes an approach to the body that is mediated by 
culture, and thus allows sentience and sensibility to be introduced 
into the notion of culture (Csordas, ed., 1994). The concept of 
embodiment even becomes an investigative tool for the 
anthropologist (see, for example, Desjarlais 1994; Turner A. 2000; 




Samudra 2008). For more than twenty years, then, the body and 
incarnate experience have become a full-fledged field of study, 
bypassing the mind-body dichotomy. This interest in sentience and 
sensibility is normally limited to the usual senses – the five western 
senses, with the occasional addition of those considered significant 
in other local contexts. David Howes and his collaborators open a 
space of investigation for the “extra-senses”. 
 
Through a series of edited collections, David Howes sets out to 
“reclaim sensation as a domain for cultural inquiry” in order “to 
reveal the role all senses play in mediating cultural experience” 
(Howes 2009: 1). The Sixth Sense Reader is the sixth book in the 
series and, contrary to the others, it deals with that “extra-sense” that 
is not connected to any organ. It asks the questions, “What is the 
sixth sense?” “Is the sixth sense ESP, electromagnetic sensitivity, 
intuition, revelation, gut instinct, or simply unfathomable?” and this, 
in different cultures. It advocates a sensographic approach, grounded 
in sensory experience and expression:  
 
It begins by reintroducing the notion of the sensorium. Used 
interchangeably with the words brain and mind in the early modern 
period, sensorium straddles the divide between mind and body, 
cognition and sensation. The early modern usage both echoed the 
ancient doctrine of ‘the common sense’ and foreshadowed the 
attempt in the late modern period to overcome the classic Western 
split between mind and body through the forging of such concepts as 
‘the mindful body’ (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987) and ‘embodied 
mind’. (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1992) (Howes 2009: 221) 
 
The author defends the holistic capacity of this notion of the 
sensorium, which can include not only the five usual senses of the 
West (or the seven senses from Philo’s model), but also the “extra-
senses” as well as those employed in other cultures. This notion is 
very useful for my work. Let me emphasize, however, that it remains 
anchored in the mind-body dichotomy, a problem I will address at a 
later point. 
 
My work draws upon all the approaches presented above. I will 
suggest that extraordinary experiences are central to contemporary 
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spiritualities. They can be read as ways of being in the world that 
give access to subtle dimensions of the world as well as humans. As 




The life experiences presented in this paper were gathered as part of 
two research projects.7 They explored what I then called 
“experiences of the invisible” in modern societies (i.e. voices, 
visions, kinesthetic or tactile sensations, odours, vivid dreams, 
relationships with spirits...), the meaning attributed to them and the 
ways in which they are integrated by those who live them. It 
compares two groups, those who have had a psychiatric diagnosis 
and those who have not. 
 
I conducted a total of fifty-seven interviews with thirty-one people, 
of whom seven had had a psychiatric diagnosis and twenty-four had 
not. All were born and grew up in a “Western” cultural environment: 
twenty-six were Francophones from Québec, two were from 
Anglophone Canada, and three were immigrants from Europe (one 
from ex-Eastern Europe, one from the United Kingdom, and one 
from France). Twenty-seven were living in Quebec at the time of the 
interview, three in Ottawa, and one mainly in France, with frequent 
trips to her home in Quebec, where I met her. In this chapter, I will 
focus on the group that did not have any diagnosed psychiatric 
problems. It includes sixteen women and eight men, whose age 
ranged from thirty-two to seventy-seven at the time of the interview. 
 
The criteria for selection were (a) that participants were Westerners 
(non-Indigenous) who had had extraordinary experiences regularly 
for at least three years, but (b) not under the influence of drugs, (c) 
who had given these experiences meaning (any meaning) and (d) had 
 
7 The first research project was funded by the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada. I am very grateful for their 
support. The second was funded by the Alliance internationale de recherche 
universités cmmunautés Santé mentale et citoyenneté, support for which I 
am also thankful. 




integrated them into their lives. These premises made it clear that I 
was not aiming for an ethnography of any particular group, least of 
all a spiritual one – working on spirituality had not even crossed my 
mind at the time. It is astonishing, in fact, that I was directly led to 
contemporary alternative spiritualities with such a tenuous starting 
point. It is also, I think, very revealing of the centrality of 
“extraordinary experiences” in these spiritualities. As I will show, 
despite their strong individual qualities, the journeys of the 
participants, most of them unknown to each other, share marked 
similarities and a generally recognizable flavour that cuts across 
differences in sex, age, life history and socio-economic background. 
 
Participants were mostly recruited through word-of-mouth. They 
were invited for an average of two semi-structured interviews of two 
hours each, retracing their life history from the point of view of these 
extraordinary experiences. The interviews mostly took place in their 
homes between October 2009 and November 2010, with a few more 
in the summer of 2011, and others between February and May 2013. 
 
To supplement the interviews, I participated in several workshops, 
some given by research participants, others attended by them. In 
2010 I also began a course in energy healing every second weekend 
over a period of eight months. I stopped taking the course halfway 
through, at the point when I would have had to begin giving 
treatments. Overall, I spent about fifty days in various training 
courses. I also regularly consulted the participants in my research 
project who offered alternative spiritual therapies. In this way, my 
participation reflects the multiplicity of modalities and their possible 




In many ways, the journeys of the people I interviewed diverge 
significantly from those described by Tanya Luhrmann in her 
inspiring, beautifully presented ethnography, When God Talks Back 
(2012). These divergences can point to ethnographic differences 
(new religious movements for Luhrmann versus contemporary 
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alternative spiritualities here), differing anthropological positions, or 
a combination of the two. 
 
Indeed, Luhrmann’s aim is to “explain to nonbelievers how people 
[members of an Evangelist Congregation, the Vineyard] come to 
experience God as real” (2012: xv). She shows how the congregants 
strained to hear God and develop a concrete relationship with him by 
training their mind: first, by learning to hear the voice of God as 
something external, then by relating to Him as a person, and finally 
by feeling His presence and love and developing an intimate 
relationship with Him as a close friend. Prayers and other spiritual 
techniques are essential to this process. 
 
A first contrast between the experiences of my interviewees and the 
process Luhrmann describes is the way these experiences start. 
Whereas Luhrmann describes a slow and gradual learning of the 
presence of God, supported by specific techniques, the people I 
interviewed describe a sudden opening of the invisible world, 
usually early on in their lives, without the experience having been 
sought, or even necessarily welcomed. I should point out that my 
criteria for participants did not require them to have had 
extraordinary experiences during childhood. And yet, this was the 
experience of thirty-two out of the thirty-four people interviewed,  
which is consistent with what Pike (2004) found. Only two of the 
participants had their first extraordinary experience as adults after 
becoming interested in esotericism or contemporary spiritualities. In 
all other cases, the extraordinary experiences predated any interest in 
these areas. Finally, it was generally much later in life (with two 
exceptions), after the age of twenty-five, that participants began a 
spiritual journey linked to their experiences or, as was the case for 
thirteen of them, started a related professional activity (in their late 
30s or 40s). 
 
In this chapter, I will focus specifically on the perceptual aspect of 
extraordinary experiences in order to emphasize the way in which it 
constitutes an alternative way of being in the world. These 
experiences fall along a continuum, from a sensoriality that could be 
qualified as subtle (involving the body but also subtle organs of 




perception that parallel physical organs) to a sensoriality featuring 
the dissolution of material references of existence (body, time, 
space), which are replaced by other dimensions of the real – a 
vibratory and energetic world, rather than a material one. This 
continuum corresponds to different states of consciousness, tuned in 
to a greater or lesser degree to invisible realms, and it raises the 
question of the real and the constitution of the world. It is not for me 
to answer this question, of course, but simply to show the way in 
which it is apprehended by the people I met. 
 
From sensoriality to subtle perception 
 
The experiences recounted by participants are deeply embodied and 
linked to non-ordinary perception that involves subtle, non-physical 
organs. Sensoriality is very present in participants’ reports, as a few 
random examples will show, taken from different categories. 
 
Éloïse8 speaks of her conviction that the ringing telephone will bring 
news of her grandmother’s death, pointing to her belly, below her 
solar plexus. When I ask, she clarifies: “Yes, it was in my body.” 
During his genealogical and historical research, Nathaniel finds a 
novel that contains reference to one of his ancestors. 
 
And I was about to leave the store and I went outside and I stopped 
and froze and felt I couldn’t move. And I felt: “You have to go back 
into the store and you have to close the door. Because behind the 
door there is something for you.” So I went in, closed the door 
behind me and I looked. And there was a corner cabinet and there 
was a copy of the novel. On the counter. For sale. I knew of the 
book but I’d never seen it. 
 
Kevin describes the way in which he found the name for one of his 
companies: 
 
It was a Saturday morning and I was pouring myself a coffee. The 
inspiration came into me through the top of my head and went out 
 
8 All names are pseudonyms; excerpts from interviews have been edited for 
readability. 
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through my feet. I felt shivers through my whole body [and it was 
then that the name came to me]. 
 
Magalie and her son communicate regularly via telepathy. One 
night, while the child was sleeping over at a friend’s, he had an 
allergic reaction to the cat in the house. He came – energetically, not 
physically – to touch his mother as she slept, at her home, and woke 
her to tell her about what was happening. His mother explains: “I 
don’t know why, but he always has to touch me on my back.” The 
next day her son refused to talk about what had happened (with the 
cat), saying he had already done so during the night. 
 
Liliane recounts an experience from her childhood, when her 
mother’s boss’s maid announced that her daughter had a boyfriend. 
She looked at the young girl. 
 
It was as though time stopped, time stood still. Then all of a sudden 
I heard – but it filled up my mind entirely: “Christopher!” Not 
necessarily shouted, but with intensity. “Christopher.” You know. 
And I couldn’t say it at that moment. Often, and this would be 
confirmed later, when it was necessary to say it, it would do this. 
And often it would even repeat the words, insistently, until I 
couldn’t stand it anymore and I had to name the person. Whether I 
wanted to or not. And that’s what happened that time. [The 
boyfriend’s name was indeed Christopher]. 
 
Kevin experiences the same necessity to “give information” when he 
feels something “rise”: “When it rises [in me], it’s in my belly, it 
comes in through here.” 
 
When she was about ten years old, Éloïse had her first remarkable 
experience: 
 
One morning, I woke up with a start, I remember. And I sat up 
practically stiff as a board in my bed. Beside my sister’s bed, I saw, 
um, what I took at that moment to be an angel. A being of light [this 
is the contemporary vocabulary]. Then I remember rubbing my eyes 
hard and saying, “but it can’t be,” and seeing it, still perceiving it. 
 




Nathaniel sometimes reads objects, a capacity called telemetry. He 
does not have control over the experience, which comes to him 
occasionally, but he is able to hold an object or to go close to it and 
when he does, the whole of the object’s history rises in him. He gets 
“hit by the object,” he gets “a feel off the object.” 
 
Shortly after Liliane arrived in Canada from France, alone, without 
resources, and as the single mother of a young baby, she had an 
operation. While she was at the hospital, she had an “unusual” 
dream, though at the time she wasn’t immersed in “that world”. She 
found herself in an Asian temple before an enormous wooden door. 
She heard a question: “Will you open it?” All the other people in the 
temple looked at her, peacefully, but she was seized with terror as 
she realized that the question was addressed to her and that she 
would have to comply. She opened the door and saw an old woman, 
then watched as she regressed through all the ages – from elderly to 
middle-aged, to young woman, to child, to baby. 
 
And I know that it’s death and that it has come for me. And at that 
moment I wake up and the energy leaves from my head and goes 
down through my body. And I think, when it’s, like, below my 
knees [she gives a little laugh], that I knew I was going to die. Three 
in the morning at the hospital. And it’s like I negotiated with God in 
that moment. Actually, I yelled. At the time, survival was: if 
someone wants something, someone who’s tougher than you, you 
have to yell. So I yelled at God [laughs]. I said, “Oh, I can’t go now. 
I have a child and she’s alone in the world. You can’t do this to me.” 
And at that moment, instinctively, I started to fight, like this. [She 
hits her body, her limbs]. I didn’t know what I was doing – now I 
know that it was a way to bring energy back, a bit like doin [a 
Chinese technique]. 
 
Alerted by the noise, a nurse came in and told her that she must have 
left her body not quite all the way and come back. She calmed her 
down, but the cardiologist did some tests the next day and found that 
her blood pressure was extremely low. Liliane knows she would 
have been gone if she hadn’t reacted the way she did. 
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Anaïs’s first apartment had a strange feel to it: she felt like she was 
never alone, and was always being watched. The feelings intensified 
in her walk-in closet. One day, she fell asleep and: 
 
When I wake up, I’m in the air. I’m floating. Both hands are caught 
like this, both feet as well. Then I’m pretty much in the air. I’m not 
touching the couch anymore. It’s as though I were caught and put on 
a spit. You know, both feet and then both hands, then I was lifted up 
into the air. I couldn’t open my eyes, but I could see the whole 
room. But it was hazy. And finally it was like in astral projection. 
Vision isn’t the same in the astral world. [Panic seizes her.] And 
during this time, I feel myself being fondled. From every angle, on 
every side. Oh it’s disgusting! Then at a certain moment, I 
remember, I try to call for help. I can’t. [She cannot reach her 
cellphone either; she realizes she can only count on herself.] I 
remember thinking: “I’m going to call on all the power I have inside 
me and push it out. To be able to call on my inner Qi [energy] and 
then project it out like a weapon [inspired by Care Bears and 
Ninjas]. 
 
Anaïs cannot say whether she was physically or energetically in the 
air, but she fell and was finally free. The experience was as 
traumatizing as a rape. She spent two more weeks in the apartment, 
in a state of constant terror, sleeping with layers of clothes on, with 
the light on and in the acute awareness that “nothing can protect you 
from this.” 
 
At a certain point, I was taking a shower with my boyfriend and I 
started to be fondled in front of him. He witnessed it and he saw, he 
sensed, he felt that there was a third presence there and that 
something was going on. He looked at me and I said, “I’m not crazy, 
right?” There, he was right there, as paralyzed as me. And then, I 
said, “Hold me. Just hold me and protect me. Just put love all 
around me. Protect me like you’d protect a child.” I knew then that I 
had to leave that apartment. 
 
Energy can also be perceived physically. Naëlle is very sensitive to 
the energy of places, and feels it through a variety of sensations. 
When she was little, she would sometimes refuse to go into certain 
places or rooms in a house because she didn’t feel comfortable in 




them. She does not describe the places physically, but remembers 
very well the feelings they evoked in her. It’s an energetic thing, she 
says. 
 
Anaïs visited the Vatican with her class when she was fifteen. When 
she arrived in St. Peter’s square, she realized that the architecture 
was made in such a way as to create a star at the central point of the 
square. 
 
So, you go to the middle. But yeah, when I got to the middle, I felt 
like I was stepping into a stream of energy, a little like a fountain of 
water. And as soon as you step a little to either side, you feel the 
edge of the stream. […] I played with stepping in and out of it. And 
then I know that at a certain moment, it felt so good that I stayed in 
and took a deep breath. It’s like it was replenishing me. Ahhhh 
[inhalation]. A little like when it’s beautiful out and the air is pure. 
“Ah, I’m going to take a big drink of this.” Then you [inhalation], 
consciously, you know. So yeah, that’s what I did. 
 
One of the first exercises in a training course Liliane was taking 
consisted precisely in feeling energy. They did it in pairs – one 
person closed their eyes and began to slowly separate their hands out 
to the sides until they were about a foot and a half apart, while the 
other moves their hands silently. 
 
My energy is fierier, I’d say, hotter. And she had a clearer energy, 
more like water. So it was also cold. Which is curious. So, when she 
brought her hands close, I felt the movement. Then I said, “You’re 
near the left, you’re near the right.” 
 
At a certain moment, at the teacher’s silent indication, the person 
with their eyes open made a quick cutting motion with one hand 
between their partner’s two open hands. 
 
And my eyes were closed and I went, “Oh!” [Shout]. So you see 
how I felt it energetically. 
 
The frequency of extraordinary experiences increases considerably 
in the professional practice of those who work with energy. The 
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visions, voices, and sensations, etc. that they receive often concern 
their clients, and can lead to physical, psychic, and energetic 
ailments. 
 
If, for example, I start listening to what’s happening in someone’s 
body, I can feel it in my own body. I could say, for example: “So, 
did you hurt your left ankle? Because my left ankle hurts.” Then: 
“Yeah, I sprained my ankle etcetera, etcetera.” That happens often. 
But now I prefer to know at the start. I remember, among other 
times, a treatment I did – a young man. And then, it was like … I 
lost my breath, then had terrible pains in my back. You’ve just 
found the expression of a physical trauma, but sometimes it can take 
you by surprise. And I asked him after the treatment: “So, does your 
back hurt?” “Oh, I forgot to tell you, I was on a scaffolding and I 
fell, bam, my spine hit the edge of a wheelbarrow and I broke three 
vertebrae.” I had felt it, but it’s a bit unsettling when it’s at that level 
of intensity. 
 
These few examples – there are many others – illustrate the 
importance of the sensorium in extraordinary experiences: a 
sensorium with a broad palette, since all the people I spoke with had 
had experiences of several kinds (voices, visions, feelings, etc.). 
 
It never comes in through the same, through the same door. When I 
observe, I can place my gaze in one place, but I let information 
come in from all around. It doesn’t really matter where it wants to 
come in from. So, it could be through my ear. It could be through 
here, through emotions, feelings […]. It’s never the same. It depends 
on what I need in the moment when I need it. 
 
This perception is not limited to the five usual senses. For example, 
the skin is an extraordinary organ of perception, according to 
Solange. 
 
It’s because the skin is the same membrane that goes inside and 
surrounds the organs. That we call the fascia. And there’s no 
separation anywhere. So, if I hear or if I pick up something, it comes 
directly to the inside. You hear it on the outside, on the inside. 
 




Another aspect to note is that, even though people use the same 
vocabulary to talk about perceptions as they would about their 
organic senses, the perceptions are somehow different. When she 
was suspended in the air above her couch, the surroundings appeared 
hazy to Anaïs (see excerpt above), similar to what she would 
experience later, in the astral plane. In the same way, when I asked 
Éloïse to describe the angel she saw beside her sister, she 
emphasizes that the density and opacity were not the same. Anaïs 
explains these perceptual differences to me: 
 
And the difference with normal vision is a matter of density. The 
only thing, I’d say, is that you have the impression that matter is less 
dense. It’s like when you look at a cloud. Or smoke. You see the 
smoke, but it’s less dense. 
 
When she was very young, Anaïs used to play several games: 
 
When I was young – I realize that when I was young, what 
fascinated me was when rays of sunlight came into the house – you 
could see dust in the empty space. So I played at trying to see the 
dust without the light. And that’s when I realized that there were – 
in the air, invisible – different consistencies. And a mote of dust is 
actually solid. And yet, you and I look at each other and we don’t 
see any of that. I’m sure that if I took the time to look here, after a 
while I’d say: “There’s dust, there’s a consistency.” That’s when I 
also learned to “unfocus” and to see the invisible. It’s that at a 
certain moment, you start to pay attention to it. 
 
She tried the same sort of exercise with gas fumes, with and without 
the sun, with the heat from the pavement, or the wind, which we can 
perceive by following the movement of leaves, for example. This 
was how she worked on what she calls “unfocusing,” like a sort of 
ocular gymnastics, without even knowing that in doing so, she was 
developing her ability to perceive the invisible. 
 
As I learned in the workshops I attended, similar exercises include 
staring at both index fingers held out in front of you, or looking at a 
vague area around people in order to see their auras appear. Thus, 
the eye learns to focus on a space that is à priori “empty,” 
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somewhere where it would not normally focus; for example, midway 
between yourself and a wall. Another way of saying it is to “blur” 
your gaze; according to a presenter in one of the workshops, this 
means synchronizing the two hemispheres. 
 
These exercises begin to develop are the subtle senses, as distinct 
from those that associated with biological organs.9  
 
There is “seeing,” which is organic. We have an organ called the 
eye. And it can transmit data from the outside to the brain and all 
that. It’s the most amazing organ. It’s the organ of light. Without 
light, we can’t look at anything. And looking at things happens with 
the organ, but seeing means going beyond this. Hearing is organic. 
You might say listening is the most subtle of the senses. Higher, you 
might say. 
 
To illustrate this idea, Solange relates about an experience she had in 
her early twenties with a young woman who had been deaf since 
birth, and who came sometimes to watch her play piano. 
 
I told her: “You have to stop watching me. You have to hear me, 
you have to listen to me. Take off your shoes. Go ahead, listen.” It 
took her three weeks. I still get so emotional when I talk about this. 
After three weeks, she could sing “Frère Jacques.” In a clear voice, 
in key. Because I got her to memorize the vibration of each note 
with her feet. 
 
Also, by touching Solange’s throat and her own for each note, the 
young woman, who had never spoken because she was deaf, learned 
to reproduce a sound that she could not hear. 
 
With this example, Solange points to an essential passageway 
between the visible, audible world (that of sound vibrations) and the 
invisible world (that of subtle vibrations). It is beyond the scope of 
this article to address how this invisible universe is constructed and 
 
9 It is significant that the only participant with olfactory perceptions has a 
very ordinary sense of smell, and her nose is often blocked. 
 




perceived: it is a complex subject, and the people I spoke with do not 
all have an articulate and coherent theory about it, nor do they 
necessarily have the same points of reference. Rather than seeing 
this as problematic, it seems to me that it confirms the primacy of 
experience over beliefs and ideas. I will therefore keep to a basic 
summary here, which links several participants’ experiences without 
there necessarily being a consensus, in order to briefly touch upon 
the ontological premises these experiences point towards. 
 
In this ontology, which is shared by most of my informants, the 
universe is made up of vibrations and energies of various densities – 
the former being the manifestation of the movements of the latter. 
These energies stretch out across a continuum, from most dense 
(matter, which is densified energy, the everyday world that human 
beings inhabit) to most pure (God, ultimately, or, in contemporary 
language, the Source), with gradations incarnated by invisible 
sentient beings of various densities. The continuum is also expressed 
in vibrational levels from lowest (that of matter) to highest (that of 
pure energy). Every being, every object emits a vibration, and every 
action, every event, leaves a trace (also a vibration) in the energetic 
world. 
 
Thus, perceiving the invisible means going beyond light, sounds, 
odours, and physical sensations—beyond the physical world of 
naturalists—to pick up a vibration or an energy. These vibrations can 
be that of God, of an invisible entity, a place, a living being or an 
“inanimate” object (rocks, precious or semi-precious stones, objects, 
houses…), an event, present or past. All this is expressed in the form 
of a vision, a voice, a feeling, an odour, etc. according to the 
person’s perceptual mode and goes hand in hand with different states 
of consciousness. 
 
From Attention to a Different State of Consciousness 
 
Perceiving the invisible is an attitude, a particular way of looking at 
the world and, ultimately, a different state of consciousness. Certain 
key words are recurrent in participants’ accounts: “observing”, 
“paying attention”, “being aware of”, being “open,” “receptive”, 
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“relaxing into it” – all of which qualify this particular way of looking 
at the world. They also lead us towards different states of 
consciousness. 
 
Several participants emphasize the importance of observation. 
Solange describes herself as a meditative child who was often 
observing: “I was a little on the outside. I had a lot of friends but I 
was always a little on the outside because I was often observing. I 
understood many things, too, but I didn’t talk about them.” For 
example, when she was five years old, she observed as a neighbour 
drowned her cat. She explains nearly sixty years later that she saw 
what was happening on an energetic level, even if her memories are 
vague: “I probably also saw what happens when life is over, then. 
There was something else. It doesn’t just stop there.” This 
observation has to be without judgment, without prejudice. It 
becomes natural. 
 
Another participant explains that extraordinary experiences don’t 
happen for everyone; still, the invisible manifests itself to everyone 
in different forms through little “coincidences,” “serendipity”, 
certain events, etc. We just have to pay attention. 
 
Oh things like the little things. I mean, these are things that happen 
to everybody. It’s just that some people pay more attention to it than 
others. Like, I don’t have any special gift, I am just a normal being 
like everybody else who’s more aware of what’s going on.  
 
Awareness is a broad view of life, as Nathaniel explains: “It’s almost 
as if I felt that people were restricted. It’s almost like people were 
watching life through a TV screen. I was watching it in a live 
theatre. There is so much going on.” Nathaniel takes pleasure in this 
large theatre – he “relax[es] into it.” Several participants express 
similar ideas, stating that when they put themselves in a good state 
of mind, a state of receptivity, the experiences come to them – the 
invisible manifests itself. It’s also possible to ask questions and 
“make requests”; the answers always come, even if people do not 
know how to hear them or do not wish to. 
 




Perception of the invisible is thus a state of mind, but a “grounded” 
one, anchored in the body and the subtle senses. Cécile explains, 
using movements of her hands for emphasis, that it is also a physical 
posture: “And my whole body is there in those moments. Because I 
hear voices. Each time I’m aligned on the earth-sky axis, vertical-
horizontal (whenever she stands up). It’s very intense.” Being 
anchored in the tangible is important for several of the people I 
interviewed – they explain that they need to be able to search deep 
into the subtle aspect of the information they receive, then bring this 
information back into the concrete world. It is like an elastic 
stretched taut between the subtle and the concrete. 
 
There are techniques that help facilitate this state, depending on the 
person, including meditation, walks in nature, exercises, relaxation. 
They do not create the experience: they simply help produce a state 
of receptivity and connection with the invisible. It is not a matter of 
mind techniques aimed at a specific result (for example, to hear the 
voice of God, as in the case of Luhrmann’s ethnography), but rather 
techniques to calm the mind in order to let something else emerge: to 
allow the invisible to manifest itself, unimpeded. 
 
Perceiving the invisible is thus a matter of attitude, openness and 
availability that goes as far as different states of consciousness. 
Anaïs says, for example, about the assault she experienced while on 
her couch: 
 
No, I was conscious of having experienced something in an altered 
state. In a way, I was completely here, but I was conscious of being 
in an altered state during the assault. So for me, there were really 
two [states of consciousness]. It was clear to me that this was true. 
[Other experiences highlighted this difference for her.] I felt the 
difference between the two states, as I felt Saint Peter’s [square in 
Rome], when I went in and out [of the stream that coincided with 
the centre of the square]. I felt the same kind of vibrational 
difference there. 
 
In the same way, she felt changes in energy within her on several 
different occasions. One happened when she was seven years old. 
Her mother, struggling with depression, decided to end her life, but 
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did not want to leave her three daughters behind. So she put them to 
bed, closed all the windows in the house and the garage, and rigged 
the vacuum cleaner to draw exhaust from the car as she sat in it with 
the motor on. Anaïs was asleep in her room when: 
 
A halo of light appeared on the edge of my bed and something spoke 
to me, woke me from my sleep. I woke up like a shot. And then I 
wasn’t seven anymore; I knew we were in danger. And I became 
this force that I’m speaking of that is bigger than me, that knows 
more than me. I found my mother downstairs in the car and I opened 
the garage door to let the air in. I pulled the car door open and found 
my mother unconscious. I screamed at the top of my lungs “You’re 
a bad mom.” So I was conscious of what was happening. My mother 
came partially back to consciousness and I saw that she had turned 
the car off. But she couldn’t walk. I went back upstairs and found 
my two sisters unconscious. I kicked the screens out of the windows. 
I took my two sisters to the window and put their heads outside, then 
pinched them hard in the back so they would take a breath. And they 
woke up. 
 
She has no control over this force; she cannot summon it at will, but 
“this energy comes out” of her in certain situations. For example, she 
knew immediately what to do when her grandfather was hospitalized 
in a coma after an operation, his chances for survival uncertain. 
 
There’s a gradation in these different states of consciousness that 
Solange explains ranges from intuition to a state of trance. She goes 
into these states regularly through her work in the energy field. In 
the first case (intuition) she is entirely conscious of herself, of her 
body, of what she’s saying: she is “shown” flashes; information is 
“communicated” to her. She speaks of it as being like channelling. In 
the trance state – that some people call channelling – she is perfectly 
articulate and acts normally, but she’s not there, she is “gone, 
unstuck”. She receives information that she has to transmit, but 
usually has no memory of what she has said. This state is visible to 
others through a change in the colour of her eyes. She herself has 
seen this different state in her teacher, through a similar change in 
her eyes. In this state, which can last for a teaching day, she loses 
consciousness of her body, of her physical needs (she makes notes 




for herself to remind her to go to the washroom, to eat, etc.) and of 
time. She must not be interrupted when she’s speaking because that 
can bring her back abruptly and “it makes me descend from a higher 
vibration too quickly, it’s too much.” 
 
Finally, a third form, more radical still, consists in being possessed 
by an invisible entity – a phenomenon that, like the trance state, is 
well known in anthropology but is usually studied in other cultures. 
Solange does not want to go into this state because she sees it as too 
painful. Another participant accepts it at times, in certain 
circumstances. A third person feels she was pushed into it. In 2010, 
she decided to organize sessions inspired by family constellations 
therapy.10 In the middle of one séance, she was violently pushed to 
the floor and then got up, sounding different, and announced a 
change in program. Three different entities had possessed her in 
order to allow for spiritual healing. In the interview, we came back 
to this event that I witnessed and for which she was not prepared. 
 
The [first] healing entity, well, it was Joshua who came. It was 
vibrating. I was having a hard time holding the energies. When the 
second one came, it was more so. But the energies were strong. 
When he left, the next one came in. I wasn’t very conscious. It’s like 
there was another person inside me, inside my body. This person 
didn’t have a physical body, but had energy. Then they start thinking 
for you, right. How can I say it? They think. It’s like they take 
control of your physical body and then of your mind. You saw the 
way I spoke, I was having a hard time. The brain has a hard time 
adjusting, speaking. Even the physical body. I had a hard time just 
moving. 
 
This continuum of different states of consciousness – from 
maintaining consciousness of one’s environment, to losing this 
consciousness because the mind is elsewhere, or even to being 
possessed by an invisible entity – is well known in anthropology. 
 
10 This is a method of transgenerational family therapy created in the 1990s 
by Bert Hellinger, based on uncovering and resolving unconscious family 
conflicts through psychodrama.  
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There are numerous examples throughout the world. What is 
significant in the Canadian context, and possibly different from 
many other non-Western contexts, is that the explanations common 
to those I interviewed always involve a continuum of different states 
of energy and vibration.11 
 
In basic terms, according to this perspective, humans function and 
perceive the world at a certain vibrational level, which is higher or 
lower according to the person. “Beings of light” or guides, in 
contemporary vocabulary, are invisible entities with much higher 
vibrational levels. In order for communication to be possible, they 
lower their vibrational level in order to enter the world of matter and 
come closer to humans, potentially to possess bodies. The other 
option, for humans, is to raise their vibrational levels and “purify” 
themselves. Purification here consists in freeing oneself from 
suffering, from one’s wounds, one’s Ego, and one’s 
transgenerational story, etc. This leads us to the importance of 
progress and personal growth, which I am not able to address within 
the limits of this article.  
 
For the same reason, I will not go deeper into various techniques and 
regular practices that allow people to raise their vibrational levels. 
They fall under the same category as what Foucault (1982: 16, 
original in French) calls “spirituality” – that is, “the set of these 
researches, practices, and experiences, which may be: purifications, 
ascetic practices, renunciations, conversions of looking, 
modifications of existence, etc.”. These constitute not knowledge, 
 
11 As Marie-Françoise Guédon remarked in a symposium I attended, this 
kind of explanation is not present among Canadian indigenous peoples who 
tend to experience such phenomena not in terms of energies, but as 
manifestations of spirits. Similarly, the Iban of Borneo have a notion of 
invisible, sentient beings, being more or less close or far away from humans, 
but this is never conceived as anything resembling what is called “energy” 
in Western spiritualities. Let us note, nevertheless, that the term “energy” 
made his appearance, alongside with “spirits”, in some contexts, such as 
videos of internationally known Shipibo shaman, Guillermo Arévalo. 
 




but the conditions for access to the truth, in philosophical language. 
In certain currents of contemporary spirituality, such practices help 
to elevate vibrational levels and, concomitantly, provoke an 
expansion of consciousness. The object of this is not the processes in 
and of themselves, but rather the link between them and 
consciousness. 
 
Liliane explains that, very early on in her training, she began a 
professional energy healing practice: “This raised my vibrational 
level and all my fields of consciousness.” The number and frequency 
of extraordinary experiences that she experienced exploded, but 
remained confined from then on to the context of consultations, for 
the most part. Quentin took a course with someone who is always at 
a very high vibrational level. He experiences this himself when he 
gives a spiritual healing session. When he is in a high vibrational 
state, the information about the person flows in (by way of voices, 
visions, sensations, and intuitions), necessary gestures and words 
come easily, and the immediate environment fades. This allows him 
to be completely present for the person and completely in the present 
moment. In this higher energetic state, the material, physical and 
temporal planes of existence give way to another experience of the 
real. 
 
In sum, perceiving the invisible is an attitude, a way of looking at 
things, but also a question of the field of consciousness, which is 
directly linked to the person’s vibrational level. Perception of the 
invisible thus happens on a continuum that stretches from 
profoundly embodied sensorial experience to a loss of consciousness 
of the human physical and material plane and one’s environment. 
The common thread along this continuum is, in fact, subtle 
perception, carried out at higher or lower levels of energy and in 
varying states of consciousness. What they perceive then and their 
modes of access raise the question of the real right from the start.  
 
The Question of the Real  
 
Participants had very different initial reactions to their experiences. 
Some felt fear, doubt, perplexity, asking themselves if they’d gone 
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crazy; some tended to dismiss these experiences, usually by 
rationalizing them with psychological explanations; others – 
although very few - embraced the esoteric possibilities of these 
experiences right from the start, without necessarily speaking of 
them publicly, nor even “doing” anything specific with them. 
Whatever their initial reaction in relation to their extraordinary 
experiences, all eventually converge on this point: the real is not that 
of naturalism and materialism. 
 
Laje insists on the fact that “I draw the other side; I know it exists.” 
Liliane speaks of a peak experience as a crucial moment:  
 
And from the moment of that experience onward, I could never deny 
that there was something other than what we experience in everyday 
life. In our… our reality. That there was something else. Because 
that, that was truly experiential. 
 
Anaïs is sure, after having seen and felt her grandfather at the church 
during his funeral, that life after death exists. After having lived 
several situations that confirmed the accuracy of his experiences, 
such as finding the book, as described earlier, Nathaniel concludes: 
 
If your intuition fills you, just as I told you about the book in the 
store, your intuition fills you that there is somebody in the room and 
you cannot deny it … it would now be almost rude to deny it. It’s in 
your face and it worked before. So, you acknowledge the presence. 
 
In other cases, when the accuracy of premonitions, visions or non-
ordinary perceptual phenomena is borne out, it reinforces the trust in 
other possibilities. 
 
Only two people use the term “belief” in the interviews – for 
example when they confirm that, “I do believe in guides.” It is, 
however, their experiences that support their belief, not the reverse. 
All the other participants go so far as to reject this terminology: it is 
not a matter of beliefs; it is a matter of fact, of repeated experiences 
that give them access to the invisible. Two people stress that beliefs 
are limits that prevent us from fully grasping the extent of human 
capacities. In Simon’s words: “It’s right to work at removing beliefs. 




Because for me, a belief is a limit. If you believe in one thing, it 
means you don’t believe in another. You exclude the rest, thus a 
belief is a limit.” In short, this world is not governed by belief but by 
experience and testing. Many of the participants insist on this, and 
even invite skeptics to have their own experiences. “Don’t believe it, 
try it” is an important leitmotif for several of them. 
 
In other words, these experiences are part of a way of inhabiting the 
world which, contrary to prevailing modernist norms, is not 
dominated by reason and human cognitive faculties. This does not 
mean, of course, that they are irrational, but rather that they draw 
upon different human dimensions: the capacity to raise one’s 
vibrational level and enter different states of consciousness that 
favours observation, awareness, and the manifestation of subtle 
dimensions of the world. These experiences thus constitute a 
privileged access to a distinct configuration of the world, one that 
people integrate progressively, and which become different ways of 




Doing justice to these extraordinary experiences is a complex and 
delicate affair. Indeed, they raise the question of the real, a real that 
is different from that of naturalists, which even the most well-
meaning authors obscure in their theories by implicitly reaffirming 
the dominant ontology. This is the case of Luhrmann, for example, 
for whom one central theme is explaining how educated people 
believe in something that is not materially there. Through a set of 
practices,  “What is absent to the senses is present in the mind,” and 
this allows people to “experience a real, external, interacting living 
presence” (Luhrmann 2012: xxii).  
 
 
12 Note that this affirmation does not imply a fixed and immutable world 
that would always be perceivable in the same way and could thus be 
substituted for naturalists’ “nature.”  
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To say this is not to say that God is an illusion. I am pointing out the 
obvious: that the supernatural has no natural body to see, hear, or 
smell (Luhrmann 2012: xxii). 
 
What I have tried to demonstrate in this article is that if the 
supernatural has indeed no “natural body”, it can nevertheless be 
seen, heard, smelled, or felt through the subtle eye (the third eye), 
subtle ear (the cosmic ear) and any other subtle perceptions. This is 
precisely what I mean by a different way of inhabiting the world, or 
one could say, inhabiting a different world entirely – a world made 
of energies and vibrations that are perceivable. Thus it is not a matter 
of working on the mind in order to make present that which does not 
have material reality, but rather of making oneself available and 
attentive to subtle dimensions of the world, the reality of which 
becomes tangible to participants as they continue to experience 
them. 
 
These subtle perceptions are anchored in the body and sometimes 
borrow its language; and yet, they also go beyond it. They go hand 
in hand with a different state of consciousness that cannot be limited 
to the mind – a consciousness that does not necessarily reside in the 
mind (Jaynes 2000). In other words, this phenomenon does not stem 
from a theory of the mind of the sort that Luhrmann suggests, but 
rather from a theory of consciousness. This complex field is the 
subject of numerous debates that I cannot address in this article. I 
will simply emphasize the point that interests me here in relation to 
the ontological question. This awareness, this consciousness, 
involves the body and the mind, without residing exclusively in one 
or the other, or even in one or the other at all. It only has meaning in 
a world that is much more than the sum of body and mind – one that 
includes other dimensions, such as energy and vibration – a world 
that is clearly very different from that of naturalists. 
 
In other words, it is necessary but insufficient to try and reunite that 
which is separated by a foundational dualism in the dominant 
Western ontology – in this case, body and mind – whether through 
the notion of a mindful body, of an embodied mind, or of a 
sensorium. Rather, we must open a conceptual space for experiences 




that encompass both notions without becoming limited to either one. 
This space, in the case of contemporary spiritualities, stems from 
consciousness, awareness to subtle dimensions of the universe. It is 
embedded in an alternative ontology, an ontology in which the world 
is made up of vibrations and energies that humans can pick up in 
various forms. In this context, the question is not to work on the 
mind, making present what is not, but rather of raising the 
vibrational field and the consciousness that goes along with it in 
order to perceive subtle phenomena that arise from another empirical 
reality. 
 
For the overwhelming majority of participants, this reality is 
perceived through experience. It is not the result of pre-existing 
beliefs that might bring about the experience. For people who live it, 
this experience constitutes empirical proof of a different reality, as 
James (1901) pointed out, and as Hufford (2005 and infra) echoes. 
 
In truth, the question is complex, because the term “belief” is 
widespread in contemporary spiritualities through the influence of 
psychology. But if we limit ourselves to manifestations of the 
invisible dimensions of the world, the issue is not believing in them, 
but opening oneself to them, perceiving them, becoming conscious 
of them. In other words, one passes from one ontological order to 
another; one passes from a naturalist configuration to a one imbued 
by energy and vibrations; at the same time, one passes from one way 
of inhabiting the world to another, using reason and reliance on what 
is measurable and duplicable, on the one hand, and going by 
perceptual experiences and connections with the invisible, on the 
other. 
 
This way of inhabiting the world evokes Ingold’s dwelling 
perspective. Indeed, it is extremely helpful for liberating our theories 
and concepts from the dominance of constructivism and 
intellectualism/rationality, and engaging fully with the world. To use 
his approach in the context of extraordinary experiences, it is 
possible to speak of engagement with the world through these 
experiences. However, to do justice to the engagement of those I 
interviewed, we must be able to consider a world that is imbued with 
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energy and vibrations and inhabited by invisible beings as empirical 
phenomena. In other words, to do justice to their experiences, it is 
not enough to transcend the nature-culture dichotomy through an 
attentive engagement with the world; one must also transport oneself 
into a world replete with the spiritual, not as a cultural product (or 
that of a popular subculture), but as an empirical phenomenon.  
 
On the basis of these premises, their extraordinary experiences, 
ranging from the most socially acceptable (intuition, for example, or 
premonition) to those that are most destabilizing (relationships with 
invisible beings, voices…) are all forms of “connection”, of 
“contact”, of “access to”, of “receptivity” and “consciousness” of 
“the other world,” “the other side,” of these empirical but invisible, 
intangible dimensions of the universe. (All terms in quotation marks 
are those of participants.) It is important to stress here that it is not a 
different world, but various dimensions of the same world in which 
we are all living. 
 
Consequently, doing justice to contemporary alternative spiritualities 
requires more than getting past the nature-culture dichotomy and its 
derivatives. It is to reinstate spirituality not as a cultural product, but 
as an empirical experience of the world. In brief, as a cornerstone of 
an alternative ontology. The issue is not to determine who is right 
and who is wrong, nor, to even wish that one side were right and the 
other wrong. The issue is simply to bring these tensions to light, in 
order that we might stop imposing – usually unconsciously – 
materialist ontological premises on contemporary spiritualities. It 
becomes possible to see, then, as Clammer and his collaborators 
point out in other contexts, that the current tensions around these 
spiritualities and extraordinary experience reflect fundamental 





Béguet, Véronique, 2006, Des entités invisibles qui font vivre les humains. 
Une approche cosmocentrique de la différenciation et de la préséance et 




leur articulation à l’égalitarisme chez les Iban de Sarawak (Malaysia). 
Université Laval, Québec, Ph.D. thesis. 
Clammer, John, Sylvie Poirier and Eric Schwimmer (eds.), 2004, Figured 
Worlds: Ontological Obstacles in Intercultural Relations. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Clammer, John, 2004, “The Politics of Animism,” In J. Clammer, Poirier S. 
and É. Schwimmer (eds.), Figured Worlds: Ontological Obstacles in 
Intercultural Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 83-109. 
Crépeau, Robert, 1997, “Le chamane croit-il vraiment à ses manipulations et 
à leurs fondements intellectuels?,” Recherches amérindiennes au 
Québec 27 (3-4) : 7-17. 
Csordas, Thomas, 1994, Embodiment and Experience: The Existential 
Ground of Culture and Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Descola, Philippe, 2005, Par-delà nature et culture. Paris: NRF Gallimard. 
Dubisch, Jill, 2008, “Challenging the Boundaries of Experience, 
Performance and Consciousness: Edith Turner’s Contribution to the 
Turnerian Project,” in Graham St John (ed.), Victor Turner and 
Contemporary Cultural Performance. New York: Berghahn Books, p. 
324-337. 
Glass-Coffin, Bonnie, 2009, “Balancing on Interpretive Fences or Leaping 
into the Void. Reconciling Myself with Castaneda and the Teaching of 
Don Juan,” in Betsy Hearne and Roberta S. Trites, A Narrative 
Compass. Stories that Guide Women’s Lives. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, p. 57-67. 
Goulet, Jean Guy, 1994, “Dreams and Visions in the Other Lifeworlds,” in 
David Young and Jean-Guy Goulet (eds.), Being Changed: The 
Anthropology of Extraordinary Experiences. Peterborough: Broadview 
Press, p.16-38. 
Greenfield, Sidney, 2003, “Can Supernaturals Really Heal? A View of 
Science that Shows How They Might,” Anthropological Forum 13 (2): 
151-158. 
Hanegraaff, Wouter, 2013, Western Esotericism: A Guide for the Perplexed. 
London: Bloomsbury Academics. 
Henare, Amiria, Martin Holbraad and Sari Wastell, 2006, Thinking Through 
Things. : Theorizing Artefacts Ethnographically. London, Routledge. 
Howes, David (ed.), 2009, The Sixth Sense Reader. Oxford: Berg. 
51                                                                         Ways of Being in the World 
                                
 
 
Hufford, David, 2010, “Visionary Spiritual Experiences in an Enchanted 
World,” Anthropology and Humanism 35 (2): 142-158. 
Hufford, David, 2005, “Sleep Paralysis as Spiritual Experience,” 
Transcultural Psychiatry 42 (1): 11-45.  
Hufford, David, and Annamarie Bucklin, 2006, “The Spirit of the Spiritual 
Healing in the United States,” in Koss-Chioino and P. Heffner (eds.), 
Spiritual Transformations and Healing. Lanham: Altamira Press, p. 25-
42. 
Ingold, Tim, 2000, The Perception of the Environment: Essays on 
Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. New York: Routledge. 
Ingold, Tim, 1996, “Hunting and Gathering as Ways of Perceiving the 
Environment,” in Roy Ellen and Katsuyoshi Fukui (eds.), Redefining 
Nature: Ecology, Culture and Domestication. Oxford and Washington 
DC: Berg, p. 117-155. 
Koss-Chioino, Joan, 2010, “Introduction to ‘Do Spirits Exist? Ways to 
Know’,” Anthropology and Humanism 35 (2): 131-141. 
Latour, Bruno, 2016, Face à Gaïa. Paris: Les empêcheurs de tourner en rond. 
Laughlin, Charles, 2011, Communing with the Gods: Consciousness, 
Culture and the Dreaming Brain. Brisbane: Daily Grail.  
Laughlin, Charles, 1994, “Psychic and Transpersonal Experience: A 
Biogenetic Account of the Tibetan Dumo Yoga Practice,” in David 
Young and Jean-Guy Goulet (eds), 1994, Being Changed: The 
Anthropology of Extraordinary Experience. Peterborough: Broadview, 
p. 99-134. 
Lett, James, 1997, “Science, Religion, and Anthropology,” in Stephen D. 
Glazier, Anthropology of Religion: A Handbook. Westport; Greenwood, 
p. 103-120. 
Lohman, Roger, 2003a, “Introduction ‘Naming the Ineffable’,” 
Anthropological Forum 13 (2): 117-124. 
Lohman, Roger, 2003b, “The Supernatural is Everywhere: Defining 
Qualities of Religion in Melanesia and Beyond,” Anthropological 
Forum, 13 (2): 175-185. 
Lurhmann, Tanya M., 2012, When God Talks Back: Understanding the 
American Evangelical Relationship with God. New York: Vintage 
Books. 




Lurhmann, Tanya M., 2011, “Hallucinations and Sensory Overrides,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology 40: 71-85. 
Miller, Bruce, 2007, “The Politics of Ecstatic Research,” in Jean-Guy 
Goulet and Bruce Miller (eds.), Extraordinary Anthropology: 
Transformations in the Field. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, p. 186-
207. 
Mol, Annemarie, 2002, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Ortner, Sherry, 1974, “Is Female to Male What Nature Is to Culture?,” in 
Michelle Z. Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (eds.), Woman, Culture, and 
Society. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, p. 68-87.  
Poirier, Sylvie, 2004, “Ontology, Ancestral Order, and Agencies among the 
Kukatja of the Australian Western Desert,” in John Clammer, Sylvie 
Poirier and Eric Schwimmer (eds.), Figured Worlds: Ontological 
Obstacles in Intercultural Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, p. 58-82. 
Rose, Deborah B., 2007, “Recursive Epistemologies and an Ethics of 
Attention”, in Jean-Guy Goulet and Bruce Miller (eds.), Extraordinary 
Anthropology: Transformations in the Field. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, p 88-102. 
Schepher-Hughes, Nancy and Margaret Locke, 1987, “The Mindful Body: A 
Prolegomenon to Future Work,” Medical Anthropology 1 (1): 6-41. 
Straight, Bilinda, 2007, Miracle and Extraordinary Experience in Northern 
Kenya. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Strathern, Marilyn, 1980, “No Nature, No Culture: The Hagen Case,” in 
Carol MacCormak and Marilyn Strathern (eds.), Nature, Culture and 
Gender. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 174-222. 
Strathern, Marilyn, 1991, Partial Connections. New York: Altamira Press. 
Tanner, Adrian, 2004, “The Cosmology of Nature, Cultural Divergence, and 
the Metaphysics of Community Healing,” in John Clammer, Sylvie 
Poirier and Eric Schwimmer (eds), 2004, Figured Worlds. Ontological 
Obstacles in Intercultural Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, p. 189-222. 
Tedlock, Barbara, 2011, “La décolonisation et le double langage du rêve,” 
Anthropologie et societies 35 (3): 43-62. 
53                                                                         Ways of Being in the World 
                                
 
 
Turner, Edith, 2006, “Advances in the Study of Spirit Experiences: Drawing 
Together Many Threads,” Anthropology of Consciousness, 17 (2): 33-6. 
Turner, Edith, 1996, The Hands Feel It. Healing and Spirit Presence among 
a Northern Alaskan People. DeKalb IL: Northern Illinois University 
Press. 
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo, 2009, Métaphysiques cannibales. Lignes 
d’anthropologie post-structurale. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.





















































My work, which constantly asks, "To what extent and in what ways 
might some supernatural beliefs be empirically based and rationally 




elaborated?" just as constantly runs into misunderstanding by the 
average reviewer. For example, a recent reviewer said that my 
purpose is to show that "spiritual encounters are not only rational, 
but ontologically real and true." That is wrong. These errors arise 
from the controversial nature of the topic and the tendency for 
opposing points of view to be perceived as polar opposites. For 
many years I tried to avoid such misunderstandings by 
accompanying each statement that I thought might be misunderstood 
with statements of what I did not mean. That was cumbersome, so I 
now make my statements as clear as I can and let the chips fall 
where they may. 
 
In this essay and all my work on the topic I assiduously avoid 
ontological claims or assertions about truth. It is specifically the 
empirical and rational aspects that concern me. For the beliefs that 
concern me here, such as near-death experiences (NDEs), there is 
ample evidence that there is empirical evidence that rationally 
implies that they are "ontologically real". There was also, a few 
hundred years ago, empirical evidence that rationally suggested the 
Sun orbits the Earth. That was rational and empirical, knowing that 
makes the belief understandable, but we now have alternative 
empirical evidence that can be rationally shown to contradict the 
older belief. This also helps us to explain the older belief. This 
example does not imply that NDEs can currently be shown to be 
misunderstandings. I am simply insisting that finding an empirical 
and rational basis for a widespread belief is important and useful, but 
it does not in itself prove the belief true. Without the empirical and 
rational understanding of NDEs that has accumulated over the past 
45 years patients reporting NDEs were medically assumed to be 
delirious and hallucinating. That was neither an empirical nor a 
rational belief, and it was harmful.  
 
The reviewer also noted that I describe "rationality's biases". But that 
confuses rationality with rationalism. Rationality is the proper use of 
reason and logic. The "biases" of rationality, which favour reason 
and logic, are good and broadly applicable. Rationalism, of course, is 
a set of specific theories that define and use rationality in particular 
ways, including specific, limited definitions of empirical that conflict 
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very directly with any rational model for understanding experiences 
such as NDEs. 
 
In closing, the reviewer also complained about my attention to the 
definition of terms. The rationality vs. rationalism example shows 
why very thorough attention to terminology is of great importance 
on this topic. One cannot construct an analysis of belief (meaning 
"an idea held to be true" vs. the idiomatic use of belief vs. 
knowledge that implies that belief is less certain than knowledge) 




My professors taught me that the spirit world is a cultural fantasy 
arising from tradition. In the disenchanted world, moderns believe 
they understand the encounters with non-material beings common to 
other societies. To the modern, spirits are no threat when in their 
appropriate place, amongst the ‘other’ of anthropology, the 
primitives who are ignorant of science. But when spirits appear out 
of place, visiting non-believers uninvited, they overturn our 
complacency. In 1963, I, a thoroughly modern and disenchanted 
American college student, was attacked by a presence that was both 
evil and foreign, alien to my worldview. I kept the experience to 
myself, until eight years later, when doing my doctoral fieldwork, I 
encountered this evil presence again, where I was not expecting it, in 
Newfoundland. It is there that I lost my modernity.  
 
My professors taught me that the spirit world is a cultural fantasy 
arising from ignorance. Tradition causes ghosts and visions; 
believing is seeing. But Newfoundland’s “Old Hag” (as they rudely 
called it) had come into my room from a cultural void. Later other 
spontaneous spirit experiences came into view confirming believers 
and converting doubters: the dead visit the bereaved, those near 
death share glimpses of the afterlife, and modern Christian toddlers 
recall past lives as well as Buddhist, Hindu and Druze children. 
Neither religious background nor education prevents spirit 
encounters (Greeley 1975, Gallup 1982; Pew 2009.) Cultural source 
theories have foundered on the data. The disenchantment of 




modernity is itself an illusion. Ironically, when positivism’s 
protection failed the disciplines most opposed to ethnocentrism 
became defenders of modernity’s disenchanted world. Custodians of 
a collection of museums and zoos clustered outside the city walls, 
between the wilderness and the moat, historians, anthropologists, 
folklorists, religious studies scholars and many others demand 
respect for their charges while keeping the drawbridge up except on 
a few high holidays.  
 
I am concerned here with the grounds ordinary people have for 
belief in spirits, and in the way that modern scholars have rendered 
those grounds invisible. This chapter touches only tangentially on 
direct scientific inquiry into the non-material. For that crucial aspect 
of the topic I refer the reader to Irreducible Mind (Kelly et al. 2007), 
a real tour de force of scientific evidence against physicalist theories 
of mind and for mind as transcending the material. Evidence 
regarding spirits runs through this monumental and indispensable 
scholarly work. 
 
I use belief in its technical sense: an idea held to be true. This is 
belief in the cognitive sense (Hahn 1973). There are other useful 
meanings of belief, such as trusting: when I say, "I believe in my 
family," I am saying something more than "I believe that my wife 
and children exist." In belief talk, trust is usually belief in, while 
cognitive belief is belief that. But, such rules are only tendencies, 
and they have many exceptions. For instance, "Do you believe in 
ghosts?" is not about how much you trust ghosts. Knowledge and 
belief are usually distinguished, with knowledge being more certain 
than belief. In epistemology knowledge has often been used as an 
achievement term on the basis of very stringent criteria; for example, 
knowledge as "justified true belief" (Audi 1988:102-118). Even such 
stringent usages recognize knowledge as a kind of belief. Because 
what counts as justification and grounds for certainty varies 
enormously from one subject to another and from one cultural frame 
to another, the knowledge-belief distinction is not useful for a 
culturally situated examination of belief. In a cultural view, 
knowledge refers to belief that is locally held to be true and justified, 
without regard to whether the inquirer shares the local certainty. 
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From this perspective there is nothing inconsistent in the statement 
that before Copernicus and Galileo it was common knowledge that 
the sun and stars revolve around the Earth, and that today it is 
common knowledge that they do not. It follows, then, that describing 
a view as belief does not imply that it is uncertain, impossible to 
confirm, etc.  
 
An Extraordinary Experience 
 
One night in December of 1963 I went to bed early in my off-
campus room. I had just completed my final exams for the term, and 
I was tired. I went to bed about 6 o’clock, looking forward to a long 
and uninterrupted night’s sleep. In that I was mistaken. About 2 
hours later I awoke to the sound of my door being opened. Footsteps 
approached the bed. I lay on my back and the door was straight 
ahead of me. But the room was pitch dark, so when I opened my 
eyes I could see nothing. I tried to turn on the bedside light, but I 
couldn’t move. I was paralyzed. The footsteps came to the side of 
my bed, and I felt the mattress go down as someone climbed onto the 
bed, knelt on my chest and began to strangle me. I thought I was 
dying. But far worse than the feelings of being strangled were the 
sensations associated with what was on top of me. I had an 
overwhelming impression of evil, and my reaction was revulsion. 
Whatever was on my chest was not just destructive; it was disgusting 
and I shrank from it. I struggled to move but could not find the 
“controls”. Somehow I no longer knew how to move. Then suddenly 
I did move, first my hand, then my whole body. I leaped out of bed, 
heart racing, and turned on the light to find the room empty. I ran 
downstairs where my landlord sat watching TV. “Did someone go 
past you just now?” He looked at me like I was crazy and said, “No.” 
I never forgot that experience, but I told no one about it for the next 
eight years. 
 
In 1966 I entered the graduate Folklore Program at the University of 
Pennsylvania to study “folk belief”. I was taught that supernatural 
beliefs are fictions arising from cultural processes. Accounts of 
supernatural experience cannot be evidence for the beliefs that have 
produced them; that would be circular. Tradition says, “We believe 




this because it has happened to us.” Modern scholarship reverses 
this: “You think this happens because you believe it.” Non-empirical 
and non-rational. I was skeptical of this sweeping dismissal, so I 
proposed to ask what empirical and rational elements traditional 
supernatural beliefs might include.  
 
In 1970 I travelled to Newfoundland, Canada, for my doctoral 
dissertation fieldwork. There I found the “Old Hag”, a tradition 
describing exactly what I had experienced in 1963, complete with 
footsteps, evil presence, and so on. I administered a formal 
questionnaire to a convenience sample of 100 young 
Newfoundlanders and followed-up with extensive ethnographic 
interviewing. I found that around 20% claimed the experience. This 
led me to formulate the experiential source hypothesis: that some 
“supernatural beliefs” arise from experience in a rational manner. 
This is counter to what I called the Cultural Source Hypothesis 
(CSH ; Hufford 1976, 1982, p.13-14) which proposes that stories of 
anomalous experience arise from narrative processes with no actual 
experience or from misunderstood experiences such as dreams or 
hallucinations. Unlike empirical encounters with the real world, the 
CSH asserts that these experiences are cultural products and that 
they appear to support traditional beliefs (e.g., ghosts) because it is 
those beliefs that have produced them. If this were true, then such 
experiences could not rationally be used as evidence supporting 
those beliefs. This does not suggest that some experiences are devoid 
of cultural influence.  
 
Rather, the issue is whether some kinds of experience are more 
culturally shaped than others, and at what point the difference rises 
to a level that justifies saying that cardinal features of the experience 
have culture as their source. I have argued, on an empirical basis, 
that the distinctive phenomenological features of SP (I use 
phenomenological in the narrow sense simply to refer to the basic 
elements of mental appearances), including the presence, the 
shuffling footsteps and the sense of reality and of evil, do not have a 
cultural source. On the other hand, interpretations of the attacker as a 
witch, a demon or a ghost have a cultural source. But, that is a huge 
difference. And of great importance, taking the attacker to be real is 
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not culturally produced. Even most subjects who do not believe in 
such things nonetheless experience the attacker as real. Their belief 
arises from the experience, not the opposite. In 1974 I joined the 
Behavioral Science Department at Penn State’s College of Medicine 
and began surveys and interviews in populations with no tradition of 
nocturnal paralysis, as well as studying the historical and 
ethnographic record for traditions containing the paralysis/intruder 
complex. I found that the phenomenology and prevalence of these 
attacks in naïve subjects were indistinguishable from those found in 
Newfoundland (Hufford 1982, 1985, 1995, etc.), and most 
experiencers considered the event real regardless of prior belief. My 
scientifically trained medical students provided excellent 
illustrations of this point. 
 
First-year medical student: 
 
What woke me up was the door slamming. "OK," I thought, "It's my 
roommate...." I was laying on my back just kinda looking up. And 
the door slammed, and I kinda opened my eyes. I was awake. 
Everything was light in the room. My roommate wasn't there and the 
door was still closed.... 
 
But the next thing I knew, I realized that I couldn't move.... I kind of 
like gazed over to the door and there was no one there. But the next 
thing I knew, from one of the areas of the room this grayish, 
brownish murky presence was there. And it kind of swept down 
over the bed and I was terrified!...It was like nothing I had ever seen 
before. And I felt – I felt this pressing down all over me. I couldn't 
breathe. I couldn't move. And the whole thing was that—there was 
like—I could hear the stereo in the room next to me. I was wide 
awake, you know....And I couldn't move and I was helpless and I 
was really—I was really scared....And this murky presence—just 
kind of—this was evil! This was evil! You know this is weird! You 
must think I'm a—....This thing was there! I felt a pressure on me 
and it was like enveloping me. It was a very, very, very strange 
thing. And as I remember I struggled. I struggled to move and get 
out. And –you know, eventually, I think eventually what happened 
was I kind of like moved my arm. And again the whole thing—just 
kind of dissipated away. The presence, everything. But everything 




else just remained the same. The same stereo was playing next door. 
The same stuff was going on. (Hufford 1982: 58-59) 
 
I carried out a random telephone survey (N = 254) in a Pennsylvania 
town with no traditions of such events. Seventeen percent said they 
had awakened paralyzed, and 86% of those said that there was a 
threatening “something” in the room with them when this happened 
(Hufford 1992, 2005). Later a national survey of 5,947 by the Roper 
Poll (1992) found that 18% of Americans answer “yes” when asked 
whether they had experienced “Waking up paralyzed with a sense of 
a strange person or presence or something else in the room” (1992: 
26).  
 
For most cultures around the world, we have no quantitative data, 
but I have found salient traditions about the experience in every 
culture where I have looked; in older English it was called the mare, 
(Anglo-Saxon root merran, “to crush”, eventually the nightmare, the 
crusher in the night); in southeast Asia, the da chor (Tobin and 
Friedman 2009), dab coj, poj ntxoog (Munger 1986), or dab tsog 
(Adler 1991); in China the “sitting ghost” or bei Guai chaak (being 
pressed by a ghost) (Emmons 1982: 144); in Japan kanashibari 
(metal bound, a Ninja spell). This is an extraordinary spiritual 
experience (ESE) (Hufford 2005; Hufford, Fritts and Rhodes 2010: 
77-78), an experience that appears to the subject to be direct 
perception of a spiritual (non-material) reality; that is, not an 
“interpretive experience” (Davis-Floyd and Rapp 2010: 26-27). 
 
Only in modern, Western society does one lack a recognizable 
analogue to Newfoundland’s “Old Hag”. While modern science has 
a related category it is not well known and it lacks the most 
distinctive details found in other societies—especially the intruder. 
This is sleep paralysis (SP): a period of immobility, usually brief, as 
one falls asleep or emerges from sleep. The paralysis is produced by 
the intrusion into wakefulness of rapid eye movement (REM) atonia 
produced by structures in the reticularis pontis oralis. This prevents a 
dreamer from acting out dream movements and interrupting sleep. In 
the sleep research literature, the descriptions of SP content are vague 
and ambiguous; e.g., “frightening hallucination.” 
63                                                                        Modernity’s Defences 
 
 
SP has frequently been mistaken for a psychiatric symptom because 
when described fully, the experience sounds impossible to the 
modern ear, yet is firmly believed to be real by the subject. For 
example, Uhde et al. (2006) asked a national sample of psychiatrists 
to offer a diagnosis for a young man based on an accurate 
description of a real case of sleep paralysis. Only 33.3% of 
respondents classified the case as some kind of sleep disorder, while 
55.9% considered it a psychotic disorder, most often schizophrenia. 
This is a typical problem with ESEs, and it is a prime source of the 
stigma attached to such experiences in modern society.  
 
The SP experience illustrates important issues in belief studies: the 
traditional-looking experience can occur independently of prior 
knowledge; the phenomenon is salient in many cultures but invisible 
in others; physiological knowledge of SP does not conflict with the 
spiritual interpretation, because it does not explain the spiritual 
components; it is very often misinterpreted as a pathological 
symptom (severe sexual anxiety neurosis, narcolepsy, repressed 
memories of sexual abuse, “alien abduction”, epilepsy and 
schizophrenia).  
 
Relating Other Experientially Based Spiritual Experiences 
 
According to the conventional modern view ESEs are obviously 
hallucinations, internally generated false perceptions with no real 
object. But, SP with a presence, like certain other ESEs such as 
“near-death experiences (Hufford 1982, 1985, 1995, 2005), 
contradicts this assumption. In contrast to ESEs, ordinary 
experiences (such as the beauty of nature or good fortune) spiritually 
interpreted are considered normal and are more commonly studied 
than ESEs (Hufford 2010; Underwood 2006). The scholarly 
preference for ordinary spiritual experiences facilitates the modern 
avoidance of evidence for spirit belief. Theories based on 
interpretive experiences find an endless variety of spiritual 
experience, none of which could constitute reasonable evidence for 
what they attest. The idea that there are specific varieties of ESE that 
relate to each other and to specifiable beliefs is central to an account 
of spirit beliefs as empirical and rational. 





For a minority of SP experiencers, SP paralysis culminates in an out-
of-body experience (OBE). I included several examples in my book 
The Terror that Comes in the Night (1982). Sometimes there is only 
a suggestion with no clear OBE sensation, as when a subject 
reported that she was being violently pressed into the bed but also 
felt she was being lifted up “at least two feet above the bed,” only to 
be dropped back onto the bed “with considerable force” (Hufford 
1982: 88). This kind of apparently contradictory description is 
common in SP accounts, representing phenomenological categories 
outside normal experience. One Newfoundlander said he felt a “very 
cold, dead weight — great fear with no apparent reason, couldn’t 
move anything, only open eyes —had feeling of looking down at 
myself from separate place”. A Pennsylvania subject said, “I woke 
up and felt very tired, but not able to move, felt weak. Didn’t seem 
like I was in myself” (p. 91). Other SP OBE sensations are more 
fully developed. For example, for an Eskimo case reported in 1976 it 
was stated that “during an attack...she was not in her body, and that 
she was fighting to get back in. Apparently the paralysis relates to 
the body which had been left by its soul....”(Bloom and Gelardin 
1976: 23). One of my Pennsylvania subjects said: 
 
I really felt that I rose up out of my body.... I had no control over 
what I was doing....I could not touch the ground...opposite my bed) 
there’s a window....Well, it’s just like I got pulled towards there. 
And I looked out the window and there was someone there…trying 
to get me to come through this window....That scared me pretty bad! 
(Hufford 1982: 240) 
 
The SP OBEs relate to spirit experiences in complex ways cross-
culturally. When SP attacks are attributed to sorcery, the intruder is 
often a spirit projection of the sorcerer. I found such accounts in 
Newfoundland, in Cotton Mather’s On Witchcraft: Being the 
Wonders of the Invisible World (1692), and in contemporary West 
African sorcery (Stoller and Olkes 1987:148). Twentieth-century 
American witchcraft manuals describe the practice as “sending forth 
the fetch” (Huson 1970). In the astral projection literature there is 
discussion of SP while learning to project (e.g., Muldoon and 
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Carrington 1951, 1969: 155), called “astral catalepsy.” Robert 
Monroe, in Journeys Out of the Body also describes the paralysis 
from his own experiences (1971, 1973: 22). During the past two 
decades the Internet has allowed those with SP to inquire and contact 
others in a way that modern stigma had prevented. One of the early 
experiencers’ websites (http://www.trionica.com/) devoted to the 
subject ends with reference to “a gateway to Out of the Body and 
Lucid Dreaming”, stating that “Beyond the Fear, There is a Gate”. 
 
Not all OBEs are associated with SP. The variety of OBE now called 
the “near-death experience” (NDE) constitutes a category of ESE 
unto itself. In 1974 Raymond Moody’s Life After Life launched the 
study of NDEs. At about the same time W. Dewi Ree, M.D. 
published "The Hallucinations of Widowhood" in the British 
Medical Journal, establishing that experiences believed by the 
subject to be real “communication with the dead” are common and 
psychologically helpful among modern bereaved people (1971: 37-
41). Both of these are “core spirit experiences” (Hufford 1995), 
referring to spirits (in the standard English-language sense of “The 
the immaterial part of a corporeal being” (Oxford English 
Dictionary), without inference or retrospective interpretation beyond 
the common meaning of the word. Leaving your physical body and 
being met by deceased loved ones or angels (NDEs), or having a 
deceased loved one visit (Rees’s widows and widowers), are clearly 
about spirits. Both experiences are independent of prior belief and 
form distinct classes with stable perceptual patterns across different 
cultural settings. As such research emerged, my Experiential Source 
Hypothesis became my Experience-Centred Theory of Spirit Belief 
(1995: 11-45). The hypothesis has been confirmed, and the resulting 
theory builds on the extraordinary spiritual experiences to examine 
their ramifications using methods centred on experience. 
 
Moody’s 1974 book introducing the NDE led to the publication of a 
great deal of compelling peer-reviewed research, much of it by 
physicians like Moody (e.g., Greyson 1997). Prior to Moody’s book 
NDEs were consistently regarded as delirium, even though the two 
have almost nothing in common (Gabbard et al.1982; Hufford 2010). 
However, by the year 2000 the Comprehensive Textbook of 




Psychiatry 7th Ed. (2000) had a separate subsection on “Death, 
Dying and Bereavement” devoted to a respectful description of 
NDEs, including their most common phenomenological elements. 
And there is substantial evidence that NDEs are associated with 
positive, healthy changes both psychologically and socially (e.g., van 
Lommel et al. 2001). Yet, even today, there is a great deal of poorly 
reasoned negative criticism of the entire NDE topic (Facco and 
Agrillo 2012). Similarly, Rees’ work led to a radical change in the 
psychiatric literature. In 1975 the Comprehensive Textbook of 
Psychiatry, vol. II, listed believed hallucinations of the deceased as a 
cardinal symptom of pathological grieving (Freedman and Sadock 
1975: 1755), but by 2000 The Comprehensive Textbook of 
Psychiatry described them as normal with a prevalence around 50% 
(Sadock et al. 2000: 810). Yet there has been relatively little new 
research published on these experiences, now often called “after 
death contacts” (ADCS), in the medical literature, and negative 
commentary from critics of “the paranormal” continues unabated. 
 
NDEs and ADCs inherently relate to central issues of religious belief 
such as the human soul and the afterlife. Yet modern the theological 
and pastoral care literature generally ignores or disparages them 




Throughout history people have reported spirit experiences, 
including visits from deceased loved ones, journeys to the afterlife 
and, on the dark side, spiritual attack. That included “the West” until 
the modern era. As Max Weber said of modernity,  
 
The growing process of intellectualization and rationalization... 
means that in principle, then, we are not ruled by mysterious, 
unpredictable forces, but that, on the contrary, we can in principle 
control everything by means of calculation. That in turn means the 
disenchantment of the world. Unlike the savage for whom such 
forces existed, we need no longer have recourse to magic in order to 
control the spirits or pray to them. Instead, technology and 
calculation achieve our ends. This is the primary meaning of the 
process of intellectualization. (2004 [orig. 1917]: 12-13) 




Weber had mixed feelings about this disenchantment, but thought it 
was an inevitable part of intellectual progress. A major element of 
the disenchantment process is the ironic alliance of western religion, 
beginning with the Protestant Reformation, and the skeptical 
materialism of the Enlightenment, against traditional spirit belief 
(Hufford 2008). This strange collaboration of opposing forces set the 
table for anthropology and other academic disciplines to erect 
powerful defences against the ubiquitous presence of the enchanted 
world. 
 
Post-Reformation Christianity and Enlightenment Skepticism 
 
Reacting against Medieval Catholicism’s sacramental view of a 
world saturated with natural-supernatural interaction, Reformation 
theology moved away from particular beliefs as depictions of 
“spiritual facts,” especially beliefs alleging an experiential 
foundation (e.g., miraculous healing or encounters with spirits). 
Along with repudiating Catholic sacraments as mere magic, 
Protestant reformers decried belief in ghosts as Catholic superstition. 
Stanley Tambiah (1994: 31) points out that “Seventeenth-century 
Protestant thought contributed to the demarcation of ‘magic’ from 
‘religion,” magic being...false manipulations of the supernatural and 
occult powers.” This dichotomization remains part of modern 
religion’s rejection of spirit encounters. For example, in his 
landmark Religion and the Decline of Magic, Keith Thomas (1971: 
ix) says that belief in ghosts is today “rightly disdained by intelligent 
persons” but was “taken seriously by equally intelligent persons in 
the past.” He places this change in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, noting that in the sixteenth century the belief in ghosts 
“distinguished Protestant from Catholic almost as effectively as 
belief in the Mass or the Papal Supremacy” (Thomas: 589).  
 
Reformation theologians took different paths in this move away 
from observable natural-supernatural interaction. On the liberal 
wing, Friedrich Schleiermacher defended religion against the 
intellectuals of early German Romanticism by dismissing 
supernatural eruptions into the material world. In his influential On 




Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (1799), marking the 
beginning of liberal Protestant theology, Schleiermacher rejected 
religious ideas he thought conflicted with “the universal validity of 
scientific and physical conclusions.... Religion...leaves your physics 
untouched, and please God, your psychology.” (1958: 88) Rejecting 
the idea of supernatural miracles, he said, “Miracle is simply the 
religious name for event” (p. 88). In Schleiermacher’s view 
authentic religion is religious feeling––a feeling of complete 
dependence and finitude––not observable evidence of the 
supernatural. Influenced by Giambattista Vico’s insights into the 
historically situated nature of human knowledge, Schleiermacher 
developed a hermeneutic theology allowing authentic religion to be 
understood only by those who experience it, rendering religious 
ideas purely subjective, unrelated to scientific knowledge. It is in this 
sense that the Reformation’s “authentic religion” became 
increasingly “non-cognitive” and, by implication, “non-rational” 
(Kellenberger 1985). 
 
Schleiermacher echoed David Hume in his concession to science and 
rejection of reason as a basis for religious belief. Hume’s essay on 
belief in miracles, published in 1748 (Section X of An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding), lays out a series of arguments 
against a rational basis for religious belief. He then states that: 
 
I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, 
as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or 
disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to 
defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion 
is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of 
exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to 
endure. (1963 [orig. 1748]: 408-419) 
 
Although this passage seems ironic, sincere friends of religion, like 
Schleiermacher, have taken Hume’s advice seriously. The onslaught 
of successful scientific explanations of the natural world and 
Enlightenment skepticism were major forces leading to Weber’s 
disenchantment of the world, and theologians struggled to find a 
comfortable home for religion in this newly dis-spirited place. 
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Yielding reason and evidence to science and abandoning 
supernatural intrusions into the mundane world removed major 
vulnerabilities in traditional religion, as the number of opportune 
openings for the “God of the gaps” dwindled. Basing belief on 
feeling, given and supported by grace and faith, removed religion’s 
remaining exposure to critical argument (Proudfoot 1985). This 
tense rapprochement between scientific skepticism and theology 
necessarily included the embrace of disenchantment and the 
rejection of spirit encounters as primitive. This helps explain why 
such disparate parties joined forces in crafting modernity.  
 
In contrast, the conservative Christian view dismissed supernatural 
influences in the world as wicked, but not necessarily unreal; false as 
an affront to God. That is why the same believers who rejected 
“Catholic superstition” and ghosts were nonetheless enthusiastic in 
their persecution of witches. The witchcraft persecutions have strong 
connections to SP, OBEs and ADCs. SP has often been associated 
(in a confused manner) with the incubus/succubus (demons in male 
or female form believed to have sexual relations with humans; 
incubus one who lies on, succubus one who lies under), related to 
accusations that witches had sexual relations with demons, witches’ 
travel to Sabbats was considered by some to be done “out of the 
body” (Hufford 1982: 54-55), and contact with spirits of the dead 
was the sorcerous practice of necromancy. By acknowledging the 
existence of ESEs as real—real but wicked and heretical—the 
conservative Christian disenchantment placed strict and narrow 
limits on the safe reporting of encounters with the invisible, adding 
another sanction to modernity’s defences against enchantment. The 
liberal theological and skeptical Enlightenment positions labelled 
spirit belief as naive ignorance, and the conservative clergy decried 
it as demonic heresy. All three parties had major disagreements with 
each other, but those disagreements actually supported their mutual 
rejection of human-spirit interaction.  
 
In the 19th century, theological existentialism further developed the 
subjectivity of religion leading to additional rejections of specific, 
cognitive beliefs as fundamental to religion. Søren Kierkegaard 
(1813-1855), a founder of religious existentialism, held that 




rationality in religion undermines true faith by attempting to make 
“safe” that which should be accepted “by virtue of the absurd” 
(Kierkegaard 1941b: 47, 51). “Faith for Kierkegaard in the Postscript 
(Kierkegaard 1941a) is against reason, it is not above reason.” 
(Kellenberger 1985: 8) 
 
In religion, the concept of hermeneutics, originally referring to the 
exegesis of sacred texts, grew to include interpretation more broadly. 
Influenced by historian and philosopher Giambattista Vico, a 
constructivist whose famous verum factum principle (1710) 
described truth as verified through creation or invention, not 
observation, hermeneutics incorporated historical and social context 
as central to meaning. 
 
Anthropology Enters the Fray 
 
Before discussing anthropology’s resistance to the idea of spirits, I 
must first acknowledge that many anthropologists have bravely 
confronted the concept. These are too numerous to mention, but two 
pioneers in particular must be named. Edith Turner’s Experiencing 
Ritual (1992) was a true landmark, and together with her other 
publications she has been a real inspiration to many of us. Stanley 
Krippner, although a psychologist by training, has spent much of his 
career studying shamanism and related phenomena in a wonderfully 
open-minded manner. My criticism of anthropology does not deny 
that there are many such brave souls, but rather aims to urge more 
such work in a field central to understanding our humanity. 
 
In the 19th century the hermeneutic approach became influential 
among outside observers seeking a respectful understanding of the 
religious viewpoint. This was in part a response to Enlightenment 
disdain and the emergence of modern positivism, a term coined by 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) asserting his evolutionary “law of three 
phases”: 1) the theological (religious and supernatural); 2) the 
metaphysical (Enlightenment philosophy); and 3) the scientific (also 
called positive). According to this view, humans proceed from the 
naïve to the fully rational mind, a view consistent with Hegel’s 
(1770-1831) idea of evolutionary progress toward a (European) 
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pinnacle of rationality. These ideas were congenial to Victorian 
anthropology. For example, Edward B. Tylor, among the founders of 
social anthropology, considered “primitive man” intelligent and 
attempting to understand the world, but doing so with inadequate 
knowledge. He located the origins of religion in animism – the 
“belief in spiritual beings”: 
 
The ancient savage philosophers probably made their first step by the 
obvious inference that every man has two things belonging to him, 
namely a life and a phantom.... [These] are doctrines answering in the 
most forcible way to the plain evidence of men’s senses, as interpreted 
by a fairly consistent and rational primitive philosophy. (Lessa and 
Vogt 1972: 12-3)  
 
For Tylor these “primitive philosophers” were rational and 
empirical, but obviously mistaken. They were also thoroughly naïve 
from the modern perspective, since those basic questions were 
already subject to scientific explanations.  
 
During the twentieth century, anthropologists sought more respectful 
ways of dealing with spirit belief, and Hermeneuticism provided the 
basis for this change of heart. For example, historian and sociologist 
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) called for an engaged empathetic 
understanding that he called Verstehen, arguing that understanding 
requires us to merge our perspective with the perspective we wish to 
understand, to breach what Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) later 
called “the hermeneutic circle” (Heidegger 1962 [1927]). 
 
Cultural relativism in anthropology, firmly established in the early 
20th century by Franz Boas, was helpful in the hermeneutic effort. 
As Boas’ student Melville Herskovits put it, cultural anthropology 
should make it possible to see “the validity of every set of norms for 
the peoples whose lives are guided by them.” (1947: 76) Cultural 
relativism has been extended to a variety of domains including 
perception (cf., the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis) and even truth, so it 
regularly entails efforts to understand belief. Sir Edward Evans-
Pritchard provided an influential example in his Nuer Religion 
(1956), especially his explanation of apparent inconsistencies, such 




as speaking of a cucumber as an ox when it is substituted for an ox 
as a sacrifice, as consistent when viewed from within the Nuer 
world.  
 
Evans-Pritchard nonetheless assumed that spirit beliefs were 
obviously false to the modern mind. In his 1937 classic Witchcraft, 
Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande, Evans-Pritchard described 
seeing a mysterious nocturnal light, what he called “witchcraft on its 
path,” asserting that the light was physically impossible. The next 
day a messenger arrived telling of the death of a man judged by the 
villagers to have been the target of the witchcraft. Evans-Pritchard 
reckons that “[t]his...fully explained the light I had seen. [But] I 
never discovered its real origin....” (1976: 11) Significantly, Evans-
Pritchard did not feel the need to explain how he knew the villagers’ 
beliefs were false. In 1952 Evans-Pritchard said: “Religion is 
superstition to be explained by anthropologists, not something that 
any anthropologist, or indeed any rational person, could himself 
believe in” (1960: 10). This is perfectly consistent with his view of 
Azande ‘beliefs’. “It is an inevitable conclusion from Zande 
descriptions of witchcraft that it is not an objective reality”, Evans-
Pritchard writes, before insisting that, “Witches, as Azande conceive 
them cannot exist” (1937:63). 
  
There is, in this juxtaposition of the hermeneutic, internal 
consistency interpretation with the outright assertion that these 
beliefs are obviously false, something of the psychiatrist’s willing 
but contingent suspension of disbelief speaking to a psychotic 
patient:“ Of course I know this is real to you.” This casts 
contemporary spirit believers as equally naïve, like their ancestors 
who did not understand how the world works.  
 
The most common anthropological mode of giving respect to spirit 
beliefs has two parts: (1) “taking them seriously,” reasonable from 
the “native” perspective; but (2) not reasonable to the objective 
anthropologist. The latter is typically assumed rather than argued 
(e.g., Lambek 1981, 2002; Mageo and Howard 1996; Malinowski 
1926). Even some anthropologists who seem to have transcended the 
Western, “rationalist” worldview exoticize spirit beliefs as untenable 
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for the modern scholar, refusing to call spirit beliefs false but 
scrupulously avoiding any suggestion that they are true. This is often 
done by denying any objective standard for truth claims and positing 
all descriptions of reality as constructed, and perhaps equally valid.  
 
In fact, the only genuine way to take extraordinary experiences 
seriously is to also take seriously the interpretations of those who 
have them. This does not require that we accept and believe those 
interpretations, but rather that we do not dismiss them without 
argument and evidence; “modern intellectuals don’t believe that sort 
of thing” does not count as an argument or evidence! I have called 
this the Principle of Local Priority (2008: 302-3). This principle is 
central to the “Insider-Outsider Problem” in hermeneutics (Hufford 
1995; McCutcheon 1999). The Principle of Local Priority raises the 
ontological implications of possibly finding a belief rationally and 
empirically superior to the available modern alternatives; the 
Principle of Local Priority risks finding our subjects’ beliefs well 
founded. 
 
How Can We Proceed? 
 
The hermeneutic turn gradually moved anthropology beyond the 
conventional bounds of modernity, searching for ways to engage the 
enchanted worlds of those they study. Experiential anthropology 
(Young and Goulet 1994) marks dramatic progress in this attempt. 
But all hermeneuticism assumes a sharp boundary between modern 
and non-modern settings with regard to spirits. Experiential 
anthropology requires immersion in cultures that teach the reality of 
spirits for the anthropologist to encounter them and grants the 
modern resistance to the lessons of the field. As David Young and 
Jean-Guy Goulet point out, anthropologists reporting their spirit 
experiences from fieldwork must express them in terms foreign to 
the culture where they occurred. “This is necessarily so...because the 
anthropological journey leads back home where they must 
communicate anew with friends and colleagues in a shared language 
of understanding” (1994: 322).  
 




As long as immersion is basic to the method, ESEs pose little threat 
to modernity, because they can be readily assimilated to cultural 
process explanations (through “set and setting”). As skeptic Steven 
Katz says, the life of a mystic is permeated with the concepts, values 
and images of his culture, which there is no reason to believe he 
leaves behind in his experience. Rather, these images, beliefs, 
symbols, and rituals define, in advance, what the experience he 
wants to have, and which he then does have, will be like (1978: 33). 
Seeing is not believing; rather believing is seeing, and reasoning 
from such seeing is viciously circular: this is basic 
constructivism/contextualism.  
 
Reports from inside the hermeneutic circle are unconvincing to those 
outside. “The Experience-Centred Approach” (Hufford 1982) seeks 
to dissolve the hermeneutic boundary through a fair and rigorous 
process of description, communication and interpretation utilizing 
the ordinary procedures of observation and reason. To be effective 
this approach forbids privileging the beliefs of either the interpreter 
or the people being studied. I have called this Methodological 




Attempting to understand another's beliefs, that is, to understand 
why they take certain ideas about the world to be true, always raises 
the question of whether to privilege one's own beliefs. When 
attempting to construct a fair and “objective” description of 
competing beliefs, privileging any belief not shared or granted by 
both “sides” pre-empts balanced investigation. Whether one shares 
or disputes a belief, the reasons that its holder finds it credible must 
be sought. Each party’s evidence and reasoning must be considered. 
Refusal to privilege relevant truth claims facilitates investigation of 
conflicting beliefs from the view of those holding them rather than 
from the view of an omniscient observer (the “bird’s eye” view, as 
Thomas Nagel elegantly put it, the “view from nowhere” [1986]). 
Methodological symmetry is similar to Ninian Smart's 
"methodological neutralism" (1973: 94), but it reaches farther. Not 
only will I not assume the falseness of folk beliefs under 
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investigation, I will also not assume the truth of the competing 
scholarly disbeliefs. I want to reopen what has been treated as a 
closed account. 
 
Methodological symmetry requires that no explanations or 
knowledge claims be either privileged or discounted without 
reasons, and similar reasons must be considered for all explanations 
(both scholarly and popular). Those who find the refusal to privilege 
certain knowledge claims to be a strongly relativistic position, insist 
that we must take as certain what Christina Larner calls "irreversible 
knowledge" (1984: 153-165) and Hollis calls "a 'bridgehead' of true 
and rational beliefs" (1982: 73). They seek to protect incorrigible 
truth from a relativism that denies the existence of any single, unique 
truth (Gellner 1992). 
 
I disagree. I do assume that some evidence on disputed questions is 
better than some other evidence. But when basic assumptions are 
contested, prior acceptance of disputed claims seriously biases the 
investigation. For example, in his April 2013 'Skeptic' column for 
Scientific American Michael Shermer described interviewing Eben 
Alexander, the neurosurgeon and near-death experiencer who wrote 
the bestseller Proof of Heaven. Shermer notes that Alexander 
presents as evidence for the validity of his NDE that it occurred 
while his “cortex was completely shut down,” and then goes on to 
say that if Alexander’s cortex had truly been shut down no 
experience and no memory would have been possible. In essence 
Alexander claims to have had a genuine NDE and Shermer says he 
could not have such an experience because genuine NDEs are 
impossible. Shermer is using a common tactic that I have labelled 
the theoretical plausibility criterion (Hufford 2002: 16): 1) all valid 
knowledge will prove to be coherent (following consistently without 
gaps) with contemporary science; and 2) that which claims will 
eventually have this relation to science can be judged on the basis of 
present knowledge. This is close to what Paul Feyerabend called "the 
consistency condition," which he said is "unreasonable because it 
preserves the older theory, not the better theory. . . . It eliminates a 
theory or a hypothesis not because it disagrees with the facts; it 
eliminates it because it disagrees with another theory." (Feyerabend 




1988: 23-24.) It is the purpose of Methodological Symmetry to 
demand “facts” rather than theory in evaluating contested beliefs 
(Hufford 2002).  
 
The symmetry principle is methodological, not general. We do not 
need to assume each side is equally likely to be right. Investigating 
the beliefs of "Flat Earthers" we do not have to curtail our travel 
plans because we are no longer certain that the non-flatness of the 
Earth is well established. But neither do we accept “because the 
Earth is round” as proof that it is not flat; rather we show the 
evidence of roundness and ask how well the flat view accounts for 
that evidence. Incorrigible truth (in this instance, the earth is flat) 
protects itself by not being correctable!  
 
Methodological symmetry is the core value of my Experiential 
Theory of Belief in Spirits (ET) (Hufford 1995) which proposes that 
many widespread spirit beliefs are both empirical and rational since 
they are based on observation and follow from ordinary reasoning 
without obvious errors. Most spirit-related observations are 
subjective. However, reasoning from subjective data is not a foreign 
concept to empirically based disciplines. In medicine, for instance, 
symptoms (subjective) are a valuable source of information despite 
the great value of signs (objective findings). In the study of spirit 
belief we need both first-person knowledge and third-person science, 
to use David Chalmers’ terms for the study of consciousness (1996). 
The task, as Chalmers notes, is to find the relationships between the 
two data sets. Chalmers’ “hard problem of consciousness” is similar 
to the “problem” of spirits; understanding them may actually be the 
same! 
 
The ET posits that many widespread spirit beliefs are supported by 
ESEs independently of an experiencer’s prior beliefs, knowledge or 
intention (psychological set), and that these experiences form 
distinct classes with stable perceptual patterns: (core spirit 
experiences). The differences among belief systems result, in part, 
from factors that compete with systematic inference from these 
observations, such as emotion and latent cultural values, yielding a 
distinctive cultural stamp. Core experiences are consistent with (do 
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not contradict) each other and contemporary scientific knowledge. 
These ESEs also do not conflict with modern knowledge through 
parsimony, because modern explanations do not account for the 
crucial elements of core spirit experiences. In sharp contrast, 
conventional academic views of spirit belief assume that they have 
no stable empirical foundation, that they are not rationally 
developed, and that they contradict modern knowledge. Given 
current knowledge of ESEs I will show that this conventional view is 
incorrect in a remarkably systematic way.  
 
The Cultural Construction of Disenchantment 
 
The Experiential Theory helps to account for the frequent occurrence 
of spirit experiences in the modern, “disenchanted,” world, events 
contrary to practically all relevant modern theories. But that does not 
explain how modernity managed to suppress our awareness of spirit 
experiences among normal, well-educated modern people even as 
those people continued to have them. I propose that modernity’s 
systematic, poorly grounded, set of disbeliefs is a culturally 
constructed tradition arising from historical conflict between 
scholars and religious authority. The resulting modern theories of 
spirit belief comprise a highly ramified cultural system that 
assimilates core experiences in the service of modernity’s socially 
constructed “traditions of disbelief” (Hufford 1987). For more than 
two centuries Western intellectuals, assuming spirit belief to be 
cultural fantasy, have worked at explaining the apparent presence of 
spirits in ancient and non-Western societies. But, given continued 
spirit encounters, the real problem is explaining the illusion of the 
absence of spirits in modernity.  
 
A great variety of academic disciplines has created explanations for 
the imagined error of spirit belief: naiveté, pious fraud, 
psychoanalysis’ defence mechanisms, latent functions, etcetera. 
Anthropology joined the enterprise, specializing in efforts to craft 
respectful explanations of the assumed non-rationality of spirit 
belief, ranging from Tylor’s “best effort from a base of ignorance,” 
to Levy-Bruhl’s primitive mentality unrestrained by logic, to “their 
own logic” in cultural relativism. But respectful or not, all modern 




explanations of spirit belief and experience rely on some formulation 
of the Cultural Source Hypothesis (CSH), the opposite of the 
Experiential Hypothesis. If similar spirit beliefs arise from some 
ESEs regardless of cultural background, the cultural source 
hypothesis positing that spirit beliefs and apparent experiences are 
produced by cultural background factors cannot provide a general 
account of spirit belief traditions. All reductive modern explanations 
founder on the reef of complex, patterned and ubiquitous spirit 
experiences.  
 
Prevalence, Distribution and Stigma 
 
In Newfoundland the Old Hag was well known; it happened to me in 
Pennsylvania, where it was unheard of at that time. This was a major 
conundrum. If Old Hag did in fact refer to sleep paralysis (SP), why 
did the SP literature contain no trace of her? If sleep paralysis was 
rare, as the sleep literature said, then why was it so common in 
Newfoundland? As Bloom and Gelardin observed in the Yupik and 
Inupik supernatural SP traditions,  
 
What is surprising is that sleep paralysis, which is described as a 
rare condition, seems from first report to be quite prevalent among 
Eskimos. The fact that the syndrome may be classified as a 
dissociative type of hysterical reaction may provide some clues to its 
seeming prevalence among the Eskimo population. (1976: 24) 
 
This served to stigmatize the experience and the entire group 
simultaneously. The attribution of hysteria to Eskimos comes from 
the literature on pibloktoq or Arctic hysteria, one of the “culture 
bound syndromes” (CBS) crafted jointly by psychiatry and 
anthropology.  
 
The CBS are part of modernity’s defence, and all are subject to 
controversy. Pibloktoq is a good example of one that may be pure 
cultural fiction arising from modernity’s concerns. In their landmark 
book The Culture-Bound Syndromes: Folk Illnesses of Psychiatric 
and Anthropological Interest, Hughes and Simons describe pibloktoq 
as a "catch-all rubric under which explorers lumped various Inuhuit 
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anxiety reactions, expressions of resistance to patriarchy or sexual 
coercion, and shamanistic practice" (1985: 275, 289; Hufford 1988; 
Dick 2001). This is a typical example of anthropology helping to 
classify spiritual experiences as mental illness, partly because of its 
ignorance of SP’s actual features, prevalence and distribution. The 
result has been both misdiagnosis and empirically unfounded 
theories of cultural 'construction' that serve to perpetuate 
misunderstanding. There are many examples. Here, I will offer two 
taken from Sacred Realms: Essays in Religion, Belief and Society  
(2009), a widely – used textbook in the anthropology of religion, that 
reveal classic oversights and misunderstandings of SP.  
 
Section eleven of Sacred Realms, 'Bewitching,' contains three 
reprinted articles. In two of these, SP is a central feature, but is not 
recognized. In both essays and the accompanying head notes the 
phenomena of SP, unwittingly mixed with other material, are 
incorrectly diagnosed. The introduction to the section states 
erroneously that the cases “can be understood as manifestations of 
psychiatric problems such as depression, acute anxiety, and 
schizophrenia” (Warms et al. 2009: 319).  
 
In Ronald Johnson's “Parallels Between Recollections of Repressed 
Childhood Sex Abuse, Kidnappings by Space Aliens, and the 1692 
Salem Witch Hunts” (Warms et al. 2009: 321-26), there are clear 
and important parallels among the three categories and many of them 
can be accounted for in terms of SP. In The Terror (1982: 220-21), I 
gave examples of SP in the Salem witchcraft trials, taken from 
Cotton Mather's accounts. For example, “Richard Coman testified 
that “as he lay awake in his bed...the Apparition of this Bishop and 
of two others...came and oppressed him so that he could neither stir 
himself, nor wake anyone else.” The connection of SP to 'alien 
abduction' is even starker.  
 
When I wrote The Terror, alien abduction was little discussed, but 
there were precursors in the UFO literature, such as “bedroom 
invaders” in John Keel’s Strange Creatures from Space and Time 
(1970). Keel described interview subjects who awoke to find a 
strange presence in their room, “the witnesses experienced total 




paralysis of the body. The witness awoke but was unable to move a 
muscle while the apparition was present.” (Keel 1970: 189) Keel 
observed that some of these subjects had also reported seeing UFOs, 
a chance connection of the kind responsible for much confusion 
about SP.  
 
Interest in alien abduction grew through the 1980s. In 1992 I was 
invited to a conference on the subject at MIT. By this time I had 
found several subjects who assumed that their SP experiences must 
be “screen memories” for UFO abductions, based on what they had 
read. As with sexual abuse, alien abduction memories often begin 
with a conscious memory of SP interpreted as a “screen memory.” If 
an investigator ignorant of SP is consulted, “memory recovery” is 
likely to follow with elaborated results that differ markedly from the 
actual basics of SP (Hufford 1995). This fact does not challenge the 
reality of sexual abuse or even alien abduction. But it does challenge 
the use of memories of SP as evidence of abuse or abduction, or as a 
starting point for memory recovery.  
 
Johnson based much of his analysis of 'repressed childhood sex 
abuse' on Lawrence Wright's detailed report in The New Yorker 
(1993), “Remembering Satan.” One of the memories recounted from 
this case is that of Chad, Paul Ingram's son who, Johnson says, 
“eventually recalled being plagued by a witch, being bound and 
gagged, and being forced to commit fellatio” (p. 336). In Wright’s 
account Chad's initial memory was of a repeated experience where 
“A witch would come in my window … I would wake up, but I 
couldn't move. It was like the blankets were tucked under and I 
couldn't move my arms.” “You were being restrained?” Peterson 
asked?” “Right, and there was somebody on top of me” (Wright: 
63). Numerous examples, in my own fieldwork and in print, 
illustrate that, not surprisingly, if one is looking for memories of 
childhood sexual abuse and does know of SP, it is easy to leap to the 
wrong conclusion: “I heard someone come into my room. I was 
terrified. They climbed on top of me. I couldn’t move. It was 
terrible.” That has an eerie resemblance to sexual abuse accounts. 
Add to this resonance a willingness to interpret in a loosely symbolic 
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manner, and it is easy to see how investigators consistently draw 
erroneous conclusions. 
 
The parallels that Johnson found among alien abduction, repressed 
sexual abuse and the Salem witchcraft accounts are largely 
accounted for by SP. Ignorance of SP results in complex and 
unnecessary theorizing arising from the assumption that the 
experiential accounts in each case cannot be as they are reported. But 
if we eliminate the elaborated accounts produced by “memory 
recovery” and related practices, the experiential accounts are 
perfectly typical of SP.  
 
An essay by Jay Tobin and Joan Friedman (2009) was originally 
published in 1983, shortly after Sudden Unexplained Nocturnal 
Death Syndrome (SUNDS) became known as a public health issue 
among Southeast Asian refugees. Their “Case of Vang Xiong”' is 
classic unrecognized sleep paralysis:  
 
As he lay in bed, a tall, white-skinned spirit came into his bedroom 
from the kitchen and lay on top of him. Her weight made it 
increasingly difficult for him to breathe and as he became frantic 
and tried to call out he could manage but a whisper. He attempted to 
turn to his side, but found he was pinned down. (Tobin and 
Friedman: 342) 
 
Tobin and Friedman state that a Hmong shaman explained Vang's 
episodes as spiritual attacks, which she treated successfully with 
Hmong rituals.  
 
The authors describe Vang’s problems as culture-bound fantasies, 
saying that “Being unlike the Hmong in not believing in spirits, but 
like them in our need to explain [we interpreted Vang's problems as] 
a result of emotional stress.” They translate the shaman's reference to 
“spirits” into their belief in “unconscious processes” (2009: 329). 
Like many authors unfamiliar with SP (e.g., Lemoine and Mougne 
1983) Tobin and Friedman interpreted Vang's experience as a kind 
of culture-bound PTSD, which they offered as an explanation of 
SUNDS. There are many reasons to reject this connection to 




SUNDS: the epidemiology of SP (common, equally among males 
and females, found in all ages) and that of SUNDS (rare, males only, 
adults under 50) are entirely different, and SUNDS is now explained 
physiologically (Brugada syndrome). This same error was made 
previously in Hawaii (Hufford 1995: 39).  
 
Confusion arising from modern ignorance about SP, partly a result 
of efforts to dismiss the idea of direct spiritual experiences through a 
combination of anthropological and psychological theories, has 
negatively affected both psychiatry and anthropology. One might 
argue that the easy availability of crude notions of schizophrenia 
(once a staple of anthropological explanations of shamanism) and 
other mental illnesses allowed anthropologists to ignore crucial 
issues of spiritual belief throughout the past century. At the same 
time, the linked anthropological theories allowed psychological 
interpretations to develop the concept of “culture boundedness” with 
very little empirical support. What allowed both disciplines to do 
this with little evidence was the modern assumption, unargued and 
unchallenged, that such experiences must be produced by prior 
belief. 
 
For those of us who are scientifically minded, the notion that one 
individual can bewitch another  
 
... seems fanciful or absolutely irrational. Yet our current scientific 
understanding of disease is quite recent.... How many of us have 
ever seen a germ? How many can claim to understand why disease 
or bad luck plagues one individual but another person seems to go 
from success to success? (Warms et al. 2008: 319) 
 
As Tobin and Friedman freely admit, they use cultural explanations 
that contradict local belief because they personally do not believe in 
spirits. The fact that accurate SP accounts sound like spirit (or 
possibly alien) attacks collides with being “scientifically minded”! 
The absence of any clear and well-supported alternative to the spirit 
explanation forces the concoction of elaborate and tenuously 
supported theories derived from the authors’ own cultural 
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background. It is, in fact, the analysts’ interpretations that are culture 
bound. 
 
Marginalizing spirit experiences as rare psychopathology is a crucial 
aspect of modernity’s defence, reinforcing the stigmatization that 
suppresses reporting. This dynamic is a common tactic for much that 
is despised in a society. The stigma brings sanctions making that 
which is despised covert. Because the stigma and sanctions attaching 
to spirits is distinctly modern, suppression is especially powerful 
among well-educated middle class Westerners, but there is little or 
no suppressing effect in non-modern settings.  
 
For modern researchers, the discovery of spirits in ancient and non-
western settings is rewarded. Exceptions within Western modernity 
appear more common in marginalized groups: ethnic minorities, 
poor and isolated rural groups, “cult members,” etc. Thus, 
prevalence of spirit belief and experience has been consistently 
assessed as low in modernity, and the distribution of “primitive” 
spirit experience and belief seemed to match the salience of spirit 
belief traditions. This association seems almost too obvious to 
mention: spirit belief is found where there are salient spirit belief 
traditions; spirit experiences are found where people say they have 
had them. But salience is governed by valorization and negative 
value reduces salience. The discovery that spirit belief and 
experience are common but hidden where we least expect them, 
among educated moderns, demands new understandings and 
explanations. 
 
The assumption that spirit belief is a cultural product is bolstered in 
the literature by a strong scholarly emphasis on traditional stories 
and descriptions of beliefs over first-hand experiences. From the 
modern perspective it makes more sense to ask subjects what they 
and their peers say about spirits than to seek subjects who have 
encountered spirits; moreover the belief-produces-experience 
assumption reduces the difference between the two approaches. 
First-hand experiences of spirits as they appear in the literature have 
been encountered within traditional contexts—the only place they 
have been sought. The Cultural Source Hypothesis, operating as an 




un-argued assumption rather than a hypothesis to be tested, has been 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Modernity’s defences have been primarily 
aimed at preventing or suppressing accurate knowledge of the 
phenomenologies, their distribution and their prevalence of the Old 
Hag, NDEs, after death contacts, and other core spirit experiences, 
all of which would have changed fundamentally the explanatory 
challenge of spirit belief. 
 
The central issue in the stigmatization-suppression of spirit 
belief/experience reports is the assertion that they are not rationally 
tenable for educated Westerners (as argued by Hume), though 
understandable in relatively naïve ancient or non-Western cultural 
settings. "It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and 
miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among 
ignorant and barbarous nations...” (Hume 1748: 413). When found in 
modern persons, against expectation, spirit belief and claims of spirit 
encounters have been automatically explained on the basis of 
ignorance, naive religiosity (heresy or spiritual immaturity), or 
psychopathology.  
 
Even the recent psychiatric recognition of such experiences as 
common and normal has not eliminated their cultural source 
connection which in turn stigmatizes contemporary Western 
subjects. For example, in 2000 the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (4th edition, text rev.; [DSM-IV-TR]) still said 
the following: 
 
A clinician who is unfamiliar with the nuances of an individual’s 
cultural frame of reference may incorrectly judge as 
psychopathology those normal variations in behaviour, belief, or 
experience that are particular to the individual’s culture. For 
example, hearing or seeing a deceased relative during bereavement 
(emphasis added) may be misdiagnosed as manifestations of a 
Psychotic Disorder. (American Psychiatric Association 2000: xxxiv) 
 
Implicitly this effort at cultural appropriateness marginalizes and 
stigmatizes modern experiencers. The notion of modern 
disenchantment endures, and it continues to mislead diagnosis, as 
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noted above in Yaroslav and Uhde’s 2005 “Physician Recognition 
Study.” 
 
I have published an analysis of the ways that even conventional 
current findings contradict long-standing clinical assumptions about 
the three spirit experiences discussed in this paper: sleep paralysis 
with a threatening presence, ADCs and NDEs (Hufford 2010). These 
three, along with several others, share the following characteristics: 
 
1) a history of being used to diagnose psychiatric illness (but not 
pathognomonic for any disorder); 
2) a greatly underestimated prevalence in modern subjects (but now 
known to be common, indeed ubiquitous, in humans); 
3) complex, cross-contextually stable phenomenologies that are 
nonetheless described in vague and general terms in the literature; 
4) are taken to be real by most who have them, regardless of prior 
belief, education, etc. 
 
If these are hallucinations, they are not accompanied by insight. That 
is very strange since they are not symptoms of psychiatric disorder: 





Issues of prevalence, distribution and stigma affect what I call 
“category inflation”. Accurately estimating the prevalence and 
distribution of anything, from poverty to spirituality, requires clear 
definition. If poverty were defined as “not having enough money” it 
would be very prevalent and found in some surprising places. If 
poverty means $15,510 for a couple (the Canadian 2013 Poverty 
Guideline), it will be less prevalent and its distribution will be more 
as one might expect. Spirituality is even more complex in this 
regard, so core spirit experiences must be defined precisely. For 
example, if Rees had not excluded dreams of the deceased in his 
survey of widows and widowers, his result would have been inflated.  
 




If a core spirit experience category is well known, its apparent 
prevalence may be exaggerated. In Newfoundland the prevalence of 
“the Old Hag” before my survey appeared to be very high, somewhat 
more than 50%. However, if such a core spirit experience category 
lacks a cultural identity its prevalence will seem to be zero, as was 
true of “Old Hag attacks” in most of mainland North America before 
my research. Where there is a well-known term assessments of 
prevalence and distribution must employ a carefully worded concept 
rather than a label. For my survey, I asked the same question in 
Newfoundland as I did on the mainland: “Have you ever awakened 
unable to move or cry out?” Had I asked, “Have you ever had an Old 
Hag attack?” the answers would have suggested a higher prevalence 
in Newfoundland than on the mainland, because the meaning of 
“Old Hag attack” had been extended in tradition. The “unable to 
move” question yielded similar results in both Newfoundland and on 
the mainland because it did not depend on traditional knowledge.  
 
Surveys related to the experience of ghosts provides a broader 
example. The Pew Survey (2009) reported that 17% of Americans 
said they had been “in touch with someone who had already died,” 
but only 9% said they had been in the presence of a ghost. I have 
encountered this often in ethnographic interviews. People who say 
they “do not believe in ghosts” may say that they have had a real 
visit from a deceased loved one. When asked about the apparent 
discrepancy they say something like “That was no ghost. That was 
my mother!” Cultural labels are often broader or narrower than the 
ideas to which they seem to refer. In this case, the term “ghost” has 
been stigmatized in modern discourse, losing its original utility. The 
ghost category has deflated in modernity.  
 
However, the same Pew report shows that subjects saying they have 
been “in touch with someone who had already died” grew between 
1990 and 2009 from 17% to 29%. Does this suggest that the dead are 
more communicative lately? Probably not. Clearly, during the past 
two decades discussions of ADCs and NDEs have penetrated 
American awareness, and they have migrated from tabloid status to 
serious, respectable discussion. Stigma, though still present, is 
reduced. Now more things count as contact with the dead such as a 
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picture falling or a clock stopping. “Communication with the dead” 
has inflated. 
 
Dynamic changes in traditional categories and the valorization of 
labels for them cause category inflation and deflation creating self-
fulfilling prophecies for modernity’s Cultural Source explanations: 
the more people believe, the more they report spirit experiences, the 
less they believe the less they report. This apparently obvious 
conclusion is falsified by the observation that the prevalence of core 
spirit experiences never drops below a minimum set by the 
parameters of minimally defined experience as illustrated by my SP 
with a presence data in the U.S. (Hufford 1982, 1995, 2005TP). 
 
However, it is important not to cast the factors affecting category 
size and salience as mere impediments to research. They are a 
natural part of cultural process serving many different functions, and 
they may support reasoned belief as well as undermine it. For 
example, once we know about the actual prevalence and 
psychological healthiness of after death contacts narrowly defined, 
we ought to reconsider the experiences that were excluded, such as 
dreams of the dead. If we find empirical grounds that rationally 
support the idea of after death contact, then we should challenge the 
assumption that dreams of the dead are always mere imagination. 
We might call this the rule of “a different light”: systematic 
knowledge of core spirit experiences puts other experiences that do 
not meet the core criteria in a different light.  
 
However, there are ways that category inflation is problematic. As a 
core spirit category naturally inflates due to growing cultural 
salience, inevitably part of the inflation will be made up of false 
positives. For example, after lecturing on the Old Hag I have had 
subjects tell me that they have had the Old Hag only to report an 
experience that is clearly not what I was talking about, such as a 
dream of trying to run but feeling like you are “running in 
molasses.” That is a common dream, but for Old Hag it is a false 
positive. False positives, along with more ambiguous experiences 
such as dreams, guarantee that there will always be some 
unconvincing reasons for spirit belief—just as there will always be 




some poor reasons offered for well-established beliefs such as that 
the world is round. Modern researchers have generally looked 
systematically for poor reasons for beliefs they assume to be false. 
Category inflation assures a good supply of these. However, 
understanding category inflation also suggests ways of avoiding 
weak study designs. Whether a belief is true or false one will always 
learn more by looking for the best reasons people have for holding 
the belief than by seeking foolish reasons. 
 
Bad Reasons and the Issue of Bias 
 
Category inflation is only one source of bad reasons for belief. Poor 
reasons and poor reasoning should be observed and taken into 
account, but some investigators preferentially seek bad reasons for 
contested beliefs. That is intellectually unacceptable. 
 
Bias is an inclination in a particular direction. Although usually used 
in a negative sense as prejudice, bias may be positive, as in the 
scientific inclination favouring rational inference. Bias is 
omnipresent in human thought. The idea that it can be eliminated 
makes it covert, whereas acknowledging and controlling for biases is 
always good method. Therefore, discovering bias in an inference 
does not negate the conclusion, but may call it into question. 
 
I proposed Methodological Symmetry in an effort to control bias in 
the study of stigmatized belief. The errors in assessing prevalence 
and distribution, overlooking the effects of category 
inflation/deflation and “language capture” are sources of 
unintentional bias in belief study. But the assumed spirit-science 
contradiction has led some scholars to propose certain biases 
(beyond the standard inclinations of the scientific method) as 
explicitly necessary to good methodology. 
 
For example, Christina Larner criticizes the open-mindedness that 
she calls the “neo-relativist position,” asserting "I see 
methodological atheism as a necessary starting point for any 
sociological exploration of the concept of God," a position that she 
says “makes the latent functions of a belief more easily detectable.” 
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(1984: 11) But this does not just make latent functions “more easily 
detectable,” it guarantees creation of grounds for a latent functional 
interpretation. In contrast, Ninian Smart called for "methodological 
neutralism" (1973: 94) or "methodological agnosticism" (p. 108), 
avoiding the assumption that a belief under investigation is false to 
“keep options of interpretation open and so that we can actually use 
data to test theory" (p. 148).  
 
Latent Functional Analysis 
 
As Larner’s position demonstrates, latent functions represent a kind 
of powerful covert bias that helps assimilate beliefs that are puzzling 
to the outsider. Although the analysis of latent functions can be 
useful, its typical formulation is implicitly biased. 
 
The concept of manifest and latent functions was developed by 
Robert K. Merton. Manifest functions are conscious and deliberate 
(like purposes). For example, the manifest function (purpose) of 
psychoanalysis is to improve mental health. Latent functions are 
unconscious and not deliberate: Freud theorized that spiritual belief 
has the latent function of (neurotic) defence against the fear of death.  
 
Latent functions may give rise to beliefs, but because they are 
unconscious they cannot be a rational basis for the subject’s belief. 
Thus latent functions are often used by outside analysts as evidence 
of the non-rational nature of belief. Typically manifest functions are 
assumed to be rational and effective while latent functions are 
ineffective and rationally unfounded. An unusually explicit example 
of this dichotomization is found in the comments of Bryan Wilson 
writing on the subject of rationality: "Clearly functionalism has 
greatest cogency as a mode of explanation where latent functions can 
be revealed. It is not distinguishable as a form of explanation where 
rational action occurs in accordance with internal beliefs” (1970: 
xvi-xvii). Essentially, latent functional analysis asserts that people 
mistakenly believe they know their reasons for what they do, but that 
an objective functionalist scholar can tell both that they are 
mistaken, and what the real reason (the latent function) for their 
actions is. Wilson further implies that actions performed for proper 




reasons that are known to the actors do not have latent functions or 
that those functions are not significant.  
 
These assertions are highly questionable. Obviously manifest 
functions may be wrong, and the intended purpose may not actually 
be served. Many now believe that is the case with psychoanalysis. 
More certainly, the manifest function of keeping a firearm in the 
home is often protection—to lower the risk of injury or death; but 
the data show that this practice is actually associated with increased 
risk of someone in the household being a homicide victim (e.g., 
Dahlberg et al. 2004). When manifest functions prove wrong, one 
may search for latent functions as an alternative explanation. Both 
psychoanalysis and support for gun ownership serve a variety of 
latent functions, and would do so whether the practices are well 
founded or not. But other explanations also exist, including simple 
error. 
 
It should also be obvious that latent functions may actually serve 
useful purposes, even if these are not a primary motivation. Given 
the multi-causal nature of human behaviour, manifest functions may 
be supplemented by latent functions in effective practices and true 
beliefs: prescription control of medical drugs reduces dangerous 
misuse (manifest function). This control also has the latent function 
of increasing the authority, power and profitability of the medical 
profession. This latent function does not negate the manifest function 
of the practice, but it does help to account for its support by doctors. 
Similarly, many who believe in life after death because of an NDE 
or ADC are unlikely to agree that they “believe in life after death 
because it reduces their fear of death.” But neither would they 
disagree that their belief has this consequence. 
 
The typical selective use of latent functional analysis, as illustrated 
by Wilson and encouraged by Larner, embeds a potent covert bias. 
Identifying latent functions is assumed to undermine any claim to a 
rational basis for the belief or practice in question. That assumption 
is unwarranted! Functional analysis needs to be re-examined and 
reformed to be useful in the study of contested beliefs. Debunking 
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Anthropology has a long-standing interest in the role of language in 
shaping worldview (e.g., the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis), and that 
interest has been instrumental in crafting a disenchanted modernity. 
Terms relevant to spirit beliefs and encounters, and their 
interpretation, are besieged by modernity and often captured, pressed 
into service to advance disenchantment, in many academic 
disciplines. The issue of belief-versus-knowledge discussed above is 
one example, embedded in the Humean dichotomy of 
science/rationality-versus-religion/faith (scientia vs. credo). 




The disenchantment project rests largely on the assertion that belief 
in spirits is not rational. This idea was used to justify the 
Enlightenment division between science, in charge of rational 
knowledge, and religion, based on faith, feeling and intuition. By the 
20th century this notion was so entrenched that even sympathetic 
anthropologists like Boas sought to protect non-Western belief by 
undercutting the idea of a universal rationality through cultural 
relativism. The need for this hermeneutic protection has been based 
on the belief that modern rationality (generally meaning modern 
science) contradicts spirit belief. But widely held spirit beliefs 
arising from common spirit experiences usually do not contradict 
any well-supported scientific knowledge. There are certainly 
religious beliefs that contradict scientific knowledge, such as 
Creationism versus geological time and evolution. But Creationism 
is not an experience-based belief! It is a religious doctrine based on 
interpretations of revelation. This is one reason that the distinction 
between religion and spirituality, discussed below, is so crucial. 
Modernity has implicitly redefined the term rational to mean 
material. Examples abound from the early Enlightenment to 
contemporary Internet chat: “The most skeptical researchers believe 




that all ghostly phenomena have rational explanations. Those who 
try to prove the existence of ghosts, however, claim that while some 




The issue is no longer whether a particular spirit belief is rationally 
tenable; it is whether the belief is rational or spiritual; game over, 
spirit belief loses rationality. 
 
However, according to the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
“rational” means “having the faculty of reasoning; endowed with 
reason” (Brown 1993: 2482). Simon Blackburn’s Oxford Dictionary 
of Philosophy states: 
 
‘Reasoning’. Any conclusion or drawing a conclusion from a set of 
premises may be called a process of reasoning …  such processes 
may be good or bad; if they are good, the premises support or even 
entail the conclusion drawn; if they are bad, the premises offer no 
support to the conclusion. (2005: 310) 
 
Blackburn defines a “premise” as “one of the propositions from 
which together the conclusion is derived” (2005: 289). Thus a belief 
is rational if it rests appropriately (reasonably) on premises that 
support it. Rational beliefs are not all true—pre-Copernican belief 
that the sun went round the Earth was rational but not true—and not 
all true beliefs are equally rational. But all beliefs (rational and 
irrational) are intelligible and in principle open to rational 
discussion. 
  
The rationality of beliefs cannot be judged on the basis of whether 
one considers them true or likes them. They cannot be judged not 
rational by appeals to authority but, rather, only on specific analysis 
and argument. Rational beliefs stand in contrast to rationally 
unfounded beliefs that are nonetheless intransigent, as in the “fixed 
ideas” called delusions. But a “fixed belief” is not fixed in this sense 
just because its holders refuse to change their minds (we who believe 
the Earth goes round the sun refuse to change our minds). The 
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delusional status of a belief’s fixity depends on the adequacy of 
alleged reasons that one should change one’s mind, placing the issue 
of the rationality of spirit belief in the same logical context as other 
beliefs rooted in experience. This distinction is essential to reforming 
the discourse of scholarship regarding spirits. 
 
Spirituality and Religion 
 
Spirituality is even more lexically complex than rationality. 
Academic interest in spirituality has grown rapidly in the past twenty 
years (Hufford 2005). But in the process academic efforts to define 
spirituality have been made arduous by the refusal to confront the 
issue of spirits (Hufford 2010). For example, one leader in the field 
defines spirituality as “that which allows a person to experience 
transcendent meaning in life...whatever beliefs and values give a 
person a sense of meaning and purpose in life” (Puchalski 2000: 
129). Such meaning-centred definitions of spirituality arise from 
Christian Existential theology, especially the influence of Paul 
Tillich, (1886 –1965), who saw spirituality as the totality of human 
qualities (1953: 51). This entirely avoids the embarrassing matter of 
spirits, and eliminates the universalizing spirituality of animism and 
panentheism. This defines spirituality without spirits—unless one 
believes that all human qualities arise from a non-material soul. In 
that case, spirit is implicit and the definition smuggles in a particular 
theology.! 
 
Ironically, a wealth of data on the meaning of spirituality in English 
is easily available in the lexicology literature, and the meanings are 
concise and clear. Spirituality means the quality relating to spirit. 
The New Oxford English Dictionary defines spirit as “1. The 
animating or life-giving principle in humans and animals. 2. The 
immaterial part of a corporeal being.” In English, spirituality has 
referred to spirits for more than five centuries (Skeat 1909). 
 
Religions are institutions organized around spirituality. Religions are 
culture-bound. But the concept of spirit varies sufficiently for cross-
culturally application: spiritual beliefs may be more about forces 
(e.g., qi) or processes (e.g., reincarnation) than about deities or other 




entities or they may be very theo-centric. Being religious, that is, 
having commitment to a particular spiritual institution, varies by 
degrees. This explains why some Americans say they are “spiritual, 
but not religious”: they hold spiritual beliefs, but do not accept the 
authority of a given religion; the tendency for modern religion to 
avoid spirits is often a reason for moderns to prefer spirituality to 
religion.  
 
It is often mistakenly claimed that the spirituality-religion distinction 
is new (George et al. 2000: 103). The development of religious 
dissent and pluralism leads to a multiplication of spiritual views that 
may seem eccentric, perhaps even “not authentically spiritual from 
within an orthodox religious perspective”. But the idea of spirituality 
as separable from religion is not new in America. (Ahlstrom 1972; 
Butler 1990; Fuller 2001; Hufford 2010). It is central to a strong and 
historically deep American spiritual tradition associated with 
progressive philosophies since before the American Revolution 
(Schmidt 2005). The “spiritual but not religious” tradition preserved 
belief in spirit, especially among intellectuals, against modern 
theological and philosophical dogma. 
 
Language capture is the explicit changing of lexically established 
meanings to new meanings that advance specific, often covert, 
theoretical positions. This removes useful terms from discourse on 
stigmatized topics, while advancing the stigmatizing theories. To 
define spirituality as that which provides ultimate meaning to the 
believer incorporates a theory about the origins of religion and 
simultaneously excludes some of the most common spirit 
experiences. Ignoring the distinction between spiritual and religious, 
allows metaphysical religious arguments (e.g., about the existence of 
God) to displace the common spirit encounters such as visits from 
the deceased that form the empirical base of spirit belief. This 
conflation of Western religion and spirituality makes theism a 










The disenchanted world of modernity arose from the interplay of 
traditional religion, the Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance, 
colonialism, the Enlightenment, and the rapid development of 
technology and science in the 19th and 20th centuries. Much of the 
modern antagonism to traditional spirit belief resulted from struggles 
over cultural authority between secular and religious institutions. In 
this process belief in spirits, the core of religious traditions, came to 
be viewed by many intellectuals as hostile to science. Although 
some religious doctrines are contrary to science, many widespread 
spirit beliefs are not. 
 
The presumed contradiction between spirit belief and science 
provided much of the foundation for modern theories about spirit 
belief. It followed that most of these theories assumed spirit belief 
would recede before modern education and science. Belief in science 
versus belief in spirits was constructed as a forced choice (Ferngren 
2002). Choosing science was equated with powerful and attractive 
improvements in modern life, from transportation to medicine. 
Science solved the mysteries of the world, spirit belief was said to 
mystify the world. Belief in spirits, outside the radically transcendent 
context of modern religion, was stigmatized and sanctions attended 
it. Why wouldn’t the rational person choose science? 
 
Religious institutions provided little protection from scientism. In 
traditional belief, spirits were plentiful and of many kinds, often 
interacting with humans for good or ill. But the spirits of modern 
religion were few and distant. The science-spirit contrast became 
increasingly stark, resulting in what Peter Berger called “the demise 
of the supernatural” (1969). But as Twain said about reports of his 
death, the reported demise of the supernatural was a great 
exaggeration (White 1897). 
 
If modern theories of spirit belief were correct, its demise would 
have been inevitable. Its persistence throughout modernity and 
among well-educated, sane persons shows these theories to be 
wrong, in both description and explanation. Anthropology has been a 




central player in the development of modern theories seeking to 
exclude from modern life spirit belief and, even more, spirit 
encounters. Those theories require radical reformation, not 
secondary elaboration.  
 
Reforming our understanding of spirit belief requires that we 
confront both the empirical and rational roots of many spirit beliefs, 
and that we not assume all spirit belief to be the same or equally 
(in)valid. First-person research should include experimental efforts 
to achieve experiential access to the believer’s viewpoint, as in 
ethnographic fieldwork. It should also include openness to scholars 
willing to describe their own experiences of “encountering the 
invisible.” I personally did not publicly acknowledge my own “Old 
Hag attack” for decades, because I knew that ironically it would 
harm my academic credibility. But first-person research is not 
enough. If we require the scholar’s own spirit experience, we simply 
reinforce the hermeneutic circle – but now the researcher is inside 
the circle.  
 
The empirical investigation of spirit belief hinges on the inclusion of 
experiential grounds for belief in a symmetrical and 
epistemologically fair enterprise (Hufford 2002). In this effort, 
neither rationality in general nor science in particular is the enemy. 
Fair and effective inquiry begins with rigorous methods and controls 
for bias. Science is not the problem, but the modern cultural bias of 
scientism is (Hufford 2003). In a long struggle scientism captured 
the flag of rationality.  
 
If we are to understand the ubiquitous experience of human spirit 
encounters and beliefs, we need rationality back. Present day, pan-
human spirit encounters prove that the spirits do not need the 
infantilizing protection of hermeneuticism and “multiple logics” in 
order to survive. What is good in modernity will survive our growing 
understanding. Modernity can protect itself, and the academic 
disciplines must stop their cooperation in erecting irrational 
authoritarian defences for its unwarranted assumptions. 
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Science, Superstition, and the Supernatural: 
Exploring the Tension between Skepticism  






Investigating the tension between scientific and religious paradigms 
has been at the heart of my academic journey. As I am deeply 
invested in a scientific way of perceiving the world and equally 
curious about religion and the spirit world, the question of 
experiences with spirits has been at the forefront of my studies. In 
Europe and North America, scientists and religious specialists have 
been debating the limits of and compartmentalizing their domains of 
knowledge since the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution. 
Deborah Blum describes the people of that time and the tension they 
felt when referring to the work of Everard Fielding, a psychic 
investigator of the early 20th century:  
 
They lived surrounded by new knowledge, inundated by facts; they 
were told absolutely that such information was the only route to 
certainty about the universe. They were given no guidance as to how 
religious feeling, faith, or intuition might fit into that world; they 
were given less guidance if they experienced a supernatural event - 
saw a crisis apparition, had a premonition, or simply felt an inner 
sense of belief in something more. "If but some link could be 
established between the two, some stepping-stone laid on which 
they could venture out into the dark stream, their confidence would 
be restored," Fielding13 would insist. And he would mourn the past, 
grieve for the loss of that moment when he and his friends had 
thought they might reconcile science and faith after all, and find that 
elusive path, as faint and as real as moonlight, leading to a universe 
where all things were possible (Blum 2006: 321). 
 
13 Fielding, Everard, 1925, “Can Psychical Research Contribute to Religious 
Apologetics?,” Dublin Review, April-June; reprinted in Fielding, Everard, 
1963: 326-334. 




Many scholars have tried to bridge the gap between scientific and 
religious ideologies that was broadened with the advent of modern 
science in the West. This is my attempt to contribute to that 
endeavour.  
 
While conducting fieldwork among Sioux and Cree medicine men in 
Canada as well as traditional Chinese spirit mediums in Taiwan, I 
have encountered beliefs and experiences for which the model of 
Western scientific materialism does not to provide satisfying 
explanations. To explore why this is, I will start with an introduction 
to the development of Western skeptical philosophy and some of its 
dealings with experiences with spirits. This will be followed with 
ethnographic accounts from three people, one from Taiwan and two 
from Canada, who have participated in my research and demonstrate 
the tension that results from being invested in scientific materialism 
and having experiences with spirits. Lastly, I will explore solutions 
with regard to the problem of experience with spirits for those of us 




In movies such as The Rite and 1408, skeptical individuals 
unconvincingly try to explain away experiences with spirits while 
revealing that their skepticism is based on traumatic events from 
their obscured past rather than on scientific inquiry. The assumption 
by filmmakers is that audiences consider skeptics to be cynical, 
arrogant, and emotionally scarred. Though this portrayal sorely 
misrepresents the true spirit of skepticism, it highlights the fact that a 
strong tendency to disbelieve experiences with spirits can be just as 
biased as the tendency of extreme believers to attribute every bump 
in the night to supernatural causes (Wiseman 1998).  
 
As long as we have had the power of self-reflection, we have 
doubted. Modern popular portrayals of skeptics are of people who 
are closed-minded in their denial of non-scientific explanations 
(Martoccia 2013). Scholarly skepticism traces its roots to the ancient 
philosophies of the Greeks, in particular Socrates and Pyrrho. The 
basic tenets of their philosophies were that doubt is a necessary part 




of the process of arriving at the truth and that we cannot know the 
objective nature of reality (Bridgestock 2009). Pyrrho admitted, 
though, that since we cannot know the objective nature of reality, we 
have to settle for our collective subjective (or intersubjective) 
experience and live in accord with the customs of our society. 
 
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and David Hume (1769-1850) are 
generally credited with the development of modern skepticism 
(Bridgestock 2009; van Ede 2009). Descartes, “father of modern 
philosophy”, was one of the first scholars to advocate for the 
importance of doubt in the pursuit of knowledge since the ancient 
Greeks. Like the Greeks, he restricted his doubt to the philosophical 
pursuit of knowledge and accepted the customs and habits of his 
society. Unlike the ancient Greeks, though, he doubted the 
appearance of things, not just the unknowable objective reality 
behind them. Descartes doubted even the subjective experience of 
our senses and questioned what we collectively accepted to be real. 
This doubting of appearances could be credited, for example, with 
laying the foundation for the idea that our bodies are made of more 
space than matter, and that it is only the forces that bind the matter 
together that give our bodies the appearance of solidity.  
 
David Hume is credited with the development of empiricism, from 
which we get the saying “seeing is believing” (Bridgestock 2009; 
Hume 2007; van Ede 2009). He was opposed to Descartes in that he 
believed we can only trust that which we can directly observe, and 
did not doubt appearances but admitted that nothing can be inferred 
from them with absolute certainty. Hume argued that all knowledge 
comes from experience, which is limited and can lead to mistakes, 
but knowledge that guides us in a course of action must be based on 
something, otherwise we are paralyzed by doubt. Wisdom and 
correct action come from weighing the evidence for and against a 
theory. In the case of extraordinary experiences like miracles, Hume 
argued that by definition they defy the laws of the natural world and 
the world as we have come to understand it through our collectively 
accumulated knowledge. Therefore, he asserted that extraordinary 
phenomena, like miracles, required extraordinary evidence to prove 




them. This sentiment was later echoed by Carl Sagan (1934-1996) 
and skeptics refer to it as Sagan’s balance (Caso 2002).  
 
Hume’s argument that extraordinary experiences necessarily defy 
the laws of nature is not a universal belief. The commonly accepted 
categorization of “supernatural” in Western culture is not found in 
every culture, and anthropological research indicates that not all 
cultures view the spirit world as being non-natural (Klass 1995; 
McClennon 1995). I have been a participant observer in Sweat 
Lodges and other First Nations ceremonies in western Canada since 
1999, and in Sioux culture, the spirit world is uniquely in tune with 
the natural world (Niehardt 1932). In ceremonies such as the Vision 
Quest, a practitioner enters an altered state of consciousness through 
fasting where it becomes possible for spirits to send messages or 
speak through non-human mediums (e.g., animals, plants). In this 
way the natural world is infused with spiritual potency, and 
spiritually gifted individuals may walk through everyday life with 
the ability to sense these messages without the aid of fasting. I have 
also done extensive research on religion in Taiwan where, according 
to traditional Chinese culture, the heavens are modelled after an 
imperial government (Feuchtwang 2001; Weller 1999). Spirits are 
ruled by the same social conventions, organization, wants, and needs 
as the living. During funerals, Tomb Sweeping Day, and the Hungry 
Ghost Festival, special money and cardboard copies of popular 
commodities (e.g., cell phones, laptops, cars, etc.) are burned as 
offerings to the dead so that they can be prosperous in the afterlife. 
For the Taiwanese, the spirit world is a reflection of both the living 
natural and human worlds.  
 
Both the Sioux and Taiwanese spiritualist traditions share the idea 
that, though this spirit world may be integrated with the natural and 
human worlds, it is not necessarily governed by the same immutable, 
physical laws. For example, ritual specialists from both traditions 
have mentioned that time in the spirit world is opposite to ours, the 
world of the living. They indicate that night in the living world is 
day in the spirit world. In Taiwan, this manifests as taboos regarding 
twilight for people who are having problems with troublesome 




spirits because Taiwanese spiritualists believe twilight is when 
spirits are waking up and are most active.  
 
In the late 1800s, during the height of the debates between scientists 
and theologians in Europe, a small group of open-minded scientists 
endeavoured to satisfy Hume’s argument that extraordinary 
phenomena require extraordinary evidence (Blum 2006). This group 
included such notable scholars as Alfred Wallace (1823-1913), who 
jointly presented the idea of natural selection as a mechanism for 
evolution with Charles Darwin, and William James (1842-1910), 
who is often credited with being the founder of American 
psychology. During this time, spiritualism—a belief that the spirits 
of the dead reside in an afterlife and can communicate with the 
living—was rising as a reaction to the rigid doctrines of both 
scientists and theologians. This preoccupation with the spirit world 
was fertile ground for those who wished to investigate experiences 
with the afterlife and who would eventually found the British 
Society for Psychical Research (1882, a.k.a. SPR). The goal of the 
SPR, which still operates today14, is to investigate extraordinary 
experiences using scientific principles.  
 
At the time of their founding, members of SPR spent most of their 
efforts investigating mediums that were part of the spiritualist 
movement and claimed to be able to contact the dead. The rules they 
set out to follow when investigating these claims were that the 
medium had to have no prior contact with the clients, they had to 
have no information about the clients’ families, and they could not 
ask leading questions of their clients. This was to ensure that 
mediums had no prior knowledge that would undermine the validity 
of their claim to contact the dead. After many years of evaluating 
mediums for their authenticity, SPR generally found that most 
professional mediums were fraudulent and unreliable—either they 
outright faked the experience with props or sleight of hand, or could 
not produce results with any consistency. Though most mediums 
proved to be false and academic support for such research was 
scarce, there were enough mediums whose powers could not be 
 
14 www.spr.ac.uk/ 




sufficiently disproven (e.g., David Home, Eusapia Palladino, and 
Leonora Piper) to keep SPR motivated to continue their research. 
 
Richard Hodgson (1855-1905), in particular, was well known for 
discrediting famous mediums and was sent by SPR to Boston to 
investigate Leonora Piper at the request of William James (Blum 
2006). Mrs. Piper was a reluctant medium who became well known 
through word of mouth for her ability to know things that she should 
not be able to (e.g., family secrets). She desired only to be a well-
respected, middle-class wife and mother, but after some 
encouragement from James, she agreed to participate in Hodgson’s 
research. Hodgson, ever the skeptic after all the frauds he had 
discredited, assumed that when Mrs. Piper related to him the 
specifics of how his long dead cousin died that she had found this 
out through some kind of background investigation. In an effort to 
uncover Mrs. Piper’s fraudulent techniques, Hodgson hired private 
detectives, but after a month of surveillance they had discovered 
nothing to indicate that Mrs. Piper was doing anything to provide her 
with the knowledge she should not have had. After sitting with 130 
clients and having many sittings himself, Hodgson claimed that Mrs. 
Piper was the only genuine medium he encountered, though other 
members of SPR claimed they had found more. As his research with 
her continued, Hodgson had the chance to test Mrs. Piper regarding a 
recently deceased friend that she had no connection with besides 
him. He found that on questioning her regarding specific and 
obscure details about his friend’s life that she produced consistent 
and reliable results. Hodgson eventually got his work with Mrs. 
Piper published in the periodical Saturday Review, but much of the 
work from the SPR was lost in obscurity because of the number of 
mediums that had been proven false, such that investigation into the 
spiritual nature of humanity was thought to be best left to 
theologians rather than scientists.  
 
In the early 1900s, experiences with spirits were considered unfit for 
proper scientific study, and this attitude is promoted by many 
scientists to this day. For example, the United States’ National 
Science Foundation states that “science and religion are based on 
different aspects of the human experience” and that “because they 




are not part of nature, supernatural entities cannot be investigated by 
science” (Drees 2010: 13-14). Investigating experiences with spirits 
continues to have a negative impact on the reputation of anyone 
trying to establish themselves as a legitimate scientist (van Ede 
2009). Though Alfred Wallace and William James were pivotal 
personages in their respective fields, they rarely receive the credit 
they are due when compared to their contemporaries—Darwin and 
Freud—in part because of their association with SPR and 
spiritualism (Blum 2006). They both died with the concern that, 
although many claims about contact with the spirits were found to be 
false, ignoring the few credible cases might blind scientists to some 
underlying truth about the nature of reality. 
 
In the skeptical movement of the 20th century, as led by such 
scholars as Carl Sagan and Paul Kurtz, it is acknowledged that our 
beliefs rest ultimately on probabilities (Kurtz 1995). Kurtz’s version 
of skepticism is motivated by a cautiously open-minded sense of 
inquiry that aims to be positive and constructive. The New 
Skepticism (or Mitigating Skepticism) that Kurtz promotes, like 
ancient and modern skepticism, acknowledges that skepticism is 
essential for a healthy mind committed to uncovering the truth, but 
when taken to excess, can lead to paralyzing doubt. We must accept 
some beliefs as true in order to function in the world even while 
entertaining the notion that those beliefs may be wrong or that there 
are better ways of doing things. It is in this spirit of practical 
skepticism that I present the following three case studies. One 
happens in the context of Taiwanese religious culture, which I will 
give some background information on; another is in with a woman 
from Canada; the third is regarding myself. In each case the person 
was skeptical of what they were experiencing, but was ultimately 
driven by practical needs to find meaning and solutions for problems 
that modern scientific materialism was deficient in providing. 
 
Taiwanese Ghosts and Ancestors  
 
Lady Wu said to her son, “Confucius claimed that ‘ghostly spirits 
manifest inexhaustible potency.’ He also said, ‘Pray ye to the spirits 
dispersed above and concentrated below.’ We may not doubt such 




things as ghostly spirits.” (Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Luo 
Guanzhong 1991: 224) 
 
Lady Wu admonished her son Sun Ce, ruler of the Southlands, for 
executing a powerful Daoist monk in his crusade to rid the land of 
what he deemed to be wasteful superstition. Tormented by the spirit 
of the man he has killed, his stubborn refusal to acknowledge the 
power of the spiritual world quickly resulted in him getting sick and 
dying from its influence. Though many of the young people I 
interviewed in Taiwan (Habkirk 2012) were skeptical about the 
existence of gods, only one gave me a definitive no when asked if he 
believed in spirits (though he had dreamed about the spirit of his 
stepfather), and most of them told me about personal experiences 
they had with spirits. According to Jean DeBernardi (2006), Chinese 
belief15 in spirits predates Confucianism and continues to this day. In 
traditional Chinese religion as practiced in Taiwan, a soul may enter 
into the world of shades, which is similar to the world of the living, 
or it may go to hell to atone for its mistakes and eventually be 
reincarnated (Jordan 1972). In the world of shades, a spirit can be 
content if it receives offerings that are usually the obligation of 
living family members to give.  
 
In the world of shades, the afterlife is much like the world of the 
living, and the descendants of the deceased make offerings of money 
and paper items so that their ancestors are provided for (DeBernardi 
2006). Those who have someone to make offerings to them and 
maintain relations with the living are called ancestors (zǔxiān祖先) 
while those who do not receive offerings or have died tragically 
become hungry or troublesome ghosts (guǐ鬼), although one 
person’s ancestor may be another’s gui (Harrell 1974; Wolf 1974). 
 
15 The island of Taiwan was a part of greater China until 1949. Between 
1895 and 1945, it was a part of the Japanese empire. It was returned to 
China after World War II. The Nationalist Party (Guomingdang) of China 
fled to Taiwan in 1949 and set up their own government after they were 
defeated by the Communists. Otherwise, it has shared a long cultural history 
with China and other countries with large Chinese populations (e.g. Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, etc.).  




Gui occupy the opposite end of the continuum of supernatural beings 
from gods (shén神), and somewhere in the middle are ancestors. 
Whereas believers consider shen to be pure, upper-class kings, 
generals, and officials (even if they were not of such high status in 
life), gui are often dirty, lower-class peasants, beggars, thieves, and 
other people of ill repute. They act like beggars and bullies even 
though they may not have been so in life. Without people to make 
offerings to them in the world of the living, the deceased may be 
reduced to a lower class in the world of shades.  
 
The relationship a person has to a spirit plays a large part in whether 
a spirit is considered a god, ancestor or hungry ghost. In Western 
culture, we typically associate any experiences with a phantasmal 
person as a ‘ghost experience’ regardless of our relationship with the 
spirit. In traditional Chinese culture, designation as a god is evident 
through veneration by those who have no personal history with the 
spirit while it was a living person, but the distinction between gui 
and ancestor is less clear. If ancestors are slighted in some way by 
their descendants, they, too, can act maliciously (Wolf 1974), and in 
either case the Taiwanese go to great lengths to avoid such 
encounters.  
 
Wolf (1974) distinguishes between gui who are actively harmful and 
may have been malicious individuals while living, and those who are 
passively harmful as Taiwanese people believe any contact with gui 
can bring about misfortune and sickness. As Charles Emmons (1982) 
notes from his research on beliefs about spirits in Hong Kong, some 
gui are not necessarily evil but just seek to satisfy their desires, 
which is why they are known as ‘hungry ghosts’. Gui are not only 
those without someone to make offerings to them, but they can also 





I conducted fieldwork in Tainan, Taiwan from 2006-2008 and have 
returned there twice (August-November 2010 and March 2012) since 




moving back to Canada. Tainan is the traditional cultural heartland 
of Taiwan and is well known for its constant public religious 
festivities. Taiwanese typically assume that most foreigners do not 
believe in spirits and look down on people that do as superstitious; 
nonetheless, as word got around about my MA research, my 
Taiwanese friends began to open up to me about their experiences 
with spirits. I then specifically targeted people who were 20-40 years 
old and had at least some post-secondary education for formal 
interviews. Regardless of their investment into scientific materialism 
through their education, the majority of the participants in my 
research had no problem maintaining a belief in spirits as well as 
faith in science and materialism.  
 
In March of 2012, I was in Taiwan making a documentary film 
based on my earlier research and the host of the movie crew, Evon, 
insisted that I interview her friend Ivory. Evon was well aware of my 
research interests, and in the spirit of letting the Taiwanese tell their 
own story through the film, I trusted her judgment and arranged the 
interview. Ivory was 23 at the time and worked as a secretary at her 
father’s lumber company. She said she was not particularly religious 
and originally only went to temples when familial obligation 
required her to do so. When she was 16 years old, though, she 
became very sick and emotionally unstable.  
 
I didn't have much pressure in school. I had a lot of friends. I was 
doing okay in school. I was pretty happy. There was a period of time 
suddenly where I was just not right. Like in class, I was very sleepy. 
No matter how early I went to bed, the next day I was just tired. I 
was just not right and then one day suddenly in the class I started 
crying for no reason. The teacher was in the class and was like, 
"What's going on there?" I was just crying like very, very sad, but I 
could not stop myself. I just couldn't control myself. My teacher 
thought it was stress or something, so they sent me to see the nurse. 
That was the first time and it stopped, and I didn't take it seriously. I 
thought maybe it was PMS because at that time I was going through 
my period, but after that the frequency was more often. First it was 
crying and then after it became crying and laughing. I just couldn't 
stop and in the end there was like a burp [makes sound like a 




hiccup], but it did not come from my stomach, like in my body or 
something. I just couldn't stop makes hiccup sound. I kept doing it 
and start shaking and crying and that was just the beginning.  
 
Ivory’s mother took her to doctors first who tried a variety of tests 
and medications. When they had finally exhausted the options 
modern medicine provided them with, Ivory’s mother started taking 
her to temples. At the second temple, Ivory lost consciousness when 
the attendant asked her who she was. According to traditional 
Taiwanese spiritualism, if a person has been possessed or spiritually 
polluted by a spirit, proximity to a virtuous god will cause the 
possessed or polluted person to get sick and try to expel the unclean 
spirit. After a series of questions, the temple attendant determined 
that Ivory was possessed by two spirits she was related to but did not 
know about, a young boy and young girl. The attendant asked if 
Ivory’s mother knew anything about having a brother and sister who 
died prematurely but she did not, so they went to ask Ivory’s 
grandmother. To their surprise, Ivory’s grandmother confirmed that 
she had had two children who had passed away that Ivory’s mother 
did not know about. They returned to the temple where Ivory once 
again became possessed, but the attendant informed them that they 
had to go to a higher god in the pantheon to get the help they needed. 
At the next temple they went to, Ivory became even sicker:  
 
As soon as I walked in the door I just dropped. The whole way I was 
just walking down on my knees with my head down. No one could 
get me up. My mom said, "Ivory, don't be like this. People are 
watching. Don't embarrass yourself." But I couldn’t help it. My legs 
wouldn’t let me stand up. A woman, she had a paper in her hand and 
she was speaking in some language I couldn’t understand, waved 
incense around me and I started hiccupping, puking, and crying. It 
was very painful. It was really painful, with the screaming and all 
the people just watching me and I couldn't stop. I felt embarrassed, 
but I couldn't stop. Then the woman said something and burned 
some ghost money16 and I started feeling better. 
 
 
16 Taiwanese burn various kinds of ritual money as offering to spirits. They 
have different kinds of spirit money for shen, zuxian, and gui. 




After further communication with the spirits, the temple attendants 
determined that the spirits had wanted to train Ivory to be a spirit 
medium and were looking for someone to help them become gods so 
that they could help people, but Ivory had no desire to become a 
spirit medium, so they agreed to leave her alone. Since then she has 
been in good health. During times when hungry ghosts are especially 
active, like the Hungry Ghost Festival (also known as Ghost Month 
because it falls on the 7th month of the lunar calendar) she might feel 
a bit sick, but a trip to the temple to maintain her relationship to the 
god remedies any illness.  
 
Skeptics will often claim that experiences with spirits are based on 
irrational belief. From an insider’s perspective Taiwanese beliefs are 
perfectly logical, though skeptics may claim other grounds for what 
they see as erroneous beliefs (e.g, lack of concrete evidence, 
inability to independently verify, etc.). A spirit medium I 
interviewed in 2006, Mr. Fu, said that people who are born with a 
low bāzì（八字） can see spirits, and every other Taiwanese person 
with whom I discussed the topic repeated the same thing. A person’s 
bazi is a divining number based on when a person is born. The 
number indicates the strength of one’s life energy (qì气). A light 
number means one’s qi is weak and that person is more prone to 
seeing and being seen by spirits, while a heavy number means one’s 
qi is strong. Another way, the Taiwanese research participants 
explained to me, was that each world (e.g., various Buddhist and 
Daoist heavens, the Earth, the world of shades, and the hells) is like 
a wave that vibrates at a different frequency. A person with weak qi 
has a vibration that is closer to the world of shades, so they can see 
spirits and spirits can see them. People who can see spirits are said to 
have yin-yang eyes, a heavenly eye, or the Buddha’s eye. Yin-yang 
eyes enable a person to see hungry ghosts and ancestors. The 
heavenly eye and the Buddha’s eye are related to higher levels of 
spiritual cultivation rather than a person’s bazi but they include yin-
yang eyes. The heavenly eye enables people to see gods and 
immortals, and the Buddha’s eye enables them to see their past and 
future lives.  
 




From the perspective of a Taiwanese person who maintains 
traditional religious beliefs and practices, it is perfectly logical to 
believe in and interact with spirits, and it is foolhardy to deny such 
things. Stories like Ivory’s, in which traditional spiritual medicine 
provides solutions where modern medicine has failed, are fairly 
common among people who have had experiences with spirits 
(Bridgestock 2009; McClennon 1995). Ivory was fortunate to be 
immersed in a culture that has ready solutions to such problems as 
possession and other negative experiences with spirits that Jean 
DeBernardi (2006: 69) identifies as “spiritual collisions”. In the 
following case study, the research participant was not as fortunate, 
and denial of her experiences served to magnify the negative impact 




Michelle and I grew up in the same city in Canada, Edmonton, 
Alberta. In contrast with Taiwan, religion is a very private affair in 
Edmonton. Like Ivory, Michelle is not particularly religious and she 
identified her most spiritual practice as spending time outdoors (e.g., 
camping, hiking, etc.). I met her at a volunteer party for a festival 
that I help to coordinate. She was 34 years of age at the time. When I 
explained what I do for a living and my research interests, she began 
to tell me about some of her more unusual experiences, and I asked 
if I could follow up with some formal interviews. One of the things 
that makes Michelle unique is the frequency of her experiences with 
the spirit world. She began seeing spirits at an early age, but due to 
the negative stigma associated with people who see spirits in 
Canada, she did not tell her family and has kept her ability secret for 
most of her life. As I do with all my interviews, I gave her the option 
to remain anonymous. After a moment of thought, she responded 
with the following:  
  
I think before I would not have wanted you to use my name because 
I don’t want to be judged like, “Oh yeah, Michelle, she’s crazy. 
Don’t talk to her, she is going to tell you something weird, or she 
might see something in you.” That’s another thing too, because I 
don’t want people to be afraid of me because they think that I can 




see something that… is wrong or might hurt them or whatever, but I 
decided that I don’t need to be anonymous because I am tired of 
hiding that. This is part of myself. I really am, because it is a huge 
part of me and I shouldn’t have to hide it. 
 
Her sentiment exemplifies the persistence of the idea in Western 
societies that people who have experiences with spirits are somehow 
mentally unfit. She currently runs her own interior decorating 
company, but at one time she was an acupuncturist. She eventually 
had to quit acupuncture because she had a hard time not taking on 
her clients’ issues. 
 
I did get out of acupuncture because I was burnt out just from 
touching people and getting too much information. I couldn’t filter it 
out. It was like an information overload on a totally different level 
and I just couldn’t deal with it anymore. As soon as I would touch 
someone I would start getting sick to my stomach. I don’t know how 
to deal with any of this stuff, and I don’t know how to filter what’s 
important and what’s not, so I think it all stays inside my body until 
I am just so fried that I just can’t do it anymore.  
 
Michelle is by no means a hermit, but remains sensitive to other 
people’s state of mind. She has never been diagnosed with any 
mental disorder and, regardless of her sensitivity, has no unusual 
problems functioning mentally, physically, or socially. She has 
shared a wide variety of extraordinary experiences with me, some 
with what Taiwanese people would consider hungry ghosts, but one 
experience in particular stood out as pivotal and transformative in 
her relationship to and acceptance of her sensitivity. During the time 
she was an acupuncturist, she and her ex-husband were active 
members of the acupuncture association and the Chinese community 
at large in Edmonton. Since they were not Chinese, they faced much 
opposition to their involvement in acupuncture and at one point 
Michelle started to think that they were being spiritually attacked by 
someone in the community with whom they had been friends. 
 
There was a lot of movement and electrical problems in my house. 
Very weird dreams. Things coming to visit me at night. Having the 
same dream with this person in it as my husband. It was pretty bad 




and we were getting sick quite a bit. I think that those who attack 
you, they make you ill and they break you down. So, we were 
getting sick a lot and just having really bizarre dreams and it 
actually was… it felt like a living hell. It was almost impossible to 
get rid of because I never had to deal with anything like that. I don’t 
know anything about magic or, even though I can feel ghosts, see 
them, and hear them sometimes, I don’t know how to deal with 
them. I have never been taught and I don’t know who to go to and, 
honestly, I don’t really feel like I trust anyone here because I feel 
like it’s so… New Age-y and flaky and that the information that 
they are giving me is not real. 
 
After three years of sickness and nightmares, Michelle and her 
husband finally sought out someone through the Internet who 
practiced what she described as voodoo. Through the use of 
protective mantras, potions, and spells they began to bring some 
sense of normalcy to their lives. Michelle has since come to terms 
with her sensitivity, but during this time she struggled to accept it. 
 
I think I kind of tried to bury my head in the sand a little bit. I just 
didn’t think that someone could be that horrible to do these things to 
you. So, I kind of avoided it. My husband really took the front seat, 
researched it and sought this person out. He took the reins there, and 
even after we hired that person I still kind of dug my head in the 
sand. I just didn’t want to deal with it and I didn’t know how. I was 
terrified to be quite honest. 
 
I really wish that I could talk about it more openly, and not be 
judged. And I really wish I had a place to go where I could learn 
about this kind of stuff and feel like it was valid information, 
because I feel like some of my closest friends don’t even know this 
about me. I don’t tell them, and I think that is awful. I think we 
should be able to be open about it. I have been to Asia, Vietnam, and 
Thailand, and it’s everywhere there. It’s even in the newspaper. 
 
Michelle’s denial and skepticism of her experiences did not serve her 
when dealing with the problems that she faced. She comes from a 
vastly different cultural background than Ivory, but the problems 
they faced required similar suspension of doubt in order to solve a 
practical problem.  




Case Study of an Anthropologist 
 
This last case study is autobiographical and exhibits my own 
struggle to find a solution to a very simple yet annoying problem. I 
had been living in Tainan for about a year and a half when I started 
having trouble with my television. I had lived in the same small 
apartment on my own for about six months and had no previous 
electrical issues. One night, as I lay down to fall asleep, my 
television suddenly turned on. Being the scientific materialist that I 
was raised to be, I checked the power outlet, the buttons on my TV, 
as well as the remote control for some kind of malfunction. I am 
quite technically savvy and could not find anything wrong. Thinking 
that it might have been some freak electrical power surge or some 
such thing, I went back to bed. As I lay down again, just as I was 
beginning to fall asleep, the TV turned on again and I got a brief 
visual image of a young boy standing beside my bed looking down 
at me like he wanted something. I was annoyed, and I got up to turn 
the TV off, but when I lay down again I could not sleep. The image 
of the boy seemed seared into my memory and I could not shake the 
feeling that he was still there. My intellectual reflex was to dismiss it 
as my imagination. I had been studying Taiwanese religion for some 
time and thought that it was starting to affect my imagination. The 
skeptical scientist in me, however, was eager to test the Taiwanese 
way of dealing with such encounters. In the spirit of curious inquiry, 
I tried to apply the logic of my research participants to the situation. 
If indeed there was a boy spirit who had followed me and was 
bothering me, I asked myself what a Taiwanese person would do in 
my place. The answer was simple. The boy was, as the Taiwanese 
call them, a hungry ghost, so, unless he was particularly malicious, 
he was just looking for a handout much in the same way a beggar 
would. I got up and grabbed some crackers from the cupboard, put 
them in the kitchen and said, “Here is something to eat. I am trying 
to sleep, so please take it and stop bothering me.” After doing this, I 
went back to bed and fell asleep soundly. If this was a one-night 
occurrence, I could have easily dismissed it as a coincidence or fluke 
of some kind. The problem was that it happened the next night, and 
the following three nights in a row. Each time the TV would turn on 




as I was lying down to go to bed and would not stop turning on until 
I had left the crackers.  
 
On the fifth day, I happened to be interviewing a spirit medium with 
a translator. Once we finished up the interview, we passed a nearby 
temple and I decided to go in and seek advice about my problem. 
Once I explained the situation to the temple attendants, they had a 
good laugh at my expense and told me that young boys will not be 
satisfied with crackers—I had to leave him candy! Before going 
home, I stopped at a convenience store to buy some candy. This time 
when the TV turned on, I left the candy instead of the crackers and 
asked more insistently that he vacate the premises. The next night 
there was no problem. In the following year that I lived there, there 
was no further recurrence of the problem with the TV or any other 
electrical appliance in my apartment. The statistical improbability of 
these occurrences and the effective solution that the Taiwanese 
spiritualists gave me led me to believe that maybe their beliefs are 
based on an intersubjectively human, spiritual reality that belongs to 
what Marshal Sahlins (1999) quoting Ulf Hannerz (1997) describes 
as our “Culture of cultures” rather than belonging to any one culture 




Though experiences with spirits may be extraordinary, 
anthropological research suggests that they are not as uncommon as 
our reluctance to talk about them would suggest. I have struggled to 
acknowledge the limits of cultural relativism, positivistic 
philosophy, and psychological reductionism because they do little to 
help us understand the data anthropologists have collected on 
experiences with spirits from the cultures we have studied. 
Dismissing experiences with spirits as culturally relative and 
subjective does not address their widespread and cross-cultural 
nature. In my own research I have found that the concept of the 
hungry ghost to be cross-cultural. I have found spiritual collisions 
with malicious or hungry ghosts like the ones I have described above 
in every culture I have done fieldwork in (e.g, Sioux, Cree, 
Taiwanese, Euro-Canadian). The cultures seem only to differ in how 




they categorize the experience, address the problem, and how open 
people are to talk about it.  
 
Trying to reduce such experiences using psychology often ends up 
creating overly convoluted explanations that would portray many 
people as being mentally unfit. Yet most scientists will not risk 
treating experiences with spirits as a serious object of study for fear 
of being labelled as crazy, superstitious, or religiously ignorant, even 
though such beliefs have not been sufficiently resolved by 
materialist explanations. Finding funding for such research is equally 
challenging and much of the research on experiences with the spirit 
world is left to paranormal investigators on television shows who 
seek more to sensationalize the experience rather than apply well 
informed scientific rigour. SPR stands out as an organization 
committed to the scientific study of paranormal phenomena, but a 
quick survey of their research indicates that their focus is primarily 
on extrasensory perception in the Western spiritualist tradition.  
 
The irony is that those who would claim that examining experiences 
with spirits is unscientific and irrational often neglect to approach 
such phenomena with the true spirit of open-minded, skeptical, 
scientific inquiry. What a scientific skeptic seeks, among other 
things, is independent verification of results and experiences. 
Generally, skeptics do not trust anecdotal evidence because it can be 
clouded by subjective factors, like confirmation bias, that make the 
findings seem questionable. What gives me pause when considering 
experiences with spirits are accounts of independent verification 
such as what Ivory received regarding her experience of being 
possessed. When the temple attendant asked if her mother had two 
older siblings that had died, Ivory’s mother said that she did not. 
Upon questioning Ivory’s grandmother, they found out that indeed 
Ivory’s mother did have two siblings that had passed away that she 
never knew about until then. How could the temple attendant know 
about the two dead siblings when she had no connection to the 
family and Ivory’s mother did not even know? As discussed earlier 
in this paper, similar independent verification was found by Richard 
Hodgson through his testing of Leonora Piper. Try as he might, 
Hodgson could not find a satisfying materialist explanation for Mrs. 




Piper’s ability to recall private, specific, and obscure details about 
the life of his friend who had recently died and to whom she had no 
previous connection. These are just two cases of many that make an 
open-minded skeptic think twice about dismissing experiences with 
spirits as purely imaginative or culturally subjective.  
 
If experiences with spirits are a cross-cultural, intersubjective 
component of human reality, then we should be able to test them 
with some consistency using the scientific method. By integrating 
data from the multitude of cultures anthropologists have studied and 
taking into account the postmodernist critiques of the ethnocentric, 
sexist, racist subjectivity of what we have come to recognize as 
science (e.g., male, white, European dominated ways of knowledge 
legitimization), we should be able to come up with scientifically 
legitimate theories and experiments that test the intersubjective 
reality of experiences with spirits. These theories and experiments, 
while rejecting the ethnocentric, racist, and sexist elements of 
traditional scientific institutions, would have to be guided by the 
principles of the scientific method - logically consistent, 
independently verifiable, predictive, broad of scope, and integrated 
into our current pool of knowledge as much as possible (Harris 
1994). They would also have to be open to the idea that the spiritual 
universe may not necessarily operate according to the same 
immutable laws as the material universe (e.g., their night is our day), 
as well as take into consideration that the spirits they may often be 
dealing with are (or were) human and that the same challenges when 
dealing with living humans may apply. 
 
To ignore the success of the scientific method because of 
postmodernist critiques of its cultural specificity is to throw the baby 
out with the bath water, but examining experiences with spirits for 
consistency and predictability would take a significant re-
examination of our acceptance of it as a legitimate field of scientific 
inquiry. It would require a de-compartmentalization of science and 
religion/spiritualism in favour of a perspective that endeavours to 
integrate multiple ways of knowing into a holistic worldview that 
runs counter to the Cartesian notions of duality that are foundational 
to Western philosophy. SPR has been conducting this kind of 




research for years, but to date they have not tapped into the wealth of 
experience, knowledge and relationships that anthropologists 
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Bāzì 八字 divining number 
Fóyǎn 佛眼 Buddha’s eye 
guǐ 鬼 unclean spirit 
línghún 靈魂 dead person 
(neutral) 
qì 氣 vital energy 
shén 神 good dead 
tiānyǎn 天眼 heavenly eye 
xiān 仙 Immortal 
yīnyángyǎn 陰陽眼 yin/yang eye 
zǔxiān 祖先 Ancestors 
 






The Quest for Evidence: 







Several months into my fieldwork with English paranormal 
investigators, one of my collaborators texted me in the middle of the 
night to let me know that Jack, a mutual friend, had “seen a ghost” 
that night on an investigation. My friend urged me to go meet with 
him as soon as possible to interview him about it. Jack was the 
leader of a paranormal research group in the North East of England 
and he was deeply agnostic—or, as he would put it “open-
minded”—about the existence of ghosts. Despite years of 
paranormal research, he remained unsure of their existence. The text 
was deeply exciting for me. While instances of informants seeing 
ghosts were far from unusual so far in my research, I interpreted my 
collaborator’s text as an indication that, perhaps, this sighting had 
transformed Jack’s view of ghosts. At that stage of my research, I 
still regularly described the goal of my project as understanding how 
knowledge and belief were produced among paranormal 
investigators. Jack’s sighting seemed like an ideal moment to 
understand how such knowledge and belief emerged. 
 
When I met up with him to discuss his sighting, he enthusiastically 
told me about his encounter. During the course of an investigation at 
a well-known haunted hotel, he was alone in a room. He felt 
someone behind him and assumed it was one of the other 
investigators. Eventually, he turned around and he saw that there was 
a figure he described as translucent standing “through a chair”. I 
eagerly asked him if this sighting had demonstrated satisfactorily the 
reality of ghosts to him. He shrugged. He was so startled by seeing 
it, Jack explained, that he didn’t “properly investigate” it. 
Ultimately, he reflected, he would “need to investigate it properly to 




really know anything.” This experience had done nothing to alter 
Jack’s understanding of the reality of ghosts. At the end of our 
conversation, he brightly suggested, “something might be out there, 
but I still need to find evidence of it.” At the time, this exchange 
confounded me. Jack told me a story, in great detail, of seeing a 
ghost, and, yet, he did not believe in ghosts or accept their existence. 
Why was this sighting not enough proof? In the aftermath of his 
seemingly extraordinary experience, Jack remained unconvinced of 
the reality of ghosts, the validity of his experience, and the rigour of 
his own investigative protocols. Jack was not alone in his inability to 
reconcile personal encounters with ghosts or spirits with his 
understanding of objective evidence. During the course of my 
research, paranormal investigators who regularly saw, heard, or felt 
ghosts during the course of their paranormal investigations remained 
deeply doubtful about the nature and meaning of these encounters.  
 
These extraordinary experiences never satisfied investigators’ 
desires for evidence of the paranormal. On the surface, this may not 
seem terribly surprising. After all, ghosts are entities typically 
associated with the supernatural or the superstitious, and, as Tanya 
Luhrmann (2012: xviii) has observed, the “supernatural is often 
treated as an entertaining fantasy” in much of the North Atlantic 
world. However, as anthropologists have shown, globally people 
come to trust (Landry 2016), experience (Klin-Oron 2014), know 
(Laycock 2015; Keane 2013), and develop personal relationships 
(Luhrmann 2012) with incorporeal entities such as gods, spirits, 
demons, aliens, and angels. In England, Abby Day has found that 
many people, including atheists, have experienced some contact with 
a ghost or paranormal force (2011: 98-101).  
 
Taken together, all of this makes paranormal investigators’ persistent 
doubt seem all the more confusing. Why doubt the entities you seek 
out and, eventually, find? This problem, while intellectual, is also 
emotionally resonant for investigators. It looms over their 
experiences and drives them in their quest for satisfactory evidence 
of the paranormal. This problem of encountering the extraordinary 
but being unable to locate a satisfactory explanatory framework 
drives much of paranormal investigating. In this chapter, I will aim 




to explain this seeming paradox of encountering ghosts yet 
remaining unconvinced of their existence. Doing so requires closely 
attending to investigators’ epistemology. Drawing on long - term 
fieldwork with paranormal investigators in the North of England 
between 2006 and 2015, I examine paranormal investigating as a 
research ideology and methodology that seeks to balance embodied 
encounters with spirits and scientifically grounded testing as a means 
of producing new knowledge of the ghostly. In this chapter, I will 
demonstrate that the balance or mastery of both scientific evidence 
and embodied experience, which is at the core of paranormal 
investigating, remains elusive for investigators. Ultimately, I argue 
that paranormal investigators, enmeshed in the moral economy of 
scientism, are unable to translate their embodied encounters into a 
growing body of knowledge. Instead, their practices of investigation 
produce doubt rather than certainty or knowledge. 
 
In recent years, anthropologists have focused on how spiritual 
practitioners come to accept incorporeal entities as real, felt 
presences. Much of this work has emphasized the embodied, 
practical dimensions of such transformation from doubt to belief. For 
example, in her study of how women in 1980s London became 
practitioners of magic, Tanya Luhrmann (1989) introduced the 
concept of the interpretive drift, which explained how people came 
to fully embrace beliefs and practices that many in their community 
might view as irrational. Highlighting the cognitive, practical, and 
embodied components of spiritual practice that allow such a 
transformation, she argued that, “magical ideas begin to seem 
normal in the process of becoming a magician” (Luhrmann 1989: 
312). Similarly, other scholars have foregrounded how material 
culture can act as a materializing catalyst affirming or generating 
belief, trust, or knowledge of spiritual domains (Landry 2016; 
Laycock 2015). In these approaches, though, the emphasis remains 
on how trust, belief, or certainty emerge. In much of this work, doubt 
remains on the ethnographic sidelines: it is something to overcome.  
 
It is only in recent years that anthropologists have begun to attend 
more closely to doubt. As Mathijs Pelkmans has suggested, 
anthropologists and social scientists have often overlooked and 




under theorized experiences and states of doubt (2013: 3-4). For 
Pelkmans, doubt is ephemeral, unstable, and inherently contradictory 
(2013: 16). He persuasively urges anthropologists to attend to the 
“dynamics of conviction and doubt through which [both religious 
and secular beliefs’] efficacy and affective qualities are made and 
unmade. Indeed, as anthropologists have shown, doubt emerges 
under particular contexts (Bloch 2013; Hanks 2016a, 2019) and 
produces particular outcomes (Bubandt 2014; Kaufman 2010). In the 
case of English paranormal investigators’ doubt, this chapter shows 
how investigators’ attempts to reconcile their extraordinary 
experiences with the epistemological demands of secularism – 
particularly scientism—produce doubt.  
 
Paranormal Investigating in England 
 
There is a long history of paranormal investigating or ghost hunting 
in England. In the 19th century, gentleman scientists pursued 
psychical research and founded organizations like the Ghost Club 
and the Society for Psychical Research (Oppenheim 1988; Owen 
2004). In the 20th century, such research attracted the attention of 
amateur researchers in the form of “ghost hunters” and “paranormal 
investigators.” Historian Owen Davies wrote that, “the twentieth 
century heralded the rise of the ‘ghost hunter’” (2007: 95). As early 
as the 1930s, ghost hunters, such as Harry Price, appeared on radio 
broadcasts popularizing the idea of rationally grounded inquiry into 
the paranormal.17 While paranormal investigating fell from favour 
during the later part of the century, by the start of the 21st century it 
was, again, widely popular. Spurred on by online networking 
technologies and the popularity of the television series Most 
Haunted, significant numbers of people began to fashion themselves 
as paranormal investigators and formed local groups dedicated to 
scientifically researching ghosts. According to one estimate, there 
 
17 While ghost hunting and paranormal investigation emerged as popular 
pursuits in the twentieth century, popular engagements in Spiritualism 
(Davies 2007; Meintel 2007), Hazlegrove (2000), and Owen (1989, 2004) 
and psychical investigation (Oppenheim 1988) predated them.   




were 1200 local groups engaged in such work in the U.K. in 2006 
(Winsper et al. 2008). 
 
Paranormal investigating was a heterodox practice. Investigators 
agreed on little in terms of standard of evidence, research protocols, 
and epistemological frameworks. No formal training programs were 
universally recognized or embraced18. Like its American 
counterpart (Bastian 2015; Li 2015), English paranormal 
investigation was a largely working-class engagement, and 
investigators brought a variety of educational and professional 
backgrounds to their work. Many had harboured an interest in 
ghosts, the paranormal, or as one investigator put it, “all things 
spooky”, since childhood. Many reported uncanny encounters in 
childhood—from seeing a ghostly figure to observing objects move 
of their own volition—that were never explained or resolved. Others 
developed an interest in ghosts after the death of a loved one; many 
reported disappointing experiences in Spiritualist churches or with 
mediums that led them to turn to paranormal investigating, which 
they saw as a more objective practice.  
 
While their beliefs were deeply heterodox, investigators typically 
espoused an interconnected view of the world (Luhrmann 2007) that 
did not distinguish between the natural and supernatural, or, as Day 
describes it, the “everyday or the ever-after” (Day 2011: 113).19  
Because of this view, they expected uncanny encounters to be 
explainable phenomena. Investigators were fond of likening the 
paranormal to known natural phenomena. Jenny, a paranormal 
investigator from Newcastle, explained, “if it’s real, the paranormal 
is just the normal. It’s like anything else: rain, gravity, 
lightning…things that used to see magical to us but are now 
 
18 While parapsychology exists as an academic discipline in the U.K., few of 
my informants fully embraced parapsychology. Many had read online texts 
about parapsychology, and a few had participated in online courses in 
parapsychology; however, it did not emerge as an authoritative way of 
knowing the paranormal for the investigators who I worked with.  
19 This worldview links paranormal investigators with a range of New Age 
practitioners, witches, and Spiritualists.  




understood.” Her point here was that while our human ancestors may 
have struggled to account for natural processes like lightening or 
gravity, through science they became knowable. Her hope was that 
the paranormal was the same. Indeed, other investigators often 
echoed Jenny’s location of the paranormal as a natural process. This 
understanding of the paranormal as part of the natural – rather than 
the spiritual world – is deeply significant. It locates paranormal 
investigating as a materially and empirically grounded process, one 
squarely part of a secular project. 
 
In recent years, anthropologists have foregrounded the political 
dimensions of secularism (Cannell 2010; Mahmood 2005); however, 
as Edward Royle’s (1974) study of 19th century English secularism 
reveals, the emergence of secularism portended radical 
transformations to political and epistemological order. Beyond 
redefining the political lines of spirituality and the public, secularism 
demanded rational explanations for the seemingly extraordinary. 
Today, scholars often overlook this epistemological dimension of 
secularism, in part, because it has become so commonly accepted. 
Indeed, Talal Asad has suggested that today, we “assume that the 
philosophical battle of truth has been won” (2011: 660). This 
assumption ignores both the complex historical relationship between 
magical practices and seemingly secular knowledge systems 
(Josephson-Storm 2017) as well as the lived realities of people who 
struggle to reconcile secular epistemological demands with their 
experience of the extraordinary, such as English paranormal 
investigators. At the core of English paranormal investigators’ 
project, then, is the desire to accumulate the rational, scientific 
evidence that could establish the status of the paranormal (Hanks 
2016b). After all, if the paranormal is a natural process akin to 
gravity, electricity, or lightening, it must be subject to the same 
processes of measurement. Managing this inquiry proves complex 
for investigators though. 
 
The Trope of the Investigator 
 
Paranormal investigators’ forms of self-identification and self-
understanding are important dimensions of how they balance the 




demands of epistemological secularism and their interest in and 
experience of the extraordinary. These self-fashioned experts on the 
paranormal tend to call themselves paranormal investigators.20 This 
form of self-identification is important. They do not call themselves 
paranormal scientists, paranormal theologians, or paranormal 
mediums; rather, they call themselves investigators. This is a term 
that is important for them and its use is not accidental. The 
investigator has become an important trope throughout much of the 
English-speaking North Atlantic world and it is one that 
investigators use to organize their queries into the paranormal. 
Tropes provide a useful framework for understanding the ways in 
which people interested in the paranormal self-identify and craft 
strategies for exploring the paranormal. Eleanor Townsley usefully 
wrote that, “tropes link cultural form to content, illuminating one 
way that actors use, enact, inhabit, and deploy cultural structures” 
(2006: 41). Researchers’ adoption of the term “investigator” 
resonates with the proliferation of idealized investigators who 
populate the English-speaking media world. 
  
The 21st century has seen an abundance of investigators in the 
popular media. House M.D., the multiple incarnations of C.S.I., Lie 
to Me, Sherlock, The Mentalist, Most Haunted, and T.A.P.S. are but 
a few of the television programs that foreground the investigator as 
popular cultural figure.21 In each of these veins, the investigator has 
emerged as a leading expert capable of solving even the most 
confounding of problems. In each of these cases, the expertise of the 
investigator crosses several arenas. She or he is not an expert in one 
arena but able to master many arenas. This ideal of multiple 
masteries is important to the self-image of investigators. 
 
Consider, for example, the representation of investigation found on 
House. Dr. Gregory House, the main character, often reminds his 
 
20 Some use the term ghost hunter; however, in my experience, the more 
seriously minded researchers tend to use “ghost hunter” to refer to those 
whom they see as thrill-seeking dilettantes.  
21 While some of these shows are American in origin, they are widely 
consumed in England as well the United States.   




colleagues that “everybody lies”, instructing them to search below 
the surface for the underlying cause of illness. This search requires 
his colleagues to embark on amusing, albeit highly unethical, 
searches of patients’ lives, homes, and work environments to 
uncover clues that reveal the true nature of the illness. Dr. House 
constantly reminds his colleagues and viewers that patients are 
untrustworthy in their accounts of their own illness. Establishing the 
truth of an illness requires marshalling a variety of different types of 
evidence. Dr. House, incidentally modelled on Sherlock Holmes, 
must engage a wide-ranging investigation to uncover the truth, a 
truth that participants, namely the ill, are not able to directly access 
themselves. While House certainly maintains multiple masteries, his 
mastery of physical evidence, in the form of biological markers of 
illness or the material traces that reveal behavioural patterns are 
prioritized over the ability to make sense of patient narratives. In her 
study of the representation of scientific truth on C.S.I., Corinna 
Kruse raises a similar point. She notes that, “the physical evidence is 
still given precedence over witness evidence or ‘stories’” (2010: 81). 
Indeed, this is so persuasively portrayed on the program that 
numerous legal scholars have worried about the so-called C.S.I.-
effect when juries deliberate on cases with forensic evidence 
(Ghoshray 2007). This cultural emphasis here on the priority of 
material evidence is significant and echoes the secular emphasis on 
scientific materialism as the core pathway to authoritative 
knowledge (e.g., Hacking 1995). What is real and knowable, then, is 
material.  
 
As a further example, then, in both C.S.I. and House, the investigator 
– whether a doctor or a forensic scientist – must engage a broad 
range of evidence to reach a conclusion. It is not sufficient simply to 
engage science; one must also investigate. The same is doubly true 
for investigators of the paranormal on television. Unlike doctors or 
forensic scientists, they venture into terrains without established 
knowledge and rules. Ultimately, what guides them is their capacity 
to evaluate evidence using the skills they bring to the table. 
 
All of these programs have in common the assertion that an 
investigator plays a critically important role. The investigator relies 




on science but is not defined by it. Dr. House does not cure illness 
because he is a skilled doctor; rather, he solves diagnostic puzzles 
because he is willing to pursue the truth ruthlessly. Here, the 
category of investigator emerges as broader and, ultimately, more 
powerful than that of scientist. Indeed, these programs constitute the 
investigator as masterful and in control, seamlessly negotiating 
bodies of evidence. These enactments of investigators and evidence 
have important real-life consequences. Indeed, as scholars concerned 
with the C.S.I. effect in legal proceedings have demonstrated, the 
depictions of forensic investigators as capable of providing 
irrefutable evidence, in some cases, has diminished jurors’ faith in 
the validity of eyewitness testimony (Cavender and Deutch 2007; 
Kruse 2010; Mopas 2007). 
 
These televised depictions of investigators constitute what Arjun 
Appadurai (1996: 31) and Charles Taylor (2002: 91) have called 
social “imaginaries”. These fictional stories become a way for 
people to imagine the realms of science, technology, evidence, and 
investigation. For self-identified investigators, these popular culture 
images of investigators become crucial tools for their own self-
imagining. 
 
An Investigator’s Tool Kit 
 
To return, then, to paranormal investigators, it is clear they see the 
category of investigator in a similar fashion. They see themselves as 
ringleaders of sorts who must balance, as Jack once explained, the 
“tools in their tool kit”, which take the form of “science, mediums, 
and personal experience” and then make sense of three resulting 
forms of evidence: “scientific data”, investigators’ narratives of their 
personal encounters with ghosts, and performances of mediumship. 
The equating of science, mediums, and personal experience as 
comparable tools is not a self-evident categorization. Each category 
is far from a simple tool. Tools, after all, are devices used to carry 
out a simple function: in this case, establishing evidence of the 
paranormal. But, of course, science, mediumship, and personal 
experience are all complex ways of knowing the world, contingent 
on particular epistemological, spiritual, and ontological worldviews. 




To position them as tools ignores those complex histories as well as 
the complexities of evidence these ways of knowing promise. 
 
For investigators like Jack, science comes to mean an idealized 
version of technologically mediated, objective inquiry that allows for 
some kind of corroboration. They produced “scientific” data by 
using technological devices to monitor their environments. When 
Jack referred to “mediums” as a tool, he was referring to the 
strategic collaboration with people who consider themselves to be 
mediums. These mediums came from a range of backgrounds. Some 
developed their mediumship in Spiritualist churches while others 
considered themselves genetically predisposed to mediumship. 
While varying acts and processes of mediumship are entrenched in 
specific cultural, spiritual, and historical contexts, paranormal 
investigators tended to ignore those particularities. For them, 
mediums were people who might have better than average luck at 
picking up paranormal processes. To use them as a tool, paranormal 
investigators aimed to record their observations and then attempting 
to substantiate their claims. Finally, paranormal investigators 
considered their own extraordinary experiences a potential tool. Few 
of the paranormal investigators I knew considered themselves 
mediums, but over the course of an investigation most would have 
firsthand experiences with a ghost or potentially paranormal entity. 
These personal experiences included a range of sensory perceptions 
of ghosts, such as sight, sound, olfactory sensations, and touch, as 
well as episodes that resembled mediumship. In such episodes, 
investigators experienced the thoughts and sensations of a ghost. 
Investigators tended to use the gloss “experience” to encompass this 
range of mundane and supernatural encounters.22 “Experience” 
remained an important category, in part, because many were 
motivated to pursue paranormal investigating because of previous 
experiences with the paranormal. Indeed, many longed for such an 
encounter, even though they believed it to be an incomplete form of 
evidence on its own.  
 
 
22 Throughout this chapter, I will follow paranormal investigators’ lead and 
refer to this set of embodied sensations simply as “experience”. 




Investigators aim to ultimately amass objective proof regarding the 
existence of the paranormal; however, each type of evidence poses a 
variety of challenges for them. They fear the subjectivity of 
mediumship and their personal “experiences” with ghosts while 
struggling to translate technologically grounded observations into 
significant evidence. Investigators manage these challenges by 
embracing what they label a “toolbox-approach,” meaning treating 
different, competing forms of knowing as simply alternative tools to 
be strategically deployed. They aim for a sort of balance; however, it 
often remains elusive for them. They aspire to include and consider 
the insights of science while also considering the insights provided 
by mediums. The ultimate, satisfying evidence, investigators argued, 
would include science and mediumship or science and personal 
experience. This would satisfy their desire for objective evidence, in 
the form of scientific proof, while also satisfying their personal 
desire to personally experience such a phenomenon.  
 
Rose, a paranormal investigator, explicitly articulated this approach. 
She explained, “A good investigator’s got a toolbox. Science is a 
tool. Mediums are a tool. People’s experiences are a tool. It’s up to 
the investigator to put it all together.” Ultimately, Rose positions the 
investigator as master of the toolbox, the agent who must piece 
together the insights garnered through strategic deployment of each 
“tool”.  
 
Consider a blog post by Bill, an investigator with Eastern Ghost 
Research (EGR), a paranormal investigation team in North East 
England. In it, he describes what he sees as the range of 
investigators. He writes: 
 
Another thing to consider when researching paranormal group(s) is 
the what 'type' of group they are. Some groups work purely from a 
scientific angle, even going so far as to belittling anyone who puts 
any value on anything that falls outside established scientific 
principles on occasion, while others lay at the opposite end of the 
spectrum and conduct more psychic-based investigations with teams 
of 'mediums' and little or no 'science' involved. Many other groups 
(such as EGR) fall somewhere between the two camps. 




Bill collapses the typical trichotomy of paranormal investigative 
tools (mediumship, experience, and science) into a simpler 
dichotomy (science and mediumship). While Bill is more explicit 
than many investigators, his equation of mediumship and personal 
experience with a ghost reveals a persistent sense that mediumship 
and personal “experience” of ghosts are similar types of tools. Both 
are grounded on first person encounters with ghosts and depend on 
the experiencer’s authority and reliability.23 They ultimately remain 
emphatic that mediumship and personal encounters with ghosts are 
deeply similar and constitute forms of experience. In Bill’s writing, 
it is clear that he sees both extremely pro-science and pro-
mediumship groups as unnecessarily restrictive. Indeed, such groups 
would leave little room for investigating. For Bill, then, investigating 
is an act of balance. It creates an objectivity that supersedes the 
objectivity of science itself.  
 
While Bill sees very real and concrete differences between groups, I 
think he overstates the difference. In fact, based on my experiences 
with a number of groups, most groups see themselves in a similar 
light – as including mediumship as well as science without excluding 
either. Because of the heterodox nature of paranormal investigating, 
groups may maintain legitimate disagreements about methods or 
epistemology; however, nearly all groups shared this common 
practice of positioning a team’s approach as moderate and balanced. 
Indeed, this echoes David Hess’s (1993) observation that in the 
culture of US paranormal research, members use boundary work to 
define themselves against the values of other groups enmeshed in 
 
23 Many mediums disagree with this equation, pointing to their spiritual 
expertise, and complain that collaborating with paranormal investigators 
yields more anxiety than rewards. Indeed, many of the mediums who work 
with paranormal investigators have considerable experience and training in 
mediumship. Some regularly demonstrate at Spiritualist churches. Others 
routinely hold “Psychic Nights” at pubs. They see the nature of their 
encounters with and understanding of spirits as very different from the 
inclusive episodes that paranormal investigators count as “experience” on 
their parts. Despite this, paranormal investigators point to what they see as 
the overarching parallels between the two forms of practice: both mediums 
and investigators encounter what they believe to be a spirit in a sensory vein. 




studying or critiquing the paranormal. For investigators like Bill, 
Jack, and Rose, they see themselves as less gullible and given to 
belief than mediums, less methodologically limited than academic 
scientists, and less limited by their skepticism than skeptics like 
James Randi.  
 
Most paranormal investigators ultimately hope and aim for a 
moderate position, eschewing an extreme embrace of either end of 
the spectrum. Bill’s positioning of his investigation group, EGR, 
mirrors that of many other groups and it reflects the collectively 
valued emphasis on the investigator as negotiating and mastering a 
range of tools or approaches. For example, Drake, the leader of a 
North East research team explained the role he saw for investigators. 
“You’ve got to make sense of a lot of things,” he observed. “You 
can’t take anything at face value—not science, not mediums, not 
experiences. You’ve got to weed out the people who want a thrill 
and tone down the ones who just want to parrot back what scientists 
say.” Drake, like Bill, sees balance as key and emphasizes the 
authority of the investigator. While crucial to their idealized sense of 




Unlike the idealized investigators on television, paranormal 
investigators are unable to control, contain, and balance the different 
tools in an investigator’s toolbox with the precision they desire. 
Paranormal investigators struggle to reconcile science and 
“experience,” the two dominant tools in an investigator’s toolbox. 
Investigators tie science to the production of “evidence”, whereas 
they associate mediumship and personal encounters with ghosts with 
“experience”. They believe and hope such “experiences” can be 
translated into evidence; however, investigators remain uncertain of 
how to do this. Typically, investigators consider evidence and 









Science and Evidence 
 
A notion of evidence informs paranormal investigators’ sense of 
their intellectual project. They see themselves as pursuing evidence 
that paranormal events do (or do not) occur. While it is imaginable 
that they might pursue religious or theological evidence, their notion 
of evidence is influenced by a sense of scientism. By scientism, I 
mean what Mikael Stenmark has defined as “the view that all or, at 
least, some of the essential non-academic areas of human life can be 
reduced to (or translated into) science” (1997: 18). Stenmark and 
others (Collins and Evans 2007; Mellor 2003) have argued that this 
is a pervasive ideology in much of Europe and the U.S. It is the 
broad context in which investigators work today. While the 
paranormal investigating project is not defined exclusively by 
scientism, it is influenced by it. 
 
A particular understanding of science, which is partially at odds with 
how scientists may see their own project, heavily inflects paranormal 
investigators’ understanding of evidence. The tenets of science that 
influence investigators include: 1) technological mediation, 2) 
idealistic imaginings of objectivity, and 3) a desire for repeatability 
and corroboration. Interestingly, these three chief components also 
inflect much of their anxiety over the validity of experience as a 
means of producing knowledge. Technology lies at the heart of their 
enterprise, at least in theory. Investigators imagine technology as an 
unbiased way of accessing, observing, and chronicling the changes 
in their surroundings that cumulatively indicate the unfolding of a 
paranormal event. While technology occupies a privileged place in 
the collective investigating imaginary, in practice, it often takes a 
backseat to more experiential engagements. In an idealized setting, 
investigators would use technology—namely, electromagnetic 
energy field (EMF) readers, thermometers, and digital recording 
devices—to record or verify the embodied experiences of 
researchers; however, this verification often remains elusive, as we 
will see later.  
 
Objectivity constitutes paranormal investigators’ chief 
epistemological goal. They hope to establish objective (i.e. real, 




irrefutable, and not subjective) indications of the reality of the 
paranormal. For them, objectivity is synonymous with a definitive 
sense that a person is reporting the truth. Indeed, they understand the 
“objective” as that which is true. It is opposed to their understanding 
of “subjective” knowledge, which is personal and difficult to 
“verify”.  
 
For paranormal investigators, repeatability replaces falsification as 
the chief component of science. Repeatability constitutes a 
component of their ideological problem with embodied experiences. 
They question how they could test or repeat instances of people 
“picking up” spirits or experiencing the symptoms of a haunting 
rather than how one might falsify the claim that a spirit was the 
cause of such occurrences. While some might see this as a problem 
emerging out of the expressly fleeting nature of the phenomena in 
question, most see it as a problem inherent in experiential 
knowledge. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, paranormal investigators’ enthusiasm for 
science does not extend to scientists. They value the methods of 
science while maintaining a degree of skepticism regarding its 
orthodox practitioners. Adopting a remarkably constructivist stance, 
many investigators argued that orthodox scientists are neither pure 
nor objective in their pursuit of knowledge, and that their practice is 
dangerously ensnared in socio-political life. For example, Jack has 
hypothesized that science, because of its deep connection to 
organized government and corporate power, has no investment in 
revealing realities that would challenge the stability of the status 
quo. He explained to me that, “they [scientists] don’t want us to 
know about ghosts and survival. If they did, think of how it would 
change the political situation.” He went on to hypothesize that if 
survival after death was a known component of human existence, 
governments ultimately would lose the power to control their 
citizens and extract wealth from them. Indeed, Jack suggested that 
people would no longer fear death and they might prefer death, with 
the promise of spiritual survival, to the financial and political 
burdens of their present lives. The specificities of this critique matter 
less than the implicit claim that official, authoritative scientists are 




complicit with systems of power. In short, they do not achieve the 
unbiased stance that science requires.  
 
While investigators remain skeptical of scientists’ objectivity, they 
still embrace science as an objective method. Investigators 
understand “science” as an instrument that enables them to detect the 
invisible worlds of the paranormal. This is evident in a popular 
online article describing “Ghosts and Science” found on many 
paranormal websites.24 The article began with the assertion that: 
 
When scientists debunk ghosts their first statement is usually, 'there 
is no scientific proof of the existence of ghosts'. This is wrong. 
There is scientific proof. Science even has theories that explain 
something must be happening beyond what we know and what we 
can see. [My emphasis.] 
 
In this statement, the crucial distinction between science and 
scientists becomes clear. Paranormal investigators do not see 
scientists as individuals able to control or determine the definition of 
science exclusively. In a sense, science is bigger and broader than 
scientists. Greg Downey has remarked that in American culture 
“scientific activity” constitutes “a supreme cultural authority” (1988: 
30) and indeed, this is true for Britain as well. In their imaginaries, it 
is deeply tied to the production of definite proof, or evidence.  
 
The article goes on to cite electrical activity and variations in 
temperature as arenas with the potential for scientific query. It stated, 
“Recording temperature changes is another scientific way of 
detecting the presence of ghosts.” The language of this assertion is 
revealing. I suspect that a scientist might note with concern that 
investigators are conflating science and technology; however, in this 
instance, it is clear that investigators see science as something 
instrumental rather than philosophical. Indeed, this conflation of 
science and technology enables them to embrace what Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison have called “mechanical objectivity,” 
which is the idea that machines “offered freedom from…the willful 
 
24 Like many such articles, there is no clear author.  




interventions that had come to be seen as the most dangerous aspects 
of subjectivity” (1992: 84).  
 
By reducing all of science to its mechanical tools, they emphasize its 
objectivity. Further, this emphasis on science as an instrument 
allows them to position it as part of their repertoire as investigators. 
Indeed, this understanding of science actively positions it as a tool. 
Because of this instrumentalization of science, they can assert more 
readily that science reveals things. The article noted, “These 
unexplainable electromagnetic fluctuations and temperature changes 
are scientific evidence that something is happening.” The role of 
interpretation is radically diminished here. 
 
Investigators’ association of the instrumentalization of science with 
the production of evidence underscores their emphasis on evidence 
as objective. Part of the appeal of this idea of science is that it is 
devoid of personalized, partial information. They conceptualize 
science as a tool that can be used to reveal real information, in the 
form of evidence. Their identification as investigators, rather than 
scientists, would allow them in a perfect world to manage and 
consume scientific evidence without succumbing to “belief in 
science”. Ideally, they would remain too objective and detached for 
such a posture.  
 
Investigators aim to extend this mode of instrumentalization to 
personal encounters with personal experience as well. Such lessons 
were rendered explicit during the course of a paranormal 
investigating course that I participated in Newcastle in 2008, which 
actively instilled these practices in students. During the experiential 
elements of the course, the instructor explained that we, the students, 
should articulate any physical or bodily sensations we encountered 
as soon as possible. Other students would report feeling cold, a 
sudden draft, a sensation of tingling in their legs, or head pain.  
 
These experiences, sometimes very clearly welcomed by the 
students, triggered others to approach the area where they were 
standing and to begin using tools such as EMF readers and 
thermometers to see if there was any “quantifiable change” that 




would indicate paranormal evidence. After class, I asked Steve, the 
instructor, about this and he explained that individuals’ bodily 
experiences were interesting, but that the data produced by EMF 
readers and other technologies was “objective.” To return to the 
recurrent toolbox metaphor, this exchange constituted embodied 
experiences as a tool but as a tool with less use and less independent 
evidentiary basis than technology.  
 
Experience and the Fear of the Subjective  
 
While paranormal investigators valued “science” for its capacity to 
yield objective understandings of the paranormal, they viewed 
experience—in the form of mediumship and extraordinary 
experiences with ghosts—far more ambivalently, fearing the 
experiential and seemingly subjective nature of them. Paradoxically, 
such “experiences,” or embodied encounters with spirits, were at 
once both a desired entity and something that was not entirely to be 
trusted as a form of knowing. 
 
Extraordinary experiences abound on paranormal investigations. 
People feel, hear, smell, see, and taste ambiguous presences, which 
are typically partial and fleeting. Investigators aim to subject these 
sensory experiences to both common sense and technical 
verification. For example, if someone smells flowers, investigators 
are likely to check to see if anyone is wearing perfume or washed his 
or her hair with floral scented shampoo. If someone remarks that she 
feels colder, ideally someone will direct the thermometer at her and 
see if there has been a decline in temperature. On one investigation 
in a pub, someone asked me if I felt anything and I remarked that 
one side of my body (the side closer to the window) was colder than 
the other. The investigator proceeded to use his handheld 
thermometer and measure the surface temperature of both of my 
arms. One side was indeed several degrees cooler.  
 
These senses, in theory at least, are subject to technological 
verification. Despite this, investigators do not always or even 
frequently pursue technologically mediated understandings. This is a 
central paradox in their project. They fervently desire to include 




sensory, mediumistic knowledge in their articulation of the 
paranormal; however, their attempts to do so remain mired in self-
doubt and suspicion. 
 
Beyond the typical sensorium, there is another component of 
embodiment present in investigations, one that is more difficult to 
articulate. It is a sense or a consciousness that permeates individual’s 
emotions and mind. During the course of an investigation, 
investigators will report thoughts and feelings that do not seem to 
originate in their own experience. For example, during one 
investigation in a pub in Stockton, Dara, an investigator, began to 
report marked changes in her mood. In everyday life, Dara was a 
soft-spoken, kind woman. She has been investigating for several 
years, and her interest veered more toward the technical side of 
research that its experiential dimensions. Dara, Joe, another 
investigator, and I were sitting in a storage room in the pub, when 
Dara began to report unusual sensations. She explained, “I’m quite 
angry. I wasn’t angry when we came in here, but I’m feeling quite 
angry right now. I’m so sorry Joe, but it feels quite directed at you. 
It’s like my mind is furious at you, like you’ve done something 
awful to me.” Joe nodded seriously and took notes about her 
experience as she reported her emotional state. When we later left 
the room, Dara again emphasized that the anger was not her own and 
that it felt quite foreign to her. Later, both Dara and Joe agreed that 
this was an “interesting”, meaning potentially significant, 
experience; however, they were unsure of how to interpret it. As Joe 
explained to me, “I trust Dara as much as I trust anyone. If she says 
she’s feeling angry, I suppose she was. But what do you do with 
that? What does that mean?” 
 
Investigators have multiple problems with experiential knowledge. 
First, there is the problem of the reliability of others’ reporting. As 
one investigator put it, “How can you trust someone else’s 
experience?” Historian Martin Jay, reflecting on the term experience, 
remarked that, “‘experience,’ we might say, is at the nodal point of 
the intersection between public language and private subjectivity” 
(2005: 6). This observation is useful here. Idealized performances of 
experience on investigations should compress the public and private 




temporally. Investigators encourage mediums and other investigators 
to “say what you get as soon as you get anything”.25 This points to 
two central components of experience. For the most part, it is 
individual and it is reported so, in essence, it is always in the past. 
Each of these points creates conflict for investigators’ sense of 
objectivity. Ultimately, the demarcation of “public language” and 
“private subjectivity” (Jay 2005: 6) proved difficult for investigators 
to successfully navigate.  
 
The Embodied Tension Between Experience and Evidence  
 
The tension that I am describing between the paranormal 
investigators’ categories of evidence and experience is not purely 
theoretical. It appears in emotionally fraught and unresolved ways in 
the lives of participants. For example, in the days after the 
investigation in Stockton, Dara expressed her frustration and doubt 
about her experience. During the course of a conversation, she 
reflected,  
 
Was that real? Why did that happen? Why didn’t Joe do more to 
investigate at the time? I don’t know why I felt that way. The not 
knowing gets me upset. We’re meant to be investigators. If all we’re 
doing is going out and having these experiences that we never 
explain, it feels like we’re not doing a good job.  
 
While people across England who are not involved in paranormal 
investigation somewhat regularly encounter ghosts (Day 2011) and 
find ways to explain them, in the wake of their own extraordinary 
experiences, paranormal investigators struggled to find a satisfactory 
explanatory framework. They were unsure what caused these 
experiences and they were uncertain of how to deploy such 
experiences in the production of new knowledge about the 
 
25 Such demands for immediate reporting often annoy the mediums, who 
have developed their own ways of processing and accounting for their 
encounters with spirits. At times, mediums became slightly resentful of 
paranormal investigators’ demands, which they saw as interfering with their 
own expertise.  




paranormal. They did not trust their own perceptions of their bodies, 
minds, and emotions.  
 
One of my close collaborators, Ginny, a woman in her late 40s, 
regularly struggled to account for her experiential encounters with 
invisible worlds. Her experiences demonstrate the degree to which 
such encounters generate heated anxiety and uncertainty. Ginny is a 
co-leader of a paranormal research team that is deeply committed to 
the deployment of scientific perspectives and methods in 
investigating. She and Harry, her husband and co-leader, were 
among the most unequivocally pro-science investigators I met during 
my research. Their typical approach to personal experience with 
ghosts was to politely record it, but to dedicate very little time to 
analyzing it. Ginny and Harry were both skeptical of most mediums. 
Despite this inclination, Ginny started out her interactions in the 
paranormal community as someone who thought she might be able 
to “develop” as a medium.26 Starting out, she regularly “picked up” 
things and she found that many of the things she was “picking up” 
on investigations, such as dates and names, turned out to correspond 
to knowledge about the sites in the historical record. This “made 
[her] wonder”. However, despite her personal encounters, she 
remains highly suspicious regarding instances of mediumship. She 
explained:  
 
I’m not saying there’s no such thing as mediumship. I think a lot of 
people are faking it, though. In my case, I don’t know what it is. I 
 
26 “Developing” is a common way of describing the processes through 
which a medium practices focusing on her encounters with ghosts or spirits 
and learns to accept and articulate them. “Developing” is associated to some 
degree with Spiritualist churches, which hold regular “development circles” 
for people to practice their mediumship. There are “development circles” 
held outside of the churches as well. While not all mediums participate in or 
embrace the idea of development circles, many use the term “develop” to 
describe the process through which they honed their skills as a medium. 
Interestingly, the term “develop” implies that mediumship is an inherent 
feature of these people and that it only requires nurturing to blossom. Of 
course, not all mediums embrace this ideology but many do.  




pick up on things, I do. But I don’t know how. I don’t even know if 
it’s real. I don’t know. It’s frustrating. 
 
For Ginny, this uncertainty emerges in a variety of distressing ways. 
One night, I arrived at an investigation with her. As we sat waiting to 
get started, she began to “pick up” on things. We were at an airfield 
in Sunderland at the time. She began to feel like “men were walking 
about here and they were happy and friendly with each other. But 
one of them wasn’t going to come back. Something was off with 
him.” She suspected that these feelings were associated with the 
presence of ghosts; however, she remained deeply uncertain. 
 
This episode of quasi-mediumship lasted for less than five minutes 
and it was the only such instance for her during the night. When I 
later asked her to describe how she “picked up” on this, she 
described her process noting, “the thought just popped into my head. 
I hadn’t been thinking of it. I’d been thinking about getting a cuppa 
but then it was there. There was imagery too. I could see it but 
couldn’t see if that makes sense.” 27  
 
After her extraordinary experience, Ginny was visibly flustered by 
the event. She continued to tell the story of it and retell it to her 
friends as they arrived at the investigation. She punctuated her 
retellings by noting, “I don’t know what it is. How is it that it 
happens?” She was genuinely flustered, confused, and anxious as a 
result of this. Her paranormal investigator friends listened to her 
attentively. Many noted that her experience was interesting; 
however, no one had an answer to her question. None were sure how 





27 In many ways, Ginny’s difficulty reckoning with her experiences mirrors 
those of experts grappling with the paranormal, such as parapsychologists. 
Beyond the amateur paranormal investigators I discuss here, many academic 
experts on the paranormal grapple with such experiences, debating if they 
originate from spirits or if they are the result of human faculties (Tart 2002).  




The Ensuing Knowledge  
 
Perhaps one of the most surprising elements of paranormal research 
is how little new knowledge is produced. Neither the extraordinary 
experiences nor the technologically mediated investigative work 
generated much in the way of the precise insights investigators 
typically hoped for. Similarly, very few paranormal investigators 
ever convince themselves that the paranormal exists.  
 
Investigators typically translate their experiences, the insights of 
mediums, and their technoscientifically-generated evidence into 
what they call “investigation reports”. This is the typical outcome of 
an investigation. The nature of these written reports is revealing. 
They are typically descriptive, chronological narratives of the events 
of an investigation. Teams typically break into groups throughout the 
night and one person recounts what happened in their visit to each 
area in a site. This results in two to three accounts of each area in a 
site. Consider the following expert from an EGR investigation that 
occurred in a pub in York in 2009. Percy, an EGR team member 
wrote: 
 
Both groups then switched locations as Percy, Jack, Rose, Molly and 
Michele trotted upstairs [to] the function room. Moonlight coming 
in through the windows that were causing a light patch on the wall 
opposite. Percy saw big shadow go across this light patch as if a 
figure had walked past the window (but it was on the 1st floor). At 
1.50 AM Rose mentioned she was experiencing a 'tightness' across 
her chest. Percy had been feeling the same thing prior to her saying 
anything and Jack also complained of a 'tightness' too. Rose started 
to pick up on things once more. She felt as though she was getting 
dragged by her hair through a street with grey cobbles (although she 
was a man in her vision). She then 'saw' grass and an empty gallows, 
but she felt that people would have gathered here to watch the 
hangings, although not in the hundreds but a smaller crowd. This 
was felt by Rose to have taken place to the right of Gillygate, which 
was a short distance away. She didn't however 'see' any city wall and 
got no sense of the gate itself. It was instead on a slight incline 
(maybe landscaped), very grassy though. The incline had been 
levelled for the gallows, so maybe landscaped for this. Rose was 
keen to point out that she was pretty sure that these images were her 




imagination and were not anything like the 'vivid' images that she 
had experienced downstairs. 
 
Percy’s clinical tone and use of the third person reflect the idealized, 
objective stance investigators hope to assume. Indeed, this 
description is a fairly typical rendering of a night of work. In fact, it 
is more attentive to detail and interplay than other reports. In the 
report above, Percy describes activities, impressions, moods, and 
perceptions. He does not assert that any of the potentially significant 
events described above, such as Rose’s vision or Percy’s sighting of 
a shadow, indicate the presence of a ghost or demonstrate the reality 
of the paranormal. Rather, these events are simply described. EGR 
pairs this narrative report with a similarly descriptive set of data 
regarding the environmental conditions present at the pub that night. 
For example, Percy charted the variation in temperature and 
humidity present in the function room during the time we sat in 
there.  
 
Reports such as this are typically the final end product of 
investigations. At best, they are frustratingly inconclusive. Such 
reports do little to add to a cumulative view of the hauntings present 
at a particular location or to the development of a portfolio of 
individual investigators’ experiences across time and space. 
 
Investigators are not all unaware of the shortcomings of this 
approach. Rose, for instance, was very vocal about what she sees as 
the futility and lost potential of such projects. Her chief argument 
was that reports were useless unless investigators were committed to 
exploring reports at the same location over time and seeking out 
patterns. This was not a remarkable claim. In essence, this was the 
goal of investigators; however, she was alone in routinely vocally 
criticizing investigators’ failure to do so. In her mind, such a 
“mishandling of evidence” reduced her team to “ghost hunters,” 
which was a serious accusation on her part. While members of the 
public may use the terms paranormal investigator and ghost hunter 
interchangeably, paranormal investigators tended to emphatically 
distance themselves from ghost hunters. Percy explained the 
difference between ghost hunters and paranormal investigators to 




me. He remarked that, “well, with ghost hunters, they want an 
experience. For them, it’s an experience they’re after. And that’s 
fine, I guess, but that’s not what we do. We want evidence.” For 
Percy, the distinction between evidence and experience is sharp.  
 
Similarly, Penelope, a lead investigator of Eastern Paranormal 
Investigations (EPI), another Northeastern Investigation team, 
articulated her periodic frustrations with EPI’s less than stellar 
attempts to gather and shepherd evidence through recourse to the 
experiential dimension of ghost hunting. After a frustrating night 
spent calling out and engaging in glass divination, she explained: 
 
When we go out and mess about with things like calling out and 
glass divination and all of that, we’re no better than ghost hunters! 
Eastern Paranormal Investigations… Investigation, it’s in our name. 
You’d think we did that! If we’re going to sit around and try to get 
an experience, we ought to call ourselves Eastern Paranormal 
Experiences, because we’re kidding ourselves if we think what we 
did was investigating. If we act like that, we’re bloody ghost 
hunters. I’m sick of it. 
  
The activities Penelope cited – divination and calling out – are often 
pointed to as among the more experiential components of engaging 
ghosts. They are designed to facilitate contact with spirits. This is 
not to say that groups do not try to deploy them in investigative 
scenarios; however, they remain highly suspicious. In Penelope’s 
comments, it is clear that she, like many investigators, view 
experience with deep skepticism, despite their efforts to include it 
into their toolboxes. 
 
This intellectual positioning does not diminish investigators’ 
individual interest in or passion for knowledge of ghosts though. 
Many investigators are interested in generating new knowledge of 
the paranormal for themselves. Most remain “skeptical but open-
minded” about the existence of paranormal phenomena and ghosts 
and they hope to find personally persuasive evidence one way or 
another. As Molly, an investigator in her 50s explained: 
 




I’m doing it because I like it, obviously. I wouldn’t do it if I didn’t 
like it. But what I really want is to find out if there’s anything to it. 
Are there ghosts? That’s a question for me. I would love there to be 
but as of now I don’t know. 
 
Investigators often revealed this sentiment during private interviews 
or conversations with me; however, it was not frequently expressed 
in group settings. Molly was more forthcoming than many about the 
role she imagined personal encounters to have in shaping her 
understanding of the paranormal. Molly, Rose, and I were sitting in a 
pub chatting one afternoon when the ever-present topic of evidence 
re-emerged. Molly remarked, “I want objective evidence, I do. But, 
for me, I know I also need a personal experience. I need to see it 
myself.” This was a common assertion. Indeed, many people become 
investigators to address their own, personal interest in the 
paranormal.  
 
Rose had been friends with Molly for some time and decided to push 
this assertion. She noted that Molly had “experienced several 
things.” She cited an incident during Molly’s first investigation when 
Molly was “winding a spirit up” and a closet door violently swung 
open, ripping Molly’s scarf. “Yes, that was quite good!” Molly 
noted. Rose pushed Molly further. She asked, “so that was an 
experience. Are you convinced there are ghosts or spirits or 
whatever you want to call them?” Molly shrugged dramatically. 
After thinking, she explained, “I guess not. It happened so quickly. I 
think I would have to see something more definitive.” This tacit 
dismissal of her own experience and her desire for further visual 
encounters was not uncommon; however, sighting a ghost did little 
to convince investigators’ of their reality. Indeed, returning to Jack’s 
sighting, which I began this chapter with, is instructive.  
 
As I noted, Jack was an open-minded skeptic but he had always said 
that a personal encounter, ideally a visual one, might convince him, 
at least on a personal level, that ghosts existed. When I asked if he 
now “thought that there was something to the paranormal”, he 
shrugged. He remained unconvinced. He continued to identify 
himself as an open-minded skeptic. He explained, “I don’t know, 




Michele. I guess I’d need to investigate.”28 The ideal of 
investigation, then, becomes crippled by the investigator’s imagining 
of evidence and science. By all explicit accounts, an embodied 
encounter such as Jack’s should be able to constitute a tool in 
understanding the paranormal; however, as Jack’s story 
demonstrates, Jack was unable to translate his own encounter into a 
meaningful insight. It remained a thrilling, tantalizing glimpse of the 
possibility of the paranormal. 
 
Revealingly, Jack explained that he could not translate this 
experience into evidence of the paranormal because it was hard to 
trust himself. He explained, “I experienced something. I did. But I 
don’t know what it was. It’s hard to believe it even happened now [a 
few days after the event]. I feel a bit mad really but it happened. It 
was great.” Like Ginny, Jack is marked by profound self-doubt. 
Despite the fact that he is certain he encountered something out of 
the ordinary, something that in his view is likely to be paranormal in 
nature, he cannot categorize it with any degree of certainty. The 
personal encounter lacks the power to persuade him or even slightly 
alter his perception of the reality of the paranormal.  
 
Despite investigators’ genuine concern for “evidence”, they produce 
markedly little of what they themselves recognize as evidence on 
either a personal or general level. At best, investigators conclude that 
a site is “active”, meaning that they suspect it is a location of 
paranormal activity. They do little in the way of defining the 
specifics of this activity or constructing an overview of the nature of 
the activity. More frustratingly to them, they are never able to locate 
the evidence necessary to enable them to accept their own 





28 At the moment he did not investigate. This is a fact that garnered some 
criticism from the group; however, it was unclear what precisely he could 
have done to investigate such an experience.  
 




Conclusion: Science as Cultural Constraint  
 
In considering the dilemma of paranormal investigators, it is 
important to ask why they associate science so closely with 
evidence. In their deliberations, the insights of mediums never 
outweigh the workings of technology. Similarly, they do not 
understand their own personal embodied encounters as transparent 
enough to indicate the unequivocal existence of the paranormal.  
 
The fascinating feature about paranormal investigating – the trait 
that separates it from movements such as ufology or creation science 
– is the residual doubt and uncertainty that marks their recourse to 
science. While they seek to position science as a tool and scientists 
as biased, subjective researchers, the spectre of science haunts their 
pursuit. And despite their explicit desire to convert embodied 
experiences of mediumship into “evidence”, they are unable to shake 
the suspicion that they are wrong, that their embodied encounters 
can never constitute real, objective evidence pointing to the 
existence of ghosts. This is all the more striking in investigators’ 
hopes to convince themselves (and themselves alone) of the 
existence of ghosts. Here, a scientifically mediated doubt permeates 
individuals’ understandings of their own minds and bodies. They 
remain hindered in categorizing and labelling a phenomenon that 
they highly suspect.  
 
Many scholars, such as Charles Taylor (1989, 2007), have noted the 
importance of attending to and better understanding the power of 
scientism. He observed that there is a “drawing power” to scientism, 
which is itself a moral framework with particular ethics of belief: 
one should not believe what one has insufficient evidence for 
(Taylor 1989: 403-404). Scientism – the fear and hope that science 
can and should explain the entirety of the world – ultimately 
condemns investigators’ endeavours. Despite their explicit suspicion 
of institutionalized science and popular scientism, investigators fall 
victim to a sneaking sense of dread and doubt that whatever they try 
to do will not work. There is no evidence capable of successfully 
submitting to the demands they imagine science to make.  
 




Investigators often deployed the metaphor of a toolbox for 
explaining their approach. In an idealized investigation, investigators 
assert that they would have a toolbox that would include science, 
experience, and mediums. Despite such reactions, many 
investigators would argue that science is just one tool in their 
toolbox for exploring the paranormal. One investigator explained, 
“It’s not perfect but it has its uses.” In much the same vein, they 
would suggest that mediums should be thought of as tools, to be 
observed and chronicled, not to be taken at face value. They 
emphasize that nothing should be left out. Ultimately they would 
fantasize that they were the masters of their toolboxes, yet the 
duelling sets of tools proved to be powerful in the own right. 
Investigators are unable to reconcile their desire to include tools of 
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“Feeling as One” during Fieldwork: 






 “What I am attempting, then is to portray the objective 
world...built up from ‘the private plane of perceptual 
experiences’ of all those who hooted with praise at the 
emergence of Sakutoha’s ihamba, of the five doctors in 
Meru’s Ihamba, and also the experiences of many other 
Africans and, indeed, as far as one can estimate, of many 
ritual performers throughout humankind.” (Edith Turner 
1992: 161 quoting Ralph Burhoe 1974: 25-26).  
 
From the effervescence of Pentecostal rituals with Congolese 
migrant believers to narratives of ecstatic encounters with “God”, 
from Sufi converts to Sufism in Montreal, my ethnographic 
experience has been fraught with the extraordinary. As I participated 
in a large-scale research project29 aimed at documenting the religious 
diversity that developed in the province of Quebec (Canada), after a 
long period of hegemony of the Catholic Church, I discovered that 
such phenomena had become common in the religious lives of many: 
 
Actually, I did not want to speak in tongues, but I had been praying 
so much in that church [and] the communion was starting, and that’s 
when I started to speak in tongues. I mean, I was under the 
impression that God was talking to me, God could talk to me at any 
time. I could sit in my living room and then start to talk with God. I 
was obviously talking alone, but I knew he was present and he could 
 
29 This project was financed by the Fonds de recherche du Québec Société et 
Culture and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. Researchers included Deirdre Meintel (director), Claude Gélinas, 
Josiane Le Gall, Géraldine Mossière, Khadiyatoulah Fall, François Gauthier 
and Fernand Ouellet. 




hear me. And I was praying and praying. [Later on], I started to have 
the gift of prophecy. I mean, I could see things before they came 
true or at the same time as they were occurring. For instance, one 
day I dreamt that my sister was losing a lot of things in her stomach. 
I had the feeling they were taking out her intestines; this is what I 
could see in my vision, in my dream. At that time, she was travelling 
in China and when I called her, she told me: “I have been losing 
blood for an hour,” [and] then I knew: That’s why God woke me up 
with this dream. (Interview conducted by the author.) 
 
When I was 6 or 7, my parents had an altar at home with pictures of 
many holy figures from different traditions, especially from 
Hinduism, like Rama, Krishna, and so forth. One day, my father 
added the picture of Sai Baba, a guru from India, even though [my 
dad] did not know much about him. Later on, [my dad] invited a 
special singer to the home; a lot of people were present and they 
sang bhajans [spiritual songs]. When the session was over, my 
mother went upstairs and discovered that ashes had appeared to 
cover Sai Baba’s picture. Everybody was astounded, because Sai 
Baba is supposed to have the power to materialize sacred ashes to 
cure people. People started to sing bhajans again. The following 
day, the altar was completely covered with ashes. Nobody knew 
what to do with it. Then people around came to ask for healing for 
particular pains. So the ash was diluted in water to be drunk by sick 
people. More and more people came to my house for this purpose 
and many of them were healed this way. (Interview conducted by 
Vincent Brillant-Goux.) 
 
For the scholar, the content of these unanticipated experiences 
belongs in the realm of the extraordinary, raising questions such as: 
did those experiences really happen or are they the fruit of believers’ 
subjective perceptions? Where should the line be drawn between 
illusion and reality? May one speak of different levels of reality? It is 
as if we are in a twilight zone where the frontier between the 
explainable and the unexplainable is blurred, as no scientific field 
has yet satisfactorily understood such experiences. According to 
Birgit Meyer: “[Social scientists] have to come to terms with the 
mediated nature of experiences that are claimed to be immediate and 
authentic by the beholders, and authorized as such by the religious 
traditions of which they form part” (Meyer 2006:  16).  
 




The issue is then not so much about what meaning and rationale we, 
as anthropologists, should give to those experiences that appear at 
first to be beyond the reach of rational explanation, than how to 
grasp and report them. Would these accounts have more empirical 
legitimacy if the ethnographer lived and reported similar experiences 
himself or herself? As Throop points out “there is indeed a spectrum 
of possible articulations of experience in terms of coherent and 
disjunctive forms” (2003: 235). How, then, can we make those 
experiences coherent and conjunctive with those of the believers’? 
 
In the following pages I want to explore subtle levels of participation 
by examining different ways of sharing extraordinary experience that 
vary on a continuum between two poles, namely as a distant 
dialogue and phenomenology. I will then look at how a 
phenomenological approach to religious experience may be an 
appropriate way to grasp the very nature of experience, notably by 
means of embodiment. In this respect, anthropologists seem well-
suited to achieve such analysis, as they are prone to embodying the 
experiences they observe by the fact of being physically present in 
the field, as well as by participation in the actions, rituals, more 
generally, the social and symbolic practices that occur during 
fieldwork, be it voluntary or not. This observation relates to a 
growing field of anthropology of experience that Turner and Bruner 
(1986) initiated and keeps on unfolding with Schmidt’s recent 
volume on the study of religious experience (2016). While 
anthropologists who situate themselves this way invite 
ethnographers to tackle the own bodiliness in the process of knowing 
in the field (Pierini 2016a), I argue that the role of the 
anthropologist’s experience in fieldwork can best be grasped by 
considering this posture as phenomenological and by addressing the 
various implications of his/her subjectivity, namely his/her 
definitions of the self, including issues of affects, emotions, 
empathy, intimacy, einfühlung (“feeling as one”) and 
intersubjectivity. 
 
Literature in recent decades has shown that such lived experiences 
not only concern those we study, but also ethnographers themselves 
who may experience the extraordinary in the course of fieldwork. 




Bruce Grindal (1983) was one of the pioneers of the current trend of 
ethnographers’ reporting such experiences in his narrative of his 
participation in a death divination ritual that he attended 15 years 
earlier in the town of Tumu (Ghana): 
 
I began to see the goka [the praise singer of the funeral] and the 
corpse [of the drummer of the chief of Tumu] tied together in the 
undulating rhythms of the singing, the beating of the iron hoes, and 
the movement of feet and bodies. Then I saw the corpse jolt and 
occasionally pulsate, in a counterpoint to the motions of the goka. At 
first, I thought that my mind was playing tricks with my eyes, so I 
cannot say when the experience first occurred; but it began with 
moments of anticipation and terror, as though I knew something 
unthinkable was about to happen. The anticipation left me 
breathless, gasping for air. In the pit of my stomach I felt a jolting 
and tightening sensation, which corresponded to moments of 
heightened visual awareness. What I saw in those moments was 
outside the realm of normal perception. From both the corpse and 
the goka came flashes of light so fleeting that I cannot say exactly 
where they originated. The hand of the goka would beat down on the 
iron hoe, the spirit would fly from his mouth, and suddenly the 
flashes of light flew like sparks from a fire. Then I felt my body 
become rigid. My jaws tightened and at the base of my skull I felt a 
jolt as though my head had been snapped off my spinal column. A 
terrible and beautiful sight burst upon me. Stretching from the 
amazingly delicate fingers and mouths of the goka, strands of 
fibrous light played upon the head, fingers, and toes of the dead 
man. The corpse, shaken by spasms, then rose to its feet, spinning 
and dancing in a frenzy. As I watched, convulsions in the pit of my 
stomach tied not only my eyes but also my whole being into this 
vortex of power. It seemed that the very floor and walls of the 
compound had come to life, radiating light and power, drawing the 
dancers in one direction and then another. Then a most wonderful 
thing happened. The talking drums on the roof of the dead man's 
house began to glow with a light so strong that it drew the dancers to 
the rooftop. The corpse picked up the drumsticks and began to play. 
I cannot say whether what transpired took a matter of minutes or 
even an hour. Nor can I be sure about the sequence of events which I 
witnessed. But after a while the power which had filled the 
compound began to cool, and the body of the Tumukuoro's drummer 




was once again sitting propped against the west wall of the 
compound. (Grindal 1983: 68) 
 
Grindal’s narrative is typical of many others. In 1984, Paul Stoller 
related his own apprenticeship among the Songhay of Niger and his 
experience of sorcery with his teacher. In Zambia, Edith Turner 
(1992) reported having been immersed in a drumming ritual to heal a 
woman with a devouring spirit, while Jeanne Favret-Saada (1977) 
gave account of her personal entanglement in the witchcraft universe 
that she studied in rural France. These narratives have nourished 
vivid debates over dominant scientific categories of thought, their 
fundamental assumptions, as well as the ethics and analytical 
changes needed to account for these experiences and phenomena. In 
Barbara Tedlock’s words, the discipline of anthropology is 
undergoing a “reconfiguration of social thought and practice that 
ought to be recognized for what it is, a change in ethnographic 
epistemology embodying key ethical and analytical issues that has 
already produced a major body of work” (Tedlock 1991: 69-94). 
 
While Favret-Saada argues that it is only by believing in witchcraft 
that she was able to witness the practice, Stoller (1984) proposes to 
approach such phenomena with a new philosophy, considering them 
as true and therefore as outside the category of rationality of Western 
thinking. For her part, while studying Balinese world views, Unni 
Wikan suggests that “feeling is more essential for intellectual 
comprehension for it spawns intuition, evaluation and moral 
judgment. From this perspective a Western epistemology based on 
intellectual reasoning and objective thought alone appears as an act 
of hubris” (1991: 229). Beyond the ongoing debates over 
anthropological and epistemological principles, ethnographers also 
question the limits and nature of their participation during fieldwork. 
Overall, the very existence of extraordinary experiences emphasizes 
ontological questionings in terms of ways of being in the world and 
conceptions about its essence and definition. In this chapter, I 
propose to draw on this current trend in anthropology to think about 
how to grasp and address such things as extraordinary experiences. 
While scholars have primarily tended to objectify these, the current 




focus on subjectivity allows for new possibilities for ethnographers 
to live such experiences as part of their methodological approach.  
 
After briefly presenting how experiences were first considered as 
social facts, I will discuss how a phenomenological approach by 
anthropologists may raise new understandings of extraordinary 
experiences by means of “embodied” fieldwork. Drawing on 
previous fieldwork studies that I have conducted among Congolese 
Pentecostal ritual congregations and with women converts to Islam 
both located in Montreal, I will show that a phenomenological 
perspective that puts senses, emotions and affect at the core of 
embodied knowledge (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987) may be the 
only feasible way for grasping unexplainable experience. I will rely 
on my own sensorial and emotional experience in Pentecostal 
African congregation rituals to argue that embodiment relates to 
experiences of empathy and einfühlung as compared to the Other’s 
lived reality. Following Julia Kristeva (in Nowak 2011: 318), I 
define einfühlung as “a feeling of oneness to the outside world with a 
loss of the subject’s identity”. As Waldstein (2016) observed during 
Rastafari rituals she documented, such “heightened sensory 
awareness” may give rise to intersubjective experiences that 
challenge the realm of Cartesian knowledge. I will show how these 
experiences impact the definition and boundaries between the self 
and otherness. 
 
In this reading, empathy and einfülhung as an ethnographic method 
are framed as an ongoing conversation, fraught with differentiation 
as well as entanglement of the self and of the Other, which are 
produced in common practices and activities. Such a perspective 
brings the possibility of opening new avenues for the construction of 
knowledge that depart from the canons of positivist thinking 
whereby reality is limited to that which is rational, verifiable and 
consensually validated; i.e., whereby “reality is relative to one's 
consciousness of it” (Grindal 1983: 76). Given that the experiences 
of the informant and of the ethnographer are intermingled in the 
process of producing knowledge, I will consider both in much the 
same way. This technique for producing knowledge, however, raises 
the issue of the relevance of the ethnographer’s experience as 




compared to the informant’s. I will argue that it requires the 
anthropologist to reach for a phenomenological perspective on his or 
her own experience. 
 
Does according legitimacy to the scholar’s experience mean that 
anthropologists should go native per se? Actually, it invites us to 
revisit anthropology’s methodological assumptions, which are 
influenced by the locations and sympathies of the researcher as 
regards his or her fieldwork - as an insider, an outsider, an apostate 
and/or an advocate - as well as by the position that the religions 
studied occupy in the societal context (Neitz 2013). In this fashion, 
as Gooren (2009) reminds us, several anthropologists who practice 
methodological theism accept the possibility that the phenomena 
they write about are related to a supernatural actor (Evans-Pritchard 
1962; Victor Turner 1986; Jules-Rosette 1975). This position 
allowed them to be full and active participants, and thus to make in-
depth observations. On the other hand, other scholars such as 
Durkheim have positioned themselves as atheists and conceive of 
experiences as social facts, putting severe limitations on the 
possibility of the researcher’s participation during fieldwork. In the 
secular and religiously diverse environments being documented 
today, a growing number of anthropologists are now adopting a 
more cautious approach by showing a nuanced openness to the 
experiences their informants report, recognizing the possibility that 
these subjective phenomena exist outside of the realm of empirical 
science. These scholars tend to distance themselves from 
methodological atheism “as the only lens through which to view 
social reality within the social scientific community,” arguing that 
“the very possibility of divine human interaction has been at best 
overlooked and at worst denied by many scholars” (Poloma and 
Hood 2008: 8). In their ethnography of an emerging Pentecostal 
church in the US, Poloma and Hood claim they adopted an agnostic 
posture so as to “use as real data the reported acts of God that 
informants assert they have experienced” (2008: 8). In so doing, the 
authors developed a model of “Godly love” to frame the experiences 
of God in evangelical churches in a range of interactions between 
divine and human love. Nevertheless, as Poloma is herself an active 
member of the church studied, the agnostic claim may be 




misleading. Overall, such methodological agnosticism obliges 
contemporary scholars to negotiate their participation during 
fieldwork.  
 
Experience and the Study of Lived Reality 
 
Victor Turner was the first anthropologist to conceptualize 
experience. He referred to its etymology that implicates the idea of 
“peril” and indicates that “each of us has had certain “experiences” 
which have been formative and transformative, that is, 
distinguishable, isolable sequences of external events and internal 
responses to them such as initiations into new lifeways (going to 
school, first jobs…)” (1986: 35). In this respect, experiences are 
events. A category sui generis, as proposed by Dilthey (1833-1911), 
they have a temporal or processual structure. During his fieldwork 
among the Ndembu in Zambia, Turner found that initiation rituals 
usually involve a deep personal experience that connects the 
individual to a group, leading her to a change of consciousness. This 
change of consciousness is achieved through a state of liminality that 
Turner defined more precisely as “a fructile chaos, a storehouse of 
possibilities, not a random assemblage but a striving after new forms 
and structures, a gestation process, a fetation of modes appropriate to 
postliminal existence” (1986: 42). In this stage of liminality, doors 
are opened to the spirits. For Turner then, experience results in 
dissolution of the ordinary sense of time and space, leading the 
individual to perceive himself or herself as a whole more clearly 
than through the fragmentedness of his/her social identity and role. 
Still, these deep human emotional and ephemeral experiences may 
be co-experienced with a group within a state of ritual comradeship 
and fellowship that Turner (1972) calls communitas, a term that 
recalls Malinowski (1923)’s notion of “phatic communion”. 
 
Anthropology of Experience or Experiential Anthropology? 
 
As Edward Bruner notes, in the field of the anthropology of 
experience it is not quite clear whether experience is the object of 
study, or whether it is the methodology. In any case, the creation of 
this novel realm of research meant to dissolve the separation 




between experience and theory, leading the ethnographer to a 
personal, participatory, reflexive and sensual approach to fieldwork 
based on the sights, sounds, smells, and body as a perceptual device. 
Among Turner’s many successors (including James Fernandez, 
Bruce Grindal, Paul Stoller, etc.), Edward Bruner notes that 
“anthropology of experience deals with how individuals actually 
experience their culture that is how events are received by 
consciousness” (1986: 4). Such perception draws on Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s reading of experience as a form of erlebniss, a German 
concept that reads as “what has been lived through”, emphasizing 
the lived dimension of experience as well as its elementary, 
preconceptual, and sometimes ineffable aspects. This is opposed to 
the term Erfahrung, which refers to the realm of already-interpreted 
fact.  
 
Edith Turner, Victor Turner’s widow, later exemplified this 
approach as she attended African rituals of healing and in her studies 
of shamanism. As the Turners’ perspectives on the anthropology of 
experience draw on the supposedly universal biological ability of 
humans to experience spirituality, their body of work invites 
ethnographers to rethink their own tools for understanding realities 
that lie beyond the reach of the ordinary. This raises new concern 
regarding the extent to which we can really experience the 
extraordinary without necessarily sharing the symbolic and social 
settings that make it possible. 
 
Experience as the Hallmark of Contemporary Religiosity 
 
The Turners’ contribution paved the way to the current focus that 
religious studies are now giving to the notion of experience, 
sometimes at the expense of ideas of belief and disbelief. This 
renewed interest in the issue of experience is related to various 
features of current religious landscape: the secularization of Western 
societies, the revitalization of mainstream religion, New Age and 
Earth-related movements, the attraction spiritualities exert on some 
seekers, globalization and religious diversity, and above all, 
individualization of religion and the centrality of the subjectivity and 
reflexivity of social actors. The stories collected in our research 




project on religious diversity in Quebec also describe encounters 
with sacred or supernatural beings, feelings of otherworldly 
transcendence, a sense of being united with all beings. Research 
participants report feelings of deep bliss, sensations of well-being 
and relief, and sometimes a sort of completeness or awe that remind 
one of Otto’s conception of the sacred. These inner experiences may 
be lived collectively and they are likely to be catalyzed by the 
strength of the community. For instance, some yogis talk of an 
energy circulating between practitioners that helps them go deeper in 
their personal, inward experiences (Bouchard 2013). Such 
experiences that relate to perceived encounters with supernatural 
entities or that heighten awareness of one's relationships and unity 
with spiritual beings may occur exceptionally as a founding moment 
in one’s faith, or regularly in the framework of organized ritual life.  
While such topics now form the core of ethnographic research on 
religion, they call for an epistemological shift from the definition of 
anthropology of religion as “the way in which religious beliefs 
[among others] appear to the believer” (Geertz 1972: 99). As a 
matter of fact, very few of the participants I mentioned above relate 
their experience to any symbolic system or to any particular belief; 
rather, they remain contemplative or interrogative. While a number 
of them combine beliefs or practices that belong to different spiritual 
traditions, they remind us of Jeanne Favret-Saada’s call to cease “to 
cling to the idea of “belief” as an analytical concept” (2012: 47). 
Rather, we should acknowledge the range of possible attitudes 
towards the propositional content of a subject’s belief, including the 
subject’s own shifting attitudes over his life trajectory.  
Favret-Saada’s contribution truly reminds us of the frontier that 
exists between the reality of individual experiences and the symbolic 
meanings that are attributed to these. The latter can be expressed by 
means of performances, commodification or texts. As they 
“encapsulate” the experience of others (Turner 1996: 5), they can be 
interpreted as ethnographic material. In my research among converts 
to Islam in France and in Quebec, I have collected nearly eighty 
interviews. However, it quickly became clear that convert narratives 
were standardized and hinged on a few redundant issues (gender 




relationships, the veil, Islam and public spaces…) , and that converts 
followed a pattern that circulates on the Internet. As experiences 
structure the modes of expression, it is likely that the patterns of 
expression that are available or culturally valued also govern the 
experiences that individuals may live through, and their awareness of 
those experiences. In charismatic movements, a broad array of ritual 
techniques function to prompt believers to speak in tongues or “fall” 
(in the Lord). Given that these unexplainable experiences are seen as 
gifts from the Holy Spirit, they display the believer’s level of 
“spiritual maturity”, and as such, they determine the symbolic capital 
he or she may enjoy within the community. On the basis of her 
ethnographic research in the Bocage (France), Favret-Saada goes 
further, showing how the set of attitudes regarding witchcraft reflect 
— in their own particular manner — “the universal demands of life 
in society” (2012: 48) and “formulate certain universal facts of life 
in society” (p. 49). She uses the notion of “force” that is present in 
humans’ corporeal world, and that some people manage to channel.  
Distinguishing the realm of subjective experience from the system of 
normative beliefs shifts the issue of experience beyond the domain 
of the mundane and of what can be socially enunciated. It puts 
severe restrictions on our ability to understand such phenomena by 
typical scientific means. If, as Favret-Saada proposes, we consider 
that a somehow universal force is at the origin of extraordinary 
phenomena, what kind of methodological tools can we develop to 
grasp them? In this respect as for many others, fieldwork knows how 
and where to guide us. 
 
Experience as a Way of Understanding 
 
The construction of anthropological knowledge is based on 
fieldwork, that is, an inductive methodology that brings 
anthropologists into sometimes chaotic and uncomfortable 
encounters that may last for long periods of time. An example of 
potentially uncomfortable field activities is attending extended and 
noisy Pentecostal services, where participants display strong 
effervescence and seemingly deep contact with supernatural entities 
they view as visits of the Holy Spirit. At the same time, participation 




in these services allows the researcher to grasp fieldwork beyond 
words, by means of prelogical tools or what I would call, borrowing 
from the phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1971), “le corps propre”, 
that is the bodily perceptual device through which individuals 
experience the world as a unit. In this reading, the meaning given to 
the world is not limited to what is said or thought by participants; it 
exists in the gestures and in what is accomplished through actions. 
This phenomenological perspective that puts senses, emotions and 
affect at the core of one’s ability to comprehend the world engages a 
form of practice that induces new perceptions and convictions, 
where doing and meaning converge. Founded on the premise that the 
ability to reach otherworldly experiences draws on biological 
universals constraining human beings, a phenomenological 
perspective typically requires the anthropologist to temporarily put 
his own categories of understanding the world into brackets, to 
suspend disbelief.  
 
A Phenomenological Approach to Knowledge 
 
For anthropologists who are physically present in the field for 
extended periods of time, phenomenology represents as much a 
methodological condition as a constraint. Indeed, experiences can 
generate sensations that directly affect the researcher’s body and 
perceptions, making it harder to maintain scholarly distance. In the 
words of Birgit Meyer:  
 
Encounters with a new religion often work through the body, 
making it difficult for researchers to maintain an outsider’s position. 
Many anthropologists have reported how they were sucked into the 
sensory modes of the religion they studied, without even being 
aware of it. (2006: 25) 
 
Although some ethnographers seem thoroughly uncomfortable with 
writing about these experiences during fieldwork, others have called 
for taking them into consideration as a means of adjusting 
anthropological methodology:  
 




What is needed for this kind of fieldwork is a technique of 
participation that demands total involvement of our whole being. 
Indeed it is perhaps only when we truly and fully participate in this 
way that we find this essentially subjective approach to be in no way 
incompatible with the more conventional rational, objective, 
scientific approach. On the contrary, they complement each other 
and that complementarity is an absolute requirement if we are to 
come to any full understanding of the social process. It provides a 
wealth of data that could never be acquired by any other means 
(Turnbull 1990: 51). 
 
Thus far, the idea of living experiences of fieldwork has generated 
varied and innovative methodologies, sometimes borrowing on the 
worldviews of those studied. Wikan sought to grasp the Balinese 
cosmology by means of an “experience-near” approach that would 
recognize the “feeling-thinking character” specific to Balinesian 
views of the world (1991: 286). Csordas (1993) transposed the 
phenomenological understanding of the world to the realm of the 
social sciences with the seminal concept of “somatic mode of 
attention”, that links perceptual experience (Merleau-Ponty 1971) 
with socially informed attitudes (Bourdieu 1980). Following on her 
husband’s work, Edith Turner reported:  
 
As for my function as ethnographer, I had had to relax the detached-
observer imperative in order to see as the Africans saw, thus 
bridging the gap and entering the culture. This turned me around to 
the spirituality of religion, honing my sense of atmosphere and my 
understanding of spiritual healing.” The same year, she pioneered a 
phenomenological approach in anthropology without labeling it as 
such: “to study ordinary human changes of consciousness, certain of 
us have had to shift our own invisible, real spiritual life and what we 
know of that of others into a position to the front and have it 
working in us, so that we fully know the material of our fieldwork. 
We’ve then written this material, intimately. (Turner 2006: 34) 
 
This reflection on anthropology as a way of experiencing the other’s 
perceived reality relies on the body and its many symbolic and 
perceptual possibilities: As a sensorial device and a mode of 
individual and collective expression, it first represents an 
experiential vehicle. Moreover, the body is endowed with great 




potential for expressivity and receptivity, which has recently led 
anthropologists to turn their focus towards the somatic dimension, 
the body,, and the role of mediation and symbolic interpretation 
especially regarding issues of healing or charisma. Because the body 
is also the locus of extraordinary experience, experiential knowledge 
also relies on embodied knowledge. 
 
Experience as a Form of Knowledge 
 
For anthropologists, experiencing fieldwork influences bodily 
sensations and perceptions in a way that creates prelogical 
knowledge, before the latter is attributed conventional meaning. The 
American ethnographer Charles Briggs (1993) writes about an 
“embodied discourse” that is based on “denotatively implicit” 
meaning (i.e. language that is lacking in semantic content), as 
opposed to “denotatively explicit” meaning (i.e. prevailing 
ideologies of language in the West). From this perspective, the 
senses stirred by music, tastes and rhythms are seen to have the 
authority of producing knowledge. Whether or not it allows one to 
consciously incorporate knowledge into the body, an experiential 
approach in fieldwork provides access to certain experiences of 
sensitive knowledge that other methods sometimes overlook or 
obscure (experiences of reflexivity, interiority, etc.). In this respect, 
Kulick and Willson argue that, “To experiential ethnographers, the 
self and especially experiences in the field, are epistemologically 
productive” (1995: 20). These arguments also promote the 
methodological benefits of a more participatory approach to 
fieldwork where the impact of the ethnographer’s presence and 
participation in actions, rituals or practices in the field are 
acknowledged and integrated into analytical work. For example, to 
go back to Bruce Grindal’s experience of a death divination ritual in 
Ghana, the ethnographer does not explicitly interpret his experience 
in religious terms, but rather compares it to what people around him 
experienced, that is the “passionate resurrection of the power of the 
ancestors” (1983: 75) Following this perspective, understanding 
extraordinary experiences can best be achieved by an embodied 
approach that transcends epistemological fields. In this reading, 




knowledge is stored in the body and is created by the practical 
execution of the act that prevails over the meaning attributed to it. 
 
The concept of embodied knowledge first emerged from medical 
anthropology with Scheper-Hughes and Lock’s (1987) contribution 
that draws on the relationship between mind, body, self and society. 
The authors deconstruct the notion of the body into three 
dimensions: “the phenomenally experienced individual body-self”, 
the social body as a “natural symbol for thinking about relationships 
among nature, society and culture”, and a body politic as an “artifact 
of social and political control” (1987: 6). In this perspective, 
emotions are considered as “embodied thoughts” (Rosaldo 1984) 
that mediate between the three dimensions of the body, acting as a 
conduit between experience and getting involved in action. Over the 
course of my fieldwork in Congolese Pentecostal churches, I had the 
opportunity to experience how rituals articulate emotions, as well as 
imagination, memory, perception and senses with the various 
dimensions of this “mindful” body. As I regularly attended Sunday 
services, I gradually became more deeply involved in hymns, 
dances, melodies and speeches, feeling intimately touched by the 
strong emotions that were evoked during rituals. Here are some 
notes that I wrote in my journal on February 22nd, 2004, after an 
observation in a Congolese Pentecostal service: 
 
I have been deeply moved by the joy that emerged from the cult. I 
surprised myself as I started to dance on my chair and to sing along 
with the lively rhythms. The atmosphere was so stirring that I even 
thought I would join the women who were dancing in circle at the 
front of the service space. 
 
I eventually experienced states of true joy and grace, sometimes a 
feeling of communion with members of the church, as well as 
spontaneous sensations of love and bliss. Such feelings aroused by 
means of music, dances, and bodily gestures convey a new grid of 
perception of the self and of the others; that is, a new sense of 
belonging and different relationships with participants. I could 
indeed observe their impact on my own subjectivity. Again, some 




personal notes from fieldwork after attending a “Christian party” 
organized by the young members of the church a few years later:  
 
All participants but one were of African or Haitian background. One 
after the other, they went on the stage to perform a personal song to 
the rhythm of rap music. The songs describe their personal 
encounter with Jesus, a sort of deep and unexplainable sense of 
being loved that came with bodily or visual sensations of his 
presence. The lyrics situate these experiences within the young 
members’ personal stories, which are often difficult trajectories that 
mix feelings of personal loss or of social rejection, mainly the 
hardships typical of teenager and immigrant pathways. The audience 
sings and dances to accompany each performer, the atmosphere is 
moving, filled with sadness and joy and a deep sense of cohesion. I 
feel moved by the party’s effervescence, by the intimacy generated 
by the sincerity of such personal narratives, as well as by the 
solidarity they arouse among participants. I can feel the emotions of 
those around me, a blend of hope and despair. At this point, I sense a 
deep feeling of communion with the others, a sort of affection for 
those young people who could all be my younger siblings. 
Regardless of the colour of my skin, I feel as though I were black 
tonight, and I start loving Jesus myself for the sense of hope it gives 
to these people who worship and believe in him. I can feel the hope 
of my companions pouring over my life and my own personal 
challenges, as I share this special moment of common bliss. Now I 
understand how the religious life of these young people relates to all 
aspects of their social and personal stories, as it alleviates their 
personal drama by giving a meaning and a purpose to it all. (Field 
notes, August 2012) 
 
For ethnographers, experience can represent an implicit form of 
knowledge that is located in the body, giving the them the possibility 
of grasping what is not visible to the external observer, and what 
cannot be verbally explained by the research participant. Through 
this awareness of one’s own experience and self-reflexivity, 
knowledge reaches a higher level of sensitivity to reality, one that 
lies beyond immediate perception. In his account of how he and his 
wife studied divination, Dennis Tedlock holds that this approach 
may sometimes be the only one possible:  
 




I have found myself expected to learn, however imperfectly, some 
of the skills I was observing. This happened when Barbara Tedlock 
and I reached a point in our questions about divinatory practices 
where the only workable answer was an offer to teach us those 
practices [...] This information permitted me to rerun the divination 
in the very process of writing it. (1997: 82)  
 
Jean-Guy Goulet (1998) also found that radical participation and 
experiential knowledge was the only way to get insights on the 
vision of the world among the Dene Tha group he was studying. In 
his reading, non-verbal communication and embodied thoughts 
represent new ways of building knowledge about the other’s 
experience that require ethnographers to open their perceptual 
apparatus to the full range of sensual and sensory experiences that 
arise from fieldwork. This raises questions about the authenticity and 
veracity of our perceptions, leading us to examine the level of 
subjectivity involved in fieldwork as an embodied process, an issue 
to which I now turn. 
 
Intersubjectivity and Empathy  
as Conditions for Ethnographic Fieldwork 
 
Proposing to consider anthropology as an embodied form of 
knowledge brings out the need for scholars to perform what they 
study in order to make their ethnographic comprehension as accurate 
as possible. However, it raises the question of the extent to which the 
anthropologist’s attention to embodiment may inform his or her 
understandings of the other’s experience. As he applied 
phenomenological theory to the social sciences, Thomas Csordas 
introduced the notion of “somatic modes of attention” to refer to the 
experience of embodied presence as both “reflexive (as sensation of 
oneself) and relational (as presence to others)” (Csordas 1993: 138). 
Bringing interactional experiences into the subjective realm has 
many implications regarding definitions and extent of the self. For 
example, Edith Turner (1996: xxiii) explains that “coexperience” 
enables one to connect to some reality that lies beyond its cultural 
substrate and represents a common human condition. Agar (2006) 
speaks of cooperation between the informant and the anthropologist, 




cooperation that depends on the adequacy of each one’s own 
perspective regarding the interests, visions of the world, and space 
and time configurations.  
 
Fabian (2001) emphasizes the coevalness of informant and 
ethnographer, since they share the same space, time and 
contemporaneity. Their intersubjectivity then relies on 
preconstructed mutual conceptions that may align during the 
encounter, though these do not always lead to consensus. As these 
experiences on fieldwork bring into question the ethnographer’s own 
otherness, they follow “a movement by which a subject leaves her 
own condition through a relation of affections that she can establish 
with another condition” (Goldman 2003: 464 in Pierini 2016b). 
 
All these approaches converge and focus on the idea of shared 
experience that conveys knowledge of its own and that is produced 
in the intersubjectivity of the ethnographer’s presence with the 
informant. Addressing the issue of intersubjectivity means 
questioning the ethnographer’s commitments during fieldwork, as 
far as social identity and inner-self are concerned. As one enters 
fieldwork, the researcher is challenged to negotiate an ethical stance, 
as well as subjective openness to sharing the experiences of the 
others. For example, when examining sorcery among the Songhay of 
Niger, Stoller realized that “anthropological writers should allow the 
events of the field to penetrate them” (1984: 110). Fieldwork then, 
situates ethnographers in a liminal state that may engender different 
degrees of ambivalence with respect to the people studied. In my 
own research on Pentecostal rituals, mere observation would have 
hardly been possible without sharing the bodily language and 
enthusiasm of my companions. My study of religious effervescence 
as it is ritually organized would have been considerably constrained 
had I taken the stance of an ambivalent outsider. On the one hand, as 
I was not Pentecostal myself, I kept a neutral and distant attitude 
which proved quite difficult to maintain in an atmosphere of strong 
collective emotions, where the expressivity of participants tended to 
emulate one another. 
 




On the other hand, the rituals deeply touched me, not only because 
of the moving narratives of believers, but above all because of the 
blissful and ecstatic atmosphere of their celebrations. The hymns, 
dances, melodies and expression of emotions emanating from 
participants may indeed easily move any witness of religious ritual. 
During the limited time of the rituals, and within the ritual space, I 
shared such intimacy with the believers I was observing that I 
gradually felt we were all part of a community; in a sense, I had the 
feeling we were as one. Resisting such spontaneous actions and 
censoring my own feelings would probably have impeded me from 
entering the field setting. Therefore, I gradually positioned myself in 
a liminal state, suspended between the circumstantial feeling of 
Sameness that Pentecostal rituals mobilize by way of warm and 
endearing rituals, and the implacable awareness of my own 
Otherness that my religious identity as Catholic combined with 
yogic philosophy and practices involves. The sense of the self I 
developed resonates with the multiple dimensions of my subjectivity 
that may extend to and connect with various realms of sensitivity 
within in a skewed matrix of space-time that some of my informants 
would label as the Holy Spirit. 
 
In a previous reflection on my stance during fieldwork among 
Pentecostals, I have shown that the possibility for anthropologists to 
share in ritual emotions with believers generates feelings of 
empathy, intimacy and intersubjectivity that pave the way for the 
ethnographic process (Mossière 2007). For me, the empathic 
position that I embraced seemed the only way to grasp the embodied 
dimensions of religious behaviour similar to the “empathic 
resonance” Halloy (2016) experienced on Afro-Brazilian fieldwork. 
Following Lutz and White, I associate the notion of “empathy” with 
the universalistic premise whereby “all humans have the ability to 
understand another’s emotional state…through the channels of 
empathic (and usually nonverbal) communication and is 
conceptualized as either an intellectual understanding or a more 
direct emotional one” (1986: 415). Such empathic methodology 
leads to other ways of producing knowledge through non-verbal and 
unintentional communication, which replaces spoken 
communication. Ethnographic fieldwork then makes it possible to 




reach other types of knowledge, and to grasp the distinction between 
communicable knowledge (informative) and kinds of knowledge 
only learned through tacit experience (formative).  
 
In fact, discussions over the notion of empathy as a mode of 
relationship to the Other date back to the German philosophical 
school of the late XIX century, and were launched with 
Schleiermacher’s romanticist theory founded in hermeneutics 
(Nowak 2012). According to its many critics, of which Gadamer was 
not the least, the concept of empathy involves the author’s own 
projection and identification with the Other; potentially reducing the 
work of interpretation to an intuitive process. In the social sciences, 
such critiques have been challenged by scholars such as Lutz and 
White (1986) and Beatty and Watson (1999), who describe empathy 
as an ability to understand phenomenologically that is not 
irreconcilable with emotional distance. In this respect, 
anthropologists can be sympathetic and compassionate (in the Latin 
sense of “compassion”, to “suffer with”) by simply observing the 
reality of the Other, rather than entering into this reality. Following 
Dilthey’s premise, anthropologists argue that before anything, 
experiences are embedded in socio-historical conditions that define 
their ordinary/extraordinary status. For example, in another study I 
conducted among converts to Islam in France and Québec, I decided 
to wear a veil to accompany one of my informants during a walk 
downtown in Montreal. I thought that trying to veil myself like my 
informants would shed a different light on my research, and help me 
understand the way they live and perceive their reality. I intended 
thereby not only to get insights about the ethical modesty the 
converts experience as they adopt the veil, but also to experiment 
with this feeling of turning the gaze inward and perhaps get a chance 
to experience the sensation of connection to the divine that the 
converts had all told me about. However, I could not take on the 
heavy burden that wearing veil the veil represents for Muslim 
women in some secular public spaces. In the end, my embodiment 
methodology (literally) followed other paths, because throughout my 
investigation over the course of two years, I wore modest clothing 
and often chose hooded jerseys. The latter not only hid my hair and 
femininity, but also helped me to experience the feeling of intimacy 




with an inner-self that the converts I was studying called Allah. 
Along with other social and personal characteristics that converts 
and I shared and created a space of intimacy (same age and on a 
same spiritual quest), I have often overstepped the limits of an 
empathic attitude, reaching a feeling of being as one (einfühlung).  
 
Nevertheless, empathy and einfülhung as an ethnographic method 
should be framed as a dialogic and ongoing process, fraught with 
differentiation as well as assertion of the self and the Other, which 
are produced in common practices and activities. Sharing 
embodiment makes the self and the Other coexist, interweaving each 
into an intimate space that does not necessarily mean mutual 
identification. In other words, if the ethnographer is able to think, 
act, and feel like the other, he does not ascribe the same meaning to 
the experiences he shares with other participants who, for their part, 
do not necessarily share the same interpretation of their lived 
experience (supposing that they have the same experience, which is 
not likely). To conceptualize this process, Rosaldo (1984) proposed 
the concept of “overlapping circles” that are shared responses to 
individual experiences, ones that overlap rather than coincide, but 
that also allow one to have insight into the meaning of another’s 
world. I then argue that since anthropology constitutes an embodied 
form of knowledge, co-presence during fieldwork paves the way for 
an empathic attitude that follows upon shared intimacy. It may 
culminate in feelings of oneness (einfühlung) but should nevertheless 
take into consideration contrast and difference. The anthropological 
method should involve a scholar’s awareness and reflexivity 
regarding his own stance and experience throughout fieldwork. This 
effort to put one’s own social and historical categories of 
understanding into brackets in order to understand the perception 
that the Other ascribes to a common experience turns the 
anthropologist into a phenomenological subject. While Pentecostal 
rituals deeply moved me in a way that created feelings of 
communion with the other believers, I decided to keep my distance 
from the dogmatic message of the church, as I often felt oppressed 
by the rigid normative framework and sermons, that in my view 
were at times fundamentalist. As a result, I did not interpret the ritual 
ecstatic atmosphere and common feelings of bliss as manifestations 




of the Holy Spirit as did my interviewees, but rather as a common 
feeling of being in touch with the divine that is accessible to all 
human beings. I then framed this shared experience in my own 
vision of the world, focusing my research on the specific Pentecostal 




When he phrased the scholars’ task of understanding social objects 
as verstehen, Weber advocated that we do not need to experience 
what others do in order to build knowledge around their activities. 
The phenomenologist Edmund Husserl agreed that it is possible to 
understand expressions and feelings that we cannot reproduce 
ourselves. In the social sciences, some scholars like Edith Turner 
consider that experiencing the extraordinary is part of the universal 
abilities shared by all human beings, while others like Renato 
Rosaldo (1984) argue that because human feelings are ineffable, they 
can only be captured by someone who has already and previously 
experienced such states. In fact, sharing feelings with the other does 
not necessarily mean full mimesis; in other words, reaching a point 
of intimacy does not require the ethnographer to “go native”, though 
some ethnographers have chosen to adopt this position (Jules-
Rosette 1975; Hermansen 2006).  
 
For the ethnographer, however, the issue lies elsewhere, as empathy 
often comes as a condition for doing fieldwork. For example, before 
accepting to meet with me, most of the converts to Islam to whom I 
had proposed an interview wanted to know more about my religious 
identity and beliefs. The fact that I am a believer myself, though 
within another religious tradition, opened doors not only to their 
homes, but also to their personal and subjective experiences with a 
sense of transcendence they deem as divine. In other words, building 
knowledge about the experiences of human beings requires the 
scientist to share a sense of humanity with the people one is trying to 
understand, who represent therefore more than a mere object of 
study. As Dilthey poses a distinction between understanding the 
experience of others and experiencing it oneself (Nowak 2011: 308), 




I suggest that for anthropologists, the conditions of fieldwork quite 
often blur the frontier between those two domains.  
 
In a context where the anthropological objective is not to feel like 
the other, but to understand what the other feels, the issue of 
experience puts the fieldwork approach into question. After all, 
Favret-Saada (1990) points out that the anthropological method of 
participant observation forms an oxymoron. In the same vein, 
Barbara Tedlock argues that in the last decades, cultural 
anthropological method has shifted from participant observation 
toward the observation of participation where the ethnographer both 
observes and experiences his “own and others’ coparticipation 
within the ethnographic encounter” (1991: 69). In this manner, 
personal openness to experiences during fieldwork allows for the 
embodiment of knowledge that only seems possible with full 
personal participation. Although the scientific nature of such a 
subjective approach may be challenged, anthropology is now framed 
so as to mobilize the human assets of the ethnographer to build 
knowledge about the Other. And indeed, it produces unique 
qualitative knowledge on the idiosyncrasy of human experiences, 
including on experiences culturally labelled extraordinary. These 
approaches to fieldwork lead to fundamental epistemological 
problems in social anthropology. For instance, can we imagine 
objects of study in which, through their own personal experience, the 
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This chapter explores the possibility that the self is an experiential 
phenomenon, as distinct from the classical anthropological 
understanding of the self as a cultural category. The notion of the 
self as a cultural category has been prevalent in anthropology since 
(at least) the work of the French sociologist Marcel Mauss (1872-
1950). This chapter will introduce key historical developments in the 
anthropology of selfhood from Mauss onwards, focusing on the 
different ways the self has been defined by ethnographers working in 
the field. We will also briefly survey the anthropological distinction 
between Western and Non-Western models of the self to set the 
scene for the discussion that follows. 
 
Against this background, I would like to suggest that the self is 
something more than a cultural category. This is not to say, of 
course, that culture plays no role in the development of self-
conceptions. Indeed I shall argue that, rather than being the source of 
self-concepts, culture is best understood as a filtration system, or as a 
modulator, through which experiences are given meaning and 
interpreted. Often, however, cultural notions become fixed, and are 
passed on as given fact: they can be taken as normative, prescriptive, 
accounts of all that is potentially possible. In such situations 
individuals who experience alternate modes of the self may find that 
their own experiential understanding of the nature of the self is at 
odds with the normative models of their host culture (unless, of 
course, their culture takes into account a wider perspective of the 
nature of self and consciousness).  
 
This is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the context of 
post-industrial Euro-American society, where the dominant 
paradigms of materialist science define consciousness, and 




consequently the self, as little more than an epiphenomenon of 
physiological brain function—as a by-product and an illusion (cf. 
Crick 1994). I argue that through adopting an understanding of the 
self as an experiential phenomenon (that is as something that is 
experientially defined, rather than culturally generated), it is possible 
to move away from such reductive explanatory models. Embracing 
the experiential dimensions of consciousness and self requires that 
we consider the implications of the widest variety of self-
experiences that are reported by human beings across the world, and 
above all that we take these experiences seriously.  
 
These ideas have emerged from my own ethnographic fieldwork 
with a private, non-denominational home-circle in Bristol, UK, 
where mediums experimentally and experientially explore the nature 
of consciousness and self through the practice and development of 
trance mediumship, which involves the incubation of altered states 
of consciousness during which ostensible spirit personalities 
communicate with sitters in the context of séances (Hunter 2020). 
Ultimately, through the development of this practice, mediums (and 
sitters) develop and adopt models of consciousness and the self that 
seem to exceed what anthropologists have historically referred to as 
the ‘Western’ conception of the self, in spite of the fact that in their 
daily lives they are immersed in mainstream Western culture. There 
are, perhaps, interesting parallels here with the work of Tanya 
Luhrmann amongst American Evangelicals, whose experiences 
communing with God have similarly led to alternate conceptions of 
the self (Luhrmann 2012). Furthermore, and intriguingly, these 
conceptions of the self appear to exceed the standard models of 
mainstream materialist science, which might suggest that this line of 
inquiry also has ontological implications for our understanding of 
the nature of consciousness (though we will be unable to explore 











The Bristol Spirit Lodge 
 
The Bristol Spirit Lodge is a private, non-denominational30 
spiritualist home-circle based in Clevedon, a town about fifteen 
miles to the West of Bristol in the southwest of England, right on the 
banks of the Bristol Channel. The Lodge was founded in 2005 by 
Christine Di Nucci, a sixty-something housewife who was 
introduced to the world of mediumship by a friend with an interest in 
Spiritualism. After some early experiments at home with a small 
group of her friends, attempting Ouija boards and meditation 
sessions, Christine was invited to attend a physical mediumship 
demonstration at Jenny’s Sanctuary, a well-known mediumship 
circle in Banbury, Oxfordshire. A complete account of Christine’s 
experience at this séance exceeds the limitations of this chapter (see 
Di Nucci 2009; Hunter 2012, 2018 for a more detailed account), but 
suffice to say that the experience was life-changing for her.  
 
In addition to observing unusual physical effects in the room around 
her (floating lights, bangs on the walls and ceiling, and touches on 
her arms and legs), Christine heard a voice that she instantly 
recognized, just a few feet away from her, emanating from 
somewhere close to the ceiling. Following this particular séance 
experience, Christine’s entire worldview was transformed, and her 
life was changed forever. To borrow Jeffrey Kripal’s term, this was 
her ‘Flip’ moment (Kripal 2019). From that day on she was 
determined to find out more about this expanded reality through her 
own experimental process of mediumship training, employing what 
she has termed a “house-wifey-DIY awareness of science”. To this 
end she established the Bristol Spirit Lodge, initially encouraging 
her friends to sit as developing mediums, and later, primarily in 
response to the Lodge’s voluminous website,31 welcoming other 
mediums to sit and develop their abilities as well.   
 
 
30 The Lodge is referred to as non-denominational because it is not affiliated 
with the Spiritualists National Union (SNU), the main organization 
representing Spiritualists in the UK. 
31 http://the-bristol-spirit-lodge.blogspot.co.uk/  




Over time, the members of the Lodge grew from the original small 
group of close friends gathering informally in Christine’s living 
room. At the time of writing there is a core group of eleven regular 
sitters, five of whom are males aged between 27 and 80 years, and 
six females, aged between 50 and 80 years, who sit in regular weekly 
circles with developing mediums. Most are old friends of 
Christine’s, but some are more recent additions, having been 
recruited by word of mouth and through the Lodge’s website – 
friends of friends, and spiritual seekers. The Lodge is also attended 
quite regularly by visiting sitters, often two or three times a week. 
Visiting sitters sometimes attend with a desire to make contact with 
a specific deceased loved one, but Christine is generally averse to 
this kind of visit as she does not think it is possible to guarantee 
communication with specific spirits. Instead, mediums at the Lodge 
usually channel a regular group of spirits known as a “spirit team”, 
which may include up to as many as 11 individual entities, each with 
strong, and distinctive personalities, complete with their own back-
stories. More often than not, however, visiting sitters are simply 
there because they have an interest in physical mediumship and want 
to experience it first-hand for themselves, perhaps as a result of 
hearing about it at Spiritualist churches, or through reading the 
Spiritualist literature, and occasionally as a direct result of personal 
paranormal experiences earlier in life and a desire to find out more.  
 
At the time of writing there are six mediums in training with 
Christine at the Lodge, half of whom are female. The most 
frequently active mediums during my time with the Bristol Spirit 
Lodge, between 2009 and 2013, were Jon, 47 years old, salesman 
brought up in the Church of England; Sandy, aged 49, a nutritional 
therapist; Syann a 36-year-old fitness instructor; and Emily, 33 years 
old, an office worker. Other trainee mediums attended less 
frequently, sometimes for weeks at a time, sometimes more 
sporadically, but the above-mentioned mediums were the most 
dedicated, attending séances at least once a week, and sometimes 
more often. Guest mediums also occasionally visit the Lodge, 
invited by Christine to give demonstrations of their more developed 
abilities. The medium who originally presented Christine with her 
life-changing experiences in Banbury regularly gives guest 




demonstrations of physical mediumship to sitters and trainee 
mediums at the Lodge, for example.  
 
It is my contention that these practices, and the unusual experiences 
that accompany them, give rise to novel ideas about the nature of 
self and consciousness in participants.  
 
What is the self? 
 
Marcel Mauss’ famous paper, “A Category of the Human Mind: The 
Notion of Person; The Notion of Self” (1938 [1985]), is frequently 
used as a starting point in discussions of the anthropology of 
personhood and selfhood, and this chapter will be no exception. In 
his writings, Mauss often employed the terms ‘self’ and ‘person’ 
interchangeably, which has become a common trait in the wider 
scholarly discourse. “What I wish to show you,” Mauss writes, “is 
the succession of forms that this concept [the category of self] has 
taken on in the life of men in different societies, according to their 
systems of law, religion, customs, social structures and mentality.” 
(Mauss 1985: 3) The specific concern he addresses in his influential 
paper is the development of what he calls conceptions of self and 
person (i.e. cultural models), as opposed to the ‘conscious 
personality’ itself (1985: 3), and this is where our approaches 
diverge. Mauss’ main emphasis is on the evolution of different 
cultural notions of the ‘self,’ while my own research is focused on 
the experiential core, the self itself that underlies such cultural 
notions.  
 
Mauss achieved his goal through a cross-cultural overview of 
different notions of the self, which he neatly divided into five 
distinct stages. He begins with the self as ‘the subject’ (being the 
state of human experience as an embodied entity, and the main focus 
of my inquiry), followed by ‘the role’ (being the place and function 
of the person within a society), the ‘persona’ (the character, or moral 
and legal entity), and onwards to the Christian ‘person’ (an 
individual metaphysical entity), before finally arriving at the person 
defined as an individual, bounded, ‘psychological being’ in the 
modern, post-industrial, Euro-American sense (Mauss 1985: 1-23). 




For Mauss, then, the self was a constantly evolving concept, 
“imprecise, delicate and fragile,” and above all was socially and 
culturally constructed, eventually culminating with the model of the 
individual Western self we know today.  
 
While I agree that self-concepts do become ingrained within a 
particular cultural context, I nevertheless feel that a focus on the self 
as purely culturally derived, that is as a category of thought without 
any wider ontological implications, is to ignore a much deeper, and 
much more interesting, problem. Namely, what do alternate 
experiences of the self, even if they fly in the face of dominant 
cultural models, tell us about the ultimate nature of human 
consciousness itself? What is the experiential core that underlies the 
cultural concepts of person and self that Mauss investigated? If the 
self is purely a cultural category, how is it that practitioners of 
mediumship, meditation and shamanism (for example), come to 
develop conceptions of the self that seem to contradict mainstream 
cultural models? 
 
Writing some sixty years after Mauss’ first tentative explorations of 
the self, the anthropologist Melford Spiro took up the issue of 
defining the self in a paper entitled “Is the Western Conception of 
the self ‘Peculiar’ Within the Context of the World’s Cultures?” 
(1993). Spiro’s article was written in response to influential papers 
by Clifford Geertz (1974), and Markus and Kitayama (1991), who 
had argued for a distinction between the bounded ‘Western’ notion 
of the self and the ‘Porous’ non-Western self (more on this later). To 
begin his deconstruction, Spiro drew attention to the different ways 
in which the terms ‘person’ and ‘self’ have been used, and very often 
conflated, by theorists, psychologists and anthropologists. Spiro 
delineated seven possible things to which the label ‘self’ is 
frequently applied: 
 
1. The person, or the individual, including the package of biological, 
psychological, social, and cultural characteristics by which he or she 
is constituted. 
2. The cultural conception of the person or individual. 




3. The cultural conception of some psychic entity or structure within 
the person, variously designated as ‘pure ego,’ ‘transcendental ego,’ 
‘soul,’ and the like. 
4. The person’s construal of such an entity as the center or locus of 
his or her initiative, sensations, perceptions, emotions, and the like. 
5. The personality or the configuration of cognitive orientations, 
perceptual sets, and motivational dispositions that are uniquely 
characteristic of each person. 
6. The sense of self or the person’s awareness that he or she is both 
separate and different from other persons. The former is often 
referred to as ‘self-other differentiation,’ the latter as ‘personal 
individuation.’ 
7. The self-representation or the mental representation of the 
attributes of one’s own person as they are known, both consciously 
and unconsciously, to the person himself or herself. (Spiro 1993: 
114)         
 
Although Spiro does not go on to propose working definitions of his 
own, which might have helped to bring a little clarity to this area, he 
nevertheless highlights the fact that the focus of the majority of 
anthropological studies has been primarily on ‘cultural conceptions 
of the self’ (1993: 143), in keeping with Mauss’ tradition, rather than 
dealing with the self as a metaphysical or phenomenological entity. 
It is this phenomenological perspective that I am concerned with 
here, that is how the self is experienced from the subjective 
perspective.  
 
Spiro also criticized the often assumed binary distinction between 
the so-called ‘Western’ and ‘Non-Western’ conceptions of the self, 
and my research would certainly seem to support this view. As we 
shall see in the next section, the ethnographic reality is far more 
complex than this simple either/or dichotomy gives it credit for. I 
also agree with Spiro’s suggestion that the over-emphasis on cultural 
conceptions, rather than on the phenomenological dimensions of the 
self (the many different ways in which the self is experienced, for 
example in different states of consciousness), is a cause for concern 
for anthropologists and anthropological theories of the self. It is my 
contention that an appreciation of the range of phenomenological 




dimensions of the self will ultimately help to shed light on the nature 
of self as a complex ontological entity. 
 
As another example of an attempt to clear up some of the confusion 
around these terms, Grace Harris (1989) has proposed much more 
rigid definitions of the terms ‘individual,’ ‘self,’ and ‘person,’ 
arguing that the conflation of such labels in anthropological and 
ethnographic writing has led to considerable problems in cross-
cultural comparison and interpretation. How do we know that we are 
talking about the same thing in one context as our colleagues are 
talking about in another, for example? In order to counteract this 
confusing state of affairs, Harris offers the following definitions: 
 
1. Individual: “A concept of the individual is one focusing on a 
human being considered as a single member of the human kind” 
(1989:600). This is a biologistic category. 
2. Self: “To work with a concept of self is to conceptualize the 
human being as a locus of experience, including experience of that 
human’s own someoneness” (1989:601). This is a psychologistic 
category. 
3. Person: “Dealing with a concept of person entails conceptualizing 
the human or other being as an agent, the author of action 
purposively directed toward a goal” (1989:602). This is a 
sociologistic category. 
 
Harris suggests that local variations of these three concepts are 
employed near-universally across human cultures, though whether 
this is actually the case is a point of contention. It could be argued, 
for example, that the models of personhood that emerge in 
Amerindian perspectivist cosmologies (as documented, for example, 
in A. Irving Hallowell and Viveiros de Castro’s work), effectively 
blur any kind of neat distinction between these three components of 
the ‘self.’ With this in mind, then, in the context of this chapter at 
least, we are primarily concerned with what Harris calls the “self”, 
as distinct from the individual or person, in that our emphasis is on 
the phenomenology of the self, how the self is experienced and how 
this experience subsequently influences the development of 
particular cultural models of self. 
 




Drawing on recent research in neurobiology, anthropologist Naomi 
Quinn (2006) criticizes the “impoverishment of cultural 
anthropological theory with regard to the self” (2006: 362), which 
she characterizes as overly simplistic. Following neuroscientist 
Joseph LeDoux’s view of the self as “the totality of what an 
organism is physically, biologically, psychologically, socially and 
culturally,” Quinn proposes a definition of the self that emphasizes 
“the intra-psychic - including psychological, biological, and cultural, 
and both explicit and implicit processes that comprise it.” This view 
of the self “encompasses the physical organism, all aspects of 
psychological functioning, and social attributes” (2006: 363). 
Interestingly, however, Quinn is comfortable with using the words 
‘self’ and ‘personality’ interchangeably, though, to me at least, this 
seems to be a further unnecessary conflation of ideas. I would 
understand personality as the outward expression of the self, much 
as in Mauss’ conception of the persona, and the self as the inner 
phenomenological component of the person. In spite of this 
difficulty, however, I agree with Quinn’s general conclusion that the 
“self” consists of a variety of component parts, ranging from the 
intra-psychic and experiential to the physical and biological. 
 
It is clear, however, that there are further aspects of the self that are 
frequently left out of these kinds of discussions, namely the so-called 
“transpersonal” dimensions. Transpersonal anthropologist Charles 
Laughlin defines the transpersonal as “a movement in science 
toward seeing the significance of experiences had in life, that 
somehow go beyond the boundaries of ordinary ego-consciousness, 
as data” (Laughlin, 2012: 70). The implication here, then, is that 
certain kinds of experiences that appear to contradict cultural 
expectations should not be simply brushed aside as essentially 
delusional, pathological and irrational, but rather ought to be 
understood as data that might provide fruitful insights into the nature 
of consciousness, mind and self.  
 
Daniels, for example, argues that the different aspects of the soul/self 
encountered in different cultural traditions are “based on 
interpretations of a wide variety of human experiences, including life 
and death, dreams, out-of-body experiences, hauntings, possession, 




self-reflexive consciousness, inspiration and mystical experience” 
(2002: 17). My own research also supports this view, and I will 
suggest that the experiences of trainee mediums in the development 
of their trances lead to expanded conceptions self and consciousness. 
 
By defining the self as experiential (that is, defined by experience 
rather than by culture), then, we can overcome many of the problems 
associated with the cross-cultural study of selfhood. Instead of 
comparing cultural models (although this is undoubtedly a 
fascinating and useful approach in itself), we could instead be 
comparing how the self is actually experienced by different groups 
and individuals, as well as the methods and techniques by which the 
experiential self is investigated and explored by our fieldwork 
informants. In this way we might also be able to learn something 
more about the nature of human consciousness, as distinct from 
specific cultural ideas about it, perhaps leading to the development 




Now that we have surveyed some of the literature on the definition 
of self, we will turn to examine some of the classical distinctions 
between so-called "Western" and "Non-Western" models of the self.  
 
Willy de Craemer (1983), in a small-scale cross cultural comparison 
of American, Bantu and Japanese conceptions of the person, 
highlighted several key characteristics of what he considers the 
“Western” conception of the person, which includes characteristics 
of: (1) Individuality, (2) Rights, (3) Autonomy, (4) self-
Determination, (5) Privacy, and (6) Specific roles and functions 
within society. In addition to these characteristic features of the 
Western person-concept, de Craemer also emphasizes the relatively 
restricted extent to which the individual is located within a wider 
kinship group, which “does not usually include kin-like friends or 
patrons and clients as it does in many other societies.” Furthermore, 
“even within the confines of strict biological relatedness, what we 
count as kin, with whom we identify, has shrivelled over time and is 
now predominantly a matter of relationship to a spouse, parent, 




sibling, grandparent, and, to a lesser extent, aunt, uncle and cousin.” 
de Craemer characterizes this individualizing of the person as 
running even deeper, arguing that “relations with the deceased and 
the unborn, especially ancestors and descendants, so interpersonally 
and metaphysically important in African and Asian societies, all play 
a minimal role in the conscious conception and life of the American 
individual” (1983: 20). While this may be true generally, the reality 
on the ground is not quite so clear-cut, as we shall see. There are 
groups, even within the dominant Euro-American culture, who 
deliberately seek to foster relationships with the deceased, as well as 
other non-physical beings, and whose understanding of the self 
clearly exceeds the limitations of the “American individual”.  
 
Clifford Geertz also provides a very similar, and hugely influential, 
definition of the so-called “Western” person when he writes that the 
Western person is conceived as  
 
[...] a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and 
cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, 
judgment and action organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively against other such wholes and against its social and 
natural background. (Geertz 1974: 31)  
 
For Geertz, then, the Western conception of the person is structured 
and defined by contrast with “other such wholes”. It is bounded by 
the limitations of the physical body, which acts as a barrier between 
the inner “centre of awareness” and the outer world of the natural 
and social spheres. The “Western” person is understood to be 
autonomous, bounded and individual. In Charles Taylor’s terms, the 
Western self is “buffered” (2007: 37-41), separated from the outside 
world. By contrast, Marilyn Strathern is famous for popularising the 
distinction between “individual” models of personhood (exemplified 
by the “Western” model), and “dividual” models (exemplified by 
“Non-Western” models, and particularly Melanesian models). The 
key differences between these two modes of conceiving of the nature 
of the person have been briefly summarised by Karl Smith as 
follows: 
 




In the simplest terms, the individual is considered to be an 
indivisible self or person. That is, it refers to something like the 
essential core, or spirit of a singular human being, which, as a 
whole, defines that self in its particularity. To change, remove or 
otherwise alter any part of that whole would fundamentally alter the 
‘self’; she/he would then be, effectively, a different person. By 
contrast, the dividual is considered to be divisible, comprising a 
complex of separable - interrelated but essentially independent - 
dimensions or aspects. The individual is thus monadic, while the 
dividual is fractal; the individual is atomistic, while the dividual is 
always socially embedded; the individual is an autonomous social 
actor, the author of his or her own actions, while the dividual is a 
heteronomous actor performing a culturally written script; the 
individual is a free-agent, while the dividual is determined by 
cultural structures; the individual is egocentric, while the dividual is 
sociocentric. (Smith 2012: 53) 
 
Anthropologists have, therefore, attempted to highlight the variety of 
personhood concepts worldwide, but have not quite so often 
addressed the plurality of personhood concepts within a single 
society. In her discussion of cultural variations in theories of mind, 
psychologist Angeline Lillard, for example, explains how “variation 
in folk psychological thinking within the [Euro-American] 
community has not received adequate attention from researchers”  
(1998: 3), and suggests that further research in this direction is 
required, a sentiment echoed more recently by Tanya Luhrmann 
(2011). Lillard proposes that differences in theories of mind within 
Euro-American society might arise as a consequence of individual, 
or sub-cultural, beliefs, for example “whether non-material sources 
like spirits or God can directly influence one’s mind” (1998: 3).  
 
Taylor also agrees, arguing that the “buffered self” arises as a 
product of the disenchantment of the world (Taylor 2007: 41). 
Cultural beliefs and expectations, then, seem to either limit or 
expand conceptions of the self. In spite of this, however, it is still 
possible to have experiences that seem to exceed the limitations 
expected by a particular cultural model, which would seem to imply 
that the self is not derived directly from culture – experience can also 
give rise to cultural models. 





What we are dealing with, then, is a greater degree of intra-cultural 
variation in experiences and conceptualisations of self than the 
standard Western/Non-Western dichotomy seems to allow for (cf. 
Spiro 1993: 144-145), and this appears, at least preliminarily, to be 
due not so much to the influence of culture, but rather due to 
individual first-personal experiences.  
 
Mediumship, Experiences and the Experiential Self 
 
We will now turn to examine some of the types of experience 
reported by developing mediums at the Bristol Spirit Lodge, before 
elaborating on how such experiences influence the development of 
models of self. In addition to accounts from mediums in training, I 
have also included a couple of references to my own subjective 
experiences as a participant-observer in mediumship development 
sittings. I felt that it was important that, as a researcher, I 
experienced, as far as possible, the kinds of experiences reported by 
my fieldwork informants. 
 
Surrendering to Trance 
 
Some of the most unusual experiences reported by mediums 
themselves involve the hours and minutes leading up to the onset of 
their trance states and the formal beginning of the séance. Before 
entering the Lodge, for example, mediums often report strange 
bodily sensations and subtle alterations of their consciousness 
indicative of the presence of their spirit teams, who are understood to 
move closer to the medium before the séance begins. In the 
following extract, Sandy describes the sensations she feels when 
surrendering herself to the early stages of the trance state: 
 
I don’t feel tired as such. But, you know if you’re tired, you start 
kind of staring, and you’re just not totally with it. If somebody’s 
chatting at you, you know they’re chatting and you’re kind of half 
with it and half not. That’s how it starts. They’ve not taken over at 
that point. I’m just aware that they’re going to be in the near future. 
And that happens before I get here [...] There’s this kind of, almost a 




daze, as if you’re really tired and you’re just going to go to sleep, 
and that’s the first thing I notice. 
 
Sandy describes a gradual process of her spirit team moving closer, 
beginning with an altered, drowsy, state of consciousness, and 
progressing towards full trance and a dissociation from the external 
world. She describes a growing awareness of the presence of her 
spirit team leading up to the beginning of the séance, as they move 
into her field of awareness. Similarly, in the following extract, 
Rachael describes her own sensation of falling into trance over the 
course of an hour leading up to the start of the séance. She explains: 
 
My head starts spinning. That’s normally before I sit, it starts about 
an hour before, just a little bit, you kind of can’t get your words in 
the right order sometimes, and your head doesn’t really seem to 
connect with the rest of you for a little while [...] by the time you’re 
sat in the cabinet you’re feeling quite calm [...] and it’s weird, it’s 
almost like you’re moving backwards inside your own head, and it’s 
like your own head is bigger than it normally is and you’re moving 
backwards into it. I don’t seem to go anywhere else at the moment, I 
just seem to stay in myself, but it’s kind of like my head’s a lot like 
an alien [laughs], and I’m going backwards into my own head.  
 
Rachael’s description contains interesting references to anomalous 
bodily sensations. Her head feels larger than it normally is, and she 
senses herself falling backwards into it. The boundaries of the 
physical body are felt to expand outwards, or dissolve, or to lose 
their normal sense of proportion, and consciousness is experienced 
as more expansive than in her everyday waking state. She feels dizzy 
and hazy as the locus of her consciousness dissociates from her 
body, perhaps focusing on inner processes rather than the external 
world. This unusual bodily sensation, the evaporation of the 
boundaries of the physical body, is also echoed in Jon’s description 
of the process of falling into the trance state: 
 
Once we’re out in the Lodge [...] I sit down [and] feel a calmness 
wash over and the music starts. I love the first couple of tracks but 
usually find they’ve gone very quickly [...] I’m still very much 
aware of the room but find that I’ve often missed bits of time [...] 
For the first half of the evening I have absolutely no awareness of 




what’s going on externally [...] Often now, when they are talking I’ll 
go back into myself and I get a strange sensation of vertigo and 
being detached from the conversation, not just intellectually but 
physically as well. (Hunter 2009: 74) 
 
Again, Jon reports the dissolution of the usual boundaries of the 
physical body. Time is experienced differently, it seems to flow 
much quicker, or it stops and starts. His awareness shifts, like 
Rachael’s, from the external world towards internal processes. 
Again, the boundaries are expanded so much that Jon has a ‘strange 
sense of vertigo’ that ‘physically’ detaches him from the 
conversations going on around him. My own experience of falling 
into trance during a development sitting at the Lodge also featured 
many of the aspects of Sandy, Rachael and Jon’s experiences, which, 
to my mind at least, adds credence to the veracity of the experiences 
they reported to me: 
 
I felt my hands begin to tingle as they rested on the arms of the 
chair, and my heart rate began to quicken. I began to feel as though I 
was going to lose control of my body, as though I was on the verge 
of fainting or passing out, though still sitting comfortably in the 
chair. Gradually I felt as though I was becoming distanced from my 
physical body; as though I was somehow sitting just behind my own 
body. At the point when I felt most distanced from my physical form 
I heard Christine say that she sensed a presence standing by me, a 
male presence that wanted to communicate. This unsettled me, 
because I too sensed an unusual, invisible, presence. I felt on the 
verge of losing control of my body. I panicked. I swore. I opened 
my eyes and snapped myself back into the room. I felt light headed, 
and my heart rate was racing. I had to regain composure, calm 
down, and reassure myself that everything was okay. The group 
laughed. 
 
Experiences such as these seem to challenge the cultural notion of 
the physical body as an impermeable membrane between the inner 
and outer worlds, which is a hallmark of the so-called ‘Western’ 
individual model of the self. I ‘felt’ a sense of presence move into 
my awareness, as if my consciousness were a field extending out 
from my experiential centre. Like Jon and Rachael, I felt an expanse 




open up within me, like a cavernous space, much larger than my 
physical body.  
 
Such experiences come as a shock to mediums in the early stages of 
development precisely because the dominant paradigms of Western 
materialist science, which are ubiquitous in mainstream post-
industrial Euro-American culture, do not prime us to expect them, 
and, if such sensations are mentioned at all, it is usually in the 
context of pathology. In the words of transpersonal anthropologist 
Charles D. Laughlin, Euro-American society participates in a 
predominantly mono-phasic culture, in which the ostensibly 
productive, everyday state of waking consciousness is promoted as 
the only acceptable, practical, economically viable and “normal” 
state of consciousness (excepting, perhaps, the drunken state at 
certain socially and culturally prescribed times; only after work, for 
example). There is no framework within which to understand 
experiences of bodily dissolution and expanded awareness, except in 
the contexts of intoxication and pathology. Polyphasic cultures, by 
contrast, can be said to embrace a variety of altered states of 
consciousness as normal, or at least not as abnormal, and have 
developed frameworks within which the kinds of sensations reported 
by developing mediums, for example, can be understood. What 
seems to be taking place at the Bristol Spirit Lodge, then, is the 
formation of a polyphasic subculture, within which expanded 
experiences of self can be made sense of.  
 
Porous Bodies and Field-Like Selves 
 
We can say, then, that the kinds of experiences reported by those 
developing mediumship at the Lodge, lead to a porous conception of 
the body. No longer is the body understood as an impermeable layer, 
as a solid boundary between the internal and external worlds. 
Instead, the body is experienced as permeable, so permeable in fact 
that under certain conditions non-physical entities can move into, 
occupy and control it. Christine describes the idea in the following 
terms: 
 




I think we just flow through each other. Or, we’ve got very blurred 
edges, we appear to be solid, but only our eyes are seeing this solid, 
this light reflection which causes us to appear solid. We’re not. So, 
our boundaries aren’t where we think they are. We are here to 
experience whatever this is, this life form, this stage of life is. We 
are here [...] to experience, or to perceive things as solid and 
individual and it’s a very little tiny part of a very big life. I think. 
Possibly.  
 
Christine conceives of the boundaries of the person as extending 
beyond the confines of the physical body, which self only appears to 
be solid. According to this perspective the “solid” and the 
“individual” are, to a certain extent, illusory. With a porous body, 
then, it is possible for things to flow into and out of the person. 
Anthropologist Fiona Bowie has characterized this, in the context of 
spiritualist trance séances, through describing the body as a “shared 
territory, holding the physical life-force of the medium and the 
conscious intelligence of visiting spirits” (Bowie, 2012 :14).  
 
In further discussions, Christine has described her model of 
consciousness as being somewhat “like an onion,” that is like “a 
whole split into millions and trillions of consciousnesses that can act 
together” This kind of pluralistic, dividual, understanding of 
consciousness and the person recurs throughout the ethnographic 
literature (see, as one such example, Roseman on the structure of the 
self among Senoi Temiar, which is described as consisting of “a 
number of potentially detachable selves” (1990: 227).  
 
In the following extract Emily further describes her own experience 
of the porosity of the body, and elaborates on how she subjectively 
experiences spirits moving into her “personal space”: 
 
Then, usually around the table while we are waiting for the start, I 
will feel a presence around me kind of like an enveloping feeling, 
the first thing I feel is as if a friend is standing unseen nearby. I have 
an awareness of there being someone there, near me; that is, a 
friend. I then feel them come closer into my personal "space" in 
some quiet gentle way. 
 




Emily’s description of a sense of presence, unseen but felt, further 
suggests a model of the self as a non-physical field expanding 
outwards from the physical body, into which other entities can pass. 
Again, we see the idea that mediumship development is a gradual 
process, beginning with a sensed presence, and an interjection into 
“personal space”, and finally resulting in the embodiment of 
distinctive spirit personalities, who communicate through the 
medium’s body. 
 
In the following extract, Rachael, who had been attending the Lodge 
for just over one year when I spoke to her in 2012, explained how 
before developing mediumship she would frequently experience the 
unusual, and often unpleasant, sensation of spirits moving through 
her body. She explains: 
 
When they actually make a personal entrance into your body, that’s 
pretty bizarre. It would normally happen, um, in the middle of the 
night I’d wake up and there was something, it’s a sort of odd feeling, 
it’s like, um, if you can imagine taking off a polo-necked jumper, 
but from inside yourself. It’s like something’s pulling, it’s kind of 
gone in, and then it’s kind of pulling out, and it’s, oh, I can’t explain 
it, but it’s the weirdest, weirdest feeling. But it’s quite horrible [...] It 
happened, um, on about three occasions through my thirties, and in 
the end I got talking to a medium and she said it sounds like a spirit 
entity in you, or something passing through you, and she said to 
contact the local Spiritualist church. I did that, but nobody there 
seemed to feel the same kind of thing: with mental mediumship it all 
seems to be outside of the person coming in through the mind and 
talking, it wasn’t, with me it’s a very physical thing [...].  
 
For Rachael the process of developing mediumship allowed her to 
come to terms with experiences that had previously been disturbing 
to her. Where once the experience of spirits moving through her 
body had been unpleasant and spontaneous, primarily because she 
did not have a cultural framework through which to understand her 
experience, it is now both deliberately induced during formalized 
séances, and has become an enjoyable experience for her. She 
explains how mediumship development has made her “soft and 
squidgy” and “more open to other people”, again, a description of 




the self that accords particularly with the so-called “Non-Western” 
model, but which has arisen through first-person experience rather 
than through cultural indoctrination.  
 
Multiple Intelligences/Spiritual Augmentation 
 
Christine’s notion that consciousness is “a whole split into millions 
and trillions of consciousnesses that can act together” accords very 
well with what I have termed “spiritual augmentation”; that is, the 
notion that spiritual beings can be thought of as augmentations of 
consciousness, co-existing and assisting with cognitive processes. In 
the following extract, for example, Sandy describes how the 
members of her spirit team assist her with memory and information 
recall: 
 
[The spirits] help me keep a clearer mind, and therefore I am able to 
make better decisions. I can utilize information that I’ve got [...] I 
did a degree in nutritional medicine, years ago I was a nurse and a 
midwife, and there’s a lot of information in my head somewhere, but 
I can actually tap in on information that I’ve not used in years and 
years and years [...] the knowledge is mine but it can be used more 
efficiently. 
 
Sandy told me this in the context of a wider discussion about an 
experience she had several years before we met. Sandy explained 
that when her children were growing up they had been ill and were 
recommended a course of drugs by their doctor. Sandy eventually 
came to the conclusion that this course of action was only making 
the situation worse, and so decided to personally oversee a reduction 
in the amount of drugs she was giving to her children, noting along 
the way that they seemed to be getting better the fewer drugs they 
were taking. Eventually, however, Sandy reached the point where 
she was beginning to doubt the action she was taking, that was until 
she was affirmed in her actions by a mysterious, seemingly 
disembodied, voice. She explains: 
 
One day I was, um, laid on the bed upstairs and um, I was really, I 
was mulling over it, and I was thinking right I really don’t know if I 
should be doing this, I don’t know if I, you know, where this can 




take me, you know, this is my kids, so this is important stuff you 
know. And so, um, and suddenly I heard the voice and it said 
“You’ve Gotta Keep Going.” And it was out-loud, you see, and I 
kinda looked round and my son was asleep on the bed [laughs]. 
Come on, I don’t know, who said this, you know? And I just didn’t 
know, and I didn’t know whether to tell anybody that I’d heard this 
voice, but it was an out-loud voice. In fact it was the only time I’ve 
heard that out-loud voice, I haven’t heard that out-loud voice since. 
In fact I don’t really hear a voice since. But this was an out-loud 
voice, it was a definite voice, and, um, and I thought wow, OK 
then...The whole thing was managed, and when Joseph started to 
come through he said that he’d been with me for a long time, and, 
you know, previously he was a medicine man in a previous life, and 
he was a healer, and he was here to heal and that was what he was 
doing...and so he said he did it. 
 
The reassuring and practical, supportive tone of Sandy’s experience 
accords well with a general pattern in auditory “hallucinations” of 
this nature, namely that they are helpful. Tanya Luhrmann, for 
instance, drawing on her own research with members of a 
Charismatic Christian church and the work of others in similarly 
structured fieldwork situations, explains how “whether internal or 
external, the voices focused on immediate issues. They offered 
practical direction, not grand metaphysical theology. Many, though 
not all, had the experiences during emotional turmoil” (2011: 74).  
 
Here Christine, the circle leader, describes how her spirit guide, 
known as Fuzzy Critter, influences her decision-making: 
 
As time went on … trusting Fuzzy Critter, and these telepathic 
voices, I did get to a point where I knew it was separate from me [...] 
It was a separate personality. The words he uses are better than mine 
[...] his language is different to mine [...] His general way of 
working, it’s not me, in fact sometimes I’ll argue with him [...] I 
have a sense, he seems to approach me from this side of my 
shoulder, this side of my head [left]. I, in my own mind, feel that 
he’s a bit like a fluffy owl sitting on my shoulder [...] Sometimes it’s 
annoying if I’m doing housework and he wants to communicate 
with me, and I get this feeling. It’s a bit like having something 




playing with your hair, or whispering in your ear when you’re trying 
to do something. 
 
Again, we see here examples of what anthropologists have labelled a 
“dividual self”, or “porous self”, emerging from a Western post-
industrial context. The locus of the self can be entered by discarnate 
spirits who may offer their assistance in a range of different 
everyday situations and decision-making processes. 
 
The Experiential Self 
 
Although the examples cited in this chapter only offer a snapshot of 
the wide range of experiences reported by developing mediums at 
the Bristol Spirit Lodge,32 they nevertheless serve as a useful 
illustration of some of the ways in which anomalous experiences 
(trance experiences in this instance), can lead to the development of 
expanded conceptions of consciousness and the self. 
 
Lillard’s (1998) suggestion that variations in theories of mind might 
arise from specific cultural beliefs about the influence of spirits, 
deities, and so on, naturally begs the questions of where such beliefs 
come from in the first place. Of course, the cultural diffusion of 
ideas clearly does takes place, and specific ideas and beliefs are 
undoubtedly transmitted through social groups, families and 
communities, but many such beliefs also have an experiential source. 
David J. Hufford (1982), for example, has written extensively on the 
experiential source for a wide variety of supernatural assault 
traditions, arguing that such traditions emerge in direct response to 
first-hand experiences, specifically of sleep paralysis. Hufford 
writes: 
 
The primary theoretical statement of the approach might be roughly 
summed up as follows: some significant portion of traditional 
supernatural belief is associated with accurate observations 
interpreted rationally. This does not suggest that all such belief has 
 
32 A more detailed analysis is presented in my doctoral thesis. 




this association. Nor is this association taken as proof that the beliefs 
are true. (Hufford 1982: xviii)    
 
Beliefs about the nature of the self, then, might also arise from first-
hand personal experience, built up over time and incorporating new 
experiential insights. Psychedelic experiences, for example, may 
lead to expanded notions of the nature of the self, just as experiences 
with mediumship might also lead to different models. An 
understanding of the self as arising through direct first-hand 
experiences, as opposed to the notion that conceptions of the self are 
purely culturally constructed, goes some way towards explaining the 
much greater variety of intra-cultural conceptions of the self 
commented on by Lillard (1998), and further noted by Luhrmann 
(2011). It also raises important questions about what, if anything, 
should be considered a “normal” self-conception, and clearly has 
implications for both psychology and psychiatry, especially with 
regard to diagnosis and treatment. Through engaging with the way 
that self and consciousness are experienced phenomenologically, 
rather than on cultural categories, we can further advance the 
anthropology of consciousness, and begin to move away from 
dealing with problematic notions of “belief” (see Hunter, 2015), 
towards a greater appreciation of distinctive phenomenological 
experiences. In other words, what I am suggesting is that people do 
not simply believe that the self can survive death, or that it consists 
of multiple parts, or that it is porous and permeable, rather they 
experience it to be so, and through this experiencing know that 
consciousness is far more expansive than the dominant cultural 
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Extraordinary Experience,  
Intersubjectivity and Doubt in Fieldwork: 








This chapter is largely inspired by several other contributions to this 
volume, notably those by Michele Hanks and Géraldine Mossière, as 
well as a recent publication by Fiona Bowie (2014).33 When 
researchers participate in the extraordinary experiences of those they 
study, questions arise that would not otherwise. All fieldwork 
involves at least a minimum of subjective engagement on the part of 
the researcher; however few ethnographers choose to problematize 
their own experience and bring it into their analyses. Though not 
entirely absent in other fields of anthropological inquiry (e.g., Wikan 
1991, 1992), this seems to happen more frequently in studies of 
religion. Part of this might be the unusual and unexpected 
“extraordinary” form that perceptions and experiences may take in 
this field of inquiry. Moreover, they would seem to be in direct 
conflict with one’s identity and role as a researcher, an issue I take 
up at a later point in this chapter. Another factor may be that scholars 
in this field must deal with the issue of credibility, simply by virtue 
of the fact of studying religion. As Hervieu-Léger (1993: 22) has 
noted, there is no unassailable position for the researcher in this 
field; whether believer, nonbeliever or former believer, one is 
vulnerable to accusations of bias. A certain degree of reflexivity is 
thus inevitable for those working on religion or spirituality.  
 
Bringing the ethnographer’s extraordinary experiences into the 
analysis of the research results raises a number of questions and 
issues that otherwise do not usually present themselves. When the 
 
33 My thanks to Guillaume Boucher and to an anonymous reviewer for their 
questions and comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 




researcher enters into experiences that science has ignored or 
dismissed, s/he is led to consider local explanations of these 
experiences; this can lead to questions of ontology that have been 
mostly ignored in classical ethnographies. As I will explain, certain 
kinds of perceptions and experiences typical of the Spiritualist 
mediums I study have become normalized in my own experience, 
yet they are not explicable in scientific terms at present (e.g., visions 
and perceptions of the invisible, foreknowledge of future events and 
so on).  
 
I have not shared every type of extraordinary perception as most of 
the mediums I have interviewed; in particular, I do not have direct 
experience of malefic entities that they typically report. Yet, I will 
explore the possibility that sharing some such experiences may 
influence one’s approach to the “extraordinary” experiences that one 
does not share with one’s informants. My understanding of their 
accounts of combat with evil entities or assaults by negative beings, 
for example, is conditioned by the fact that I have had experiences of 
benevolent invisible presences that are similar to theirs. 
 
Continuing a thread of analysis proposed by Michele Hanks in this 
volume, I would argue that what she terms a “growing body of 
knowledge” should be constructed by researchers reporting and 
analyzing such experiences. The ontological status given to 
extraordinary experiences lived in the course of fieldwork varies 
from one author to another (cf. Turner 1994; Dubisch 2005, 2008; 
Tedlock 1997), and it is perhaps not necessary to agree on their 
ontological status in order to begin building such a corpus. However, 
given that we are not immune to the logic of scientism, taking these 
experiences seriously as tools for understanding, forms of 
knowledge and material for analysis requires us to suspend 
objectivist judgments as to their reality, at least temporarily. I hope 
to contribute by example to a conversation about what makes such 
experiences convincing to the one who experiences them, even in the 
absence of conventional proofs. I shall do so by laying out some of 
the emergent criteria of validity that allow participants, including 
researchers, to consider their experiences as real. In this context, it is 
perhaps worth remembering that certain non-extraordinary 




intrapersonal experiences have long gone unverified by objectivist 
means, and are now finding documentation by objectivist methods. 
One example is the experience of pain by newborns now being 
discussed in medical circles as it relates to circumcision. Another 
concerns the pain felt by patients who, unknown to their doctors, 
remain completely conscious during surgery. This phenomenon of 
“intraoperative recall” (Lang 2013), long discounted, is now being 
studied with the help of new research instruments.  
 
In what follows, I will present the fieldwork on which my remarks 
are based, first describing the context of the study, noting some of 
the circumstances that affected my participation in Spiritualist 
religious activities such as healing and clairvoyance. I then present 
different types of extraordinary experiences typical of Spiritualist 
mediums, and continue with some reflection on the notion of 
intersubjectivity in anthropology. I give particular attention to 
intersubjectivity’s embodied aspects, as much of the intersubjectivity 
that is created in the Spiritualist church where my research is based 
is not articulated in words, but rather is deeply felt, often via the 
body. Next, I take up the issue of scientific skepticism, looking at 
how scientism, or the notion that all can and should be explained by 
science, affects the intellectual reflexes even of researchers, myself 
included, who are open to the idea that there are realities that science 
cannot explain, at least at present. 
 
The Fieldwork Context 
 
After several decades of working on ethnicity and migration34, 
studying the religious experience of Spiritualists brought the 
challenge of a far deeper reflexivity than that required in my earlier 
work. Not only does studying the religion of others push us to 
examine our own beliefs as well as to situate ourselves in relation to 
theirs, but it also brings the possibility of a more challenging 
intersubjectivity than most ethnographic research. It is safe to say 
 
34 I did doctoral fieldwork in Cape Verde on migration and racial ideology 
(Meintel 1984) and then worked mainly on migration, family and identity 
issues in Montreal until 2005. 




that most fieldworkers aspire, as Malinowski (1932, first published 
in 1922) put it in his introduction to Argonauts of the Western 
Pacific, “to wake up every morning to a day, presenting itself … 
more or less as it does to the native” (p. 7) and ultimately, “to grasp 
the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of 
his world” (p. 25). This was certainly the case for my fieldwork on 
race and colonialism in the Cape Verde Islands, where conditions 
approximated those experienced by the author of Argonauts: 
tropical, colonial and very isolated (Meintel 1984). Empathy led to 
close, enduring friendships in several cases; however, I could never 
claim to inhabit the colonial world in the same way as my friends 
did. Though I did reflect on the personal factors conditioning my 
fieldwork (my relative youth, gender, whiteness, etc.), such 
reflexivity was usually mobilized for interpreting interview material 
and observations rather than for structuring the research itself.  
 
The fieldwork that gave rise to the questions discussed here is based 
in the Spiritualist Church of Healing35 (hereafter referred to as the 
SCH), situated in downtown Montreal. Its services attract people 
from all over the metropolitan region and regular members 
numbered 187 in 2019. Membership is simply a matter of paying an 
annual fee of $20 and does not involve baptism or conversion nor 
does it necessarily represent religious affiliation. In fact, the 
boundaries of the congregation are quite blurred; members are 
mostly baptized Catholics who do not consider that they have 
rejected Catholicism (Meintel 2011a). Some still attend Catholic 
churches or participate in shamanic rituals; in fact, many of them 
frequent groups representing different religious currents. Women 
outnumber men at services and other activities by a ratio of about 3 
to 1, though there are as many men as women among the healers, 
mediums and ministers who practice in the SCH. For participants, 
their spiritual experience is central to their connection with the SCH, 
which is the main reason it became the focus of my research. 
 
 
35 The name of the church as well as those of individuals mentioned are 
pseudonyms. 




My first contacts with the Spiritual Church36 of Healing date from 
late 1999. Situated on a slightly seedy stretch of a central 
thoroughfare, not far from a subway stop, the presence of the church 
is indicated only by a discreet sign at the entrance. Located over a 
restaurant, it shares the block with several grocery stores, 
restaurants, a sex shop and other small businesses. Members are 
mostly French - speaking though a growing number of immigrants 
and English - speaking Montrealers come to its activities. Services 
attract many individuals who are not members, who may also seek 
other spiritual resources from its seven ministers; for example, 
private clairvoyance sessions, a naming ceremony or a wedding, 
exorcism.37 
.  
Clairvoyance and spiritual healing by the laying on of hands feature 
prominently in the SCH’s public rituals, as is the case of the seven 
other Spiritualist churches in the city. These activities involve 
volunteer mediums and healers trained by the ministers and the 
ministers themselves. Services also include opening prayers, 
including the Our Father38, and hymns. According to Spiritualist 
belief, everyone has spiritual gifts that can be developed with 
practice. However, they must be used in a spiritual framework and 
never for personal advantage. Receiving and transmitting the 
spiritual gifts of clairvoyance and healing are at the heart of the faith 
of those who frequent the SCH. 
 
My interest in studying religion was sparked by several events in the 
late 1990s. As a visiting professor at the Université Lyon2, I was 
 
36 Officially a church; that is, recognized by the Québec government. This 
means that the ministers are able to officiate at weddings and funerals, but 
does not mean that the SCH enjoys tax exemption.  
37 Michel is the only Spiritualist minister I know of in Montreal who 
performs exorcisms (Meintel and Boucher 2020). These are always 
conducted either at a distance, using floor plans, or at the home of those 
concerned, whether it is exorcism of a person or, as is more often the case, 
of a dwelling. 
38 At the SCH, this term is used, in Catholic fashion, rather than “the Lord’s 
Prayer”, more common among Protestants. 
 




asked to give part of a course on the anthropology of religion. 
François Laplantine, of the same university, had recently published a 
book with some colleagues on a popular clairvoyant in Lyon. 
Though personally fascinated by clairvoyance, I had never thought 
of mediumship or clairvoyance as an object of ethnographic study. 
Not long after my return to Montreal, a friend told me of Michel, 
whom he described as a talented medium, and put me in touch with 
him. I soon found out that Michel was also the pastor of a downtown 
Spiritualist congregation. When I visited their services at his 
invitation, I was struck by the contrast between the church clientele 
(working class, Francophone, brought up Catholic) and their 
religious activities (channelling, clairvoyance, healing by the laying 
on of hands) that till then I had associated with more exotic contexts. 
I found myself spontaneously taking notes and thought of doing a 
small fieldwork project for my own interest. Most of my research on 
ethnic themes was carried out by assistants and returning to Cape 
Verde was difficult to combine with other obligations. I was missing 
fieldwork. At that point, the Spiritualist church seemed to offer a 
chance to once again experience real otherness and on my own 
doorstep, so to speak. Besides the fact that their activities were 
strange to me, the congregation represented a part of Quebec society 
that I did not know well. My work on Spiritualists in Montreal 
would lead to a long-term interest in contemporary religions and 
spiritualities in Quebec, and to broader team research projects on the 
subject. 
 
When he accepted my request to do fieldwork on the SCH the 
pastor, Michel, encouraged me to join what he called a “closed 
group” or “circle”. I soon discovered that this was a stable group of 
about 5 - 20 persons (there are currently seven such groups in the 
SCH, each led by a minister/medium). Most include no more than 10 
people, except for Michel’s groups, and meet weekly or biweekly. 
The object of the groups, I learned, is to develop the members’ 
spiritual gifts, mainly clairvoyance. Members are chosen by the 
leader and commit to attend regularly and to pay $10 per meeting, 
including any they miss. Michel was agreeable to my conducting 
observations of church activities, on the condition that I participate 
like the others present. By joining the closed group, I hoped to 




connect with future informants and perhaps meet some individuals 
who had had mediumnic experiences. For about 18 months I carried 
out participant observation on church activities but conducted no 
interviews except for three with Michel. Later I conducted two or 
more interviews with 15 individuals, one on life history and the other 
on their spiritual trajectory, as well as informal interviews with 
dozens of other “regulars” at the SCH. Most of the structured 
interviews were carried out before 2008, but I have continued to 
have regular contact with the SCH since then and often conduct 
informal interviews with Michel or other participants. 
 
Learning to See 
 
Normally the closed groups number twenty or fewer people, though 
Michel’s groups are sometimes larger. People arrive on time and 
take their assigned place on chairs arranged in a circle. Michel, the 
leader of the group where I have participated, assigns places on the 
basis of the colour of one’s aura39. A guided meditation of some 20 
minutes is followed by a brief exchange on what each received. 
After a break, participants return to their places and Michel gives 
instructions for an exercise in clairvoyance. This is usually focused 
on a particular theme (health, spirituality, daily life…) and using a 
particular kind of symbolism (precious stones, colours, etc.). 
Occasionally, the exercise focuses on a material object; in one form, 
participants write their name on a slip of paper and then fold it. Each 
person chooses a folded “billet” as it is called, picks up what they 
can and relates it to the group before reading the name. In a 
somewhat similar exercise, psychometry, each person places a 
personal object on a tray passed around in the dark and then picks up 
an object and tries to read it. Participants are directed to receive what 
they are able from the object and relate it to the group. In all the 
 
39 Auras are the fields of light around people, something like a large halo; 
the colours vary from one individual to another. Michel sees changes in aura 
according to the person’s mood, but also holds that there are stable aspects, 
colours that are always there. Some mediums see auras around animals as 
well.  
 




clairvoyance exercises, the group sits silently in the near darkness. 
After about five minutes, Michel calls on each person in the group to 
share whatever they have received. As in the exchange after the 
guided meditation, each participant speaks when called upon, or 
otherwise asks permission. People remain in their places and in the 
designated posture (seated on chairs, with feet crossed during 
meditation, uncrossed during clairvoyance). Respectful behaviour is 
required, and verbal aggression forbidden.  
 
Thus is created a space of security in which participants come to 
notice sensations and impressions that might otherwise go unnoticed 
– feelings of heat, cold, tingling, mental images, voices and so on. 
Generally, Michel’s comments are encouraging but noncommittal: 
“Good, thank you.” Having nothing to report is not seen as a failure; 
in fact, this is common, especially for newcomers. In any case, the 
objective of the group is spiritual development, clairvoyance being 
simply a tool in the process. Laughter is frequent, especially during 
the challenging exercises of the “billets” and psychometry. 
Generally, exchanges are kindly, often light-hearted, though 
occasionally participants may be moved to tears by a meditation 
experience or a “message” (clairvoyance) from someone else in the 
circle.  
 
Newcomers to the closed group usually have the impression that 
they are “imagining things” rather than receiving clairvoyant 
messages. Yet, even in a group of neophytes, the convergence 
between messages for any given individual is striking. Usually, 
messages for the same individual are different, but are rarely 
contradictory. Moreover, in almost every session, one or two 
individuals will receive far more messages than others. Learning to 
see clairvoyantly involves not only becoming aware of one’s 
perceptions and impressions but also learning how to interpret them 
and how to formulate them verbally for the person involved. 
Seemingly negative messages (rare among neophytes) are generally 
given a positive twist. When participants do not know how to 
interpret what they have perceived, Michel often encourages them to 
consult (silently) their spirit guides.  
 




The learning process in the closed group, which I have described in 
detail elsewhere (Meintel 2003), is reminiscent in some ways of 
Luhrmann’s (2007) analysis of the process whereby the Christians 
she studied learn to receive communication from God in their lives. 
In both cases, religious learning is an individual process, but one that 
is socially shaped and based on common understandings. I should 
mention, though, that there is much less attention given to the 
written word at the SCH than at the Vineyard church that Luhrmann 
studied, where there is great emphasis on the Bible and where most 
keep a prayer journal. Some Spiritualists enjoy reading the Bible as a 
personal spiritual practice, and biblical passages are often the point 
of departure for Michel’s “discourses”, however, he often mentions 
that other great spiritual texts (the Torah, the Koran etc.) are equally 
valid.  
 
The social aspect of learning in the closed group is revealed by the 
language regarding colours among the participants. For example, 
blue may stand variously for water, the Virgin Mary or spirituality. 
Participants learn to see colours or alternatively, see that a certain 
colour is “needed” by someone in the group. The way clairvoyant 
messages are transmitted to others is also framed socially. On 
several occasions that I know of, Michel intervened privately with 
individuals whose messages were considered too judgmental or in 
one case, “too depressing” by other participants. 
 
Close to Home, in Real Time 
 
In a geographical sense, the fieldwork at the SCH has been close to 
home. In fact, I had passed by the front door of the church many 
times without noticing it. In social terms, it has taken me out of my 
usual “locality” in Appadurai's (1996) sense, given that its members, 
unlike myself, mostly come from the French-speaking working class. 
For Appadurai, “locality” can be non-territorial; it is a dimension of 
social life whereby the close social relations of “neighbourhood” 
(again, not necessarily a spatial entity) are produced and reproduced 
and often marked by shared rituals. Nevertheless, one does find 
bilingual English-speakers and immigrants among the regulars at 
church activities, and a few have advanced degrees. My initial 




impression of strangeness arose from the dissonance I perceived 
between the modern, metropolitan context of the SCH and its 
religious activities, from the fact that the direct contact with spirits 
was obviously normalized for people who otherwise looked to be 
typical North American urbanites. And in the same fact lay the new 
possibilities of this research: rather than the barriers of language, 
lifelong cultural understandings or neo-colonial privilege that 
affected my work in Cape Verde, only my own personal capacities 
and choices would limit how much I would share in of 
Spiritualists’40 religious experience.  
 
At the same time, as Dubisch (2008: 331) has pointed out, there is 
always a certain cultural newness for the researcher working “at 
home” among those for whom spirits are “real and active.” It means 
learning a new language, not only of colours, as mentioned earlier, 
but of personal spiritual experience. For example, in the SCH 
context, when someone says, “They are telling me that …”, it is 
understood that “they” refers to spirit guides. As for the deeper 
learning that would permit one to also hear “them” speaking, the 
anthropologist is situated like any other neophyte.  
 
When researchers enter into extraordinary lifeworlds in culturally 
and geographically distant settings, the divide between the scientific 
rationality of the investigator and the “beliefs” of others is rarely 
questioned. If on the experiential level, some researchers have 
bridged this divide (Goulet 1993; Stoller 2004), the credibility issues 
that haunt anthropologists who adopt “experience near” (Wikan 
1991) approaches are intensified for anyone studying spiritual or 
other forms of extraordinary experience close to home. 
 
 
40 I refer to those who frequent the activities of the SCH as "Spiritualists" for 
the sake of economy; in fact, most do not identify as Spiritualists; rather 
Spiritualist activities correspond to their "spirituality" and most would 
consider Catholicism as their "religion", whether or not they practice it.  




The proximity of home to field tends to blur the boundaries between 
the two (Hirvi 2012) and may bring issues of credibility to the fore41. 
At the same time, proximity often allows research to be carried out 
in “real” time, rather than the compressed temporal framework of 
more distanced fieldwork. This was the case of my work at the SCH, 
which had the further advantage of not being dependent on outside 
funding. This allowed relationships with participants to evolve 
naturally; it also affected the expectations of others regarding my 
role in the SCH. Fieldwork in one’s own urban environment is 
necessarily a part-time affair in most cases, but in this case it was 
extended over a number of years. Moreover, after a few years of 
attending church activities, I was asked to take on roles (healer, 
apprentice medium42) that I would not have been invited to adopt in 
the first year or two. 
 
In the following section I will discuss some of the experiences of 
Spiritualist mediums that I came to share. Often the deep 
participation of the researcher in a new locality (again in 
Appudurai’s sense of the term) is completely unexpected. This was 
the case, for example, with Edith Turner’s (1994) vision of a spirit 
form among the Ndembu, not to mention Evans-Pritchard’s (1996) 
vision of a ball of light one evening described in his classic 
discussion of witchcraft among the Azande. My subjective 
participation in Spiritualist religious experience came as a surprise; 
 
41 To give a personal example, I chose to keep a low profile in Spiritualist 
activities during a heated political debate in Montreal in the first few months 
of 2014 about religious garb (Muslim headscarves, primarily) when I took a 
public position on numerous occasions based on my team’s research on 
religious minorities.  
42 The Spiritualists speak of the gift of clairvoyance to refer to seeing things 
that are not knowable by normal means; however, they tend to use the term 
"medium", rather than "clairvoyant" to refer to the individual practicing 
clairvoyance. This situates the one giving the message as an intermediary, 
rather than the initiator, in a process of transmission of messages received 
from their spirit guides. Mediumship also refers to channelling and in the 
broad sense healing, because in all cases the individual practitioner is seen 
as a vehicle rather than the source of these gifts. 
 




when I first asked if I could do research on the ESG, Michel invited 
me to join a closed group. At that point, I did not even know such 
groups existed or what their activities were and only hoped that by 
participating, I would make some contacts for interviews that would 




Elsewhere (Meintel 2007, 2011b) I have shared some of the key 
events that have marked my evolving participation in Spiritualist 
religious experience; I present several of them in summary form in 
what follows. I should perhaps make it clear that while my 
relationship with Spiritualism has a personal dimension, it is not a 
denominational affiliation for me, as is also the case of most of the 
people who frequent the SCH. (Most identify as Catholic.) From the 
beginning, images that were meaningful for those concerned came to 
me during the period of the meeting devoted to a clairvoyance 
exercise. Initially I did not welcome receiving what were “messages” 
for other participants. It was not what I had expected in this research; 
another part of my reluctance was the fear of seeing negativity, 
whether in my own life or for others in the group. Indeed, the night 
after the first class, which I was eager to leave, I had vivid 
nightmares about a childhood trauma. As I woke up, saying aloud, 
“It really happened,” I realized that if I were to continue my 
initiation into clairvoyance, I would have to accept my perceptions 
of negativity, past or present. Not long after, in a group meeting, we 
were asked to “see what you can see” for anyone in the group. I was 
trying, as per Michel’s instructions, to mentally “enter the aura” of 
Nancy, a woman in her mid-thirties with whom I had become 
friendly. I found it impossible to approach her this way, feeling a 
disagreeable sensation each time I did; moreover this sensation was 
accompanied by a strong mental image of a small dirty whitish blob 
near her. I felt embarrassed at the prospect of having to give a 
message that seemed negative in her regard, the rule being, “you 
must give what you receive”. I phrased the message as carefully as I 
could, and Michel quickly intervened. He interpreted my 
impressions as a “thought form”; that is, a materialization of 




negative energies around Nancy, and went on to describe in detail 
the jealousy she was experiencing in her work.  
 
As time went on, I was surprised to experience bodily sensations in 
the clairvoyance exercises – heat, cold, tingling … often combined 
with mental images as well. I received a message early on for a 
woman in the group whom I was slightly acquainted with. The 
message made no sense to me, but when I told her what I received, 
she began to cry with gratitude and relief. After some months, when 
I shared the physical and mental impressions I had received in a 
clairvoyance exercise, I added that I did not know how to interpret 
them. Michel instructed me to “ask your guides.” Given that I had 
grown up in a practicing Catholic family, I had no trouble with the 
idea of spirit guides; yet to think of them as actually present beside 
me was a bit disturbing. I resolved to continue “as if”, invoking them 
without much conviction. Here I think of Drooger’s (1996)43 
“methodological ludism”, where anthropologists of religion, “play 
along”, entering fully into participation while knowing that later, 
they must take a distance in order to comment on what they have 
observed – or, I would add – experienced. In Drooger’s words, 
 
They need to find an equilibrium between distant observation and 
intimate participation. While observing, they belong to two 
domains; while participating, they belong to one only. When only 
observing they cannot participate, and vice versa. Fieldworkers 
often report on the play-acting needed in such situations. They too 
experience … tension between multiple selves and the illusion of 
wholeness and find a way to manage these contradictions. (1996: 
59-60) 
 
Some months later, the group was asked to do an exercise where we 
would receive healing for ourselves and to put our hands on our 
hearts while trying to receive such healing. Suddenly my heart 
started to pound and seemed to be surging out of my chest; at the 
same time, I felt a huge, heavy hand on my chest. “I know who it is,” 
I thought. It’s my Native guide.” Typically, in the SCH, the principal 
spirit guide is believed to be an Amerindian spirit who acts as a 
 
43 See also Knibbe and Droogers 2011. 




“gatekeeper” and allows other spirits to come through or not. Michel 
attributes this to the fact that “we are on their land and that First 
Nations peoples are very spiritual”.44  
 
After a few years, Michel asked if I would serve as a healer at the 
weekly healing service in the church. I readily accepted, since I 
myself had been the recipient of Spiritualist healing, where a team of 
six or so healers transmit healing by the “laying on of hands” to 
individuals who seek it, as I have described in more detail (Meintel 
2003, 2013). Despite the term, little or no direct physical contact is 
involved; furthermore, I had never found it anything but relaxing and 
beneficial. However, I hesitated for several years to accept Michel’s 
invitation to “work up front”; that is, to give clairvoyant messages 
during church services to members of the congregation45 a much 
more visible role than that of healer. Whereas healers work 
anonymously, in a team, mediums seem to be individualized, set 
apart from the rest of the congregation. I finally accepted, if only to 
discover for myself how this would be different from giving a 
message to someone in the closed group. Though I had asked SCH 
mediums about this, their answers were vague (e.g., “It’s a different 
energy”), reminiscent of Samudra’s (2008) remarks about embodied 
experience in her study of White Crane Silat (a martial art), as often 
being difficult for actors to articulate. I have found that they are 
often unmotivated to do so; the telling can seem laborious compared 
to the experience itself (think of describing riding a bicycle as 
opposed to actually doing it). Moreover, some find these experiences 
to be both sacred and deeply personal and are not eager to put words 
to them.  
 
 
44 It is worth noting that Spiritualism first developed in upstate New York in 
the 1840s in a region where Amerindian groups of the Iroquois confederacy 
were present. Accounts of British spiritualist séances of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries often mention “Red Indian” guides; e.g., Marryat 1920. 
45 Though people in the congregation are free to refuse to receive a message, 
I have only seen this happen once in the hundreds of services I have 
attended.  
 




Accepting the apprentice medium role led me to understand that far 
from being removed from the others present, the medium is in 
intense communion with them. The touching receptivity of those 
present is matched by the act of faith that allows the medium to take 
her/his role. The exercises in the closed group habituate participants 
to let go of any desires to “succeed” at transmitting messages, since 
this only closes off the extraordinary perceptions that clairvoyance 
involves. Rather, the process of learning mediumship in the small 
group context is largely a process of unlearning (Meintel 2011b), 
where some of the usual filters to our perceptions are deactivated. 
Working “up front” in clairvoyance means accepting all possibilities, 
including that of receiving no messages at all. To my surprise, 
accepting the apprentice medium role had the effect of increasing 
and intensifying the messages I received, giving them more clarity 
and detail than those I had received in the small group. This was 
eventually confirmed by others and corresponds to the experience of 
several whom I interviewed who have served as mediums in the 
SCH.  
 
I should perhaps add here that the mediums usually do not know the 
persons to whom their messages are addressed. Even in the small 
group, there are participants of many years’ standing who are 
familiar to me in energetic terms; yet I do not know if they are 
married, single or cohabiting with a partner nor do I know their 
occupation. Community life at the SCH is almost exclusively limited 
to spiritual activities, such that those present, including mediums, 
have limited knowledge of each other’s lives.  
 
At first, my anxiety was lessened when I saw that the messages I 
received corresponded in a general way to Michel’s, though they 
were far less elaborate than his. Later, I would occasionally receive 
messages that were quite different from his, though not in 
contradiction with them. For example, one evening he addressed a 
young woman in the congregation, describing issues in her work life. 
With some trepidation, I gave a very different message to the same 
person, describing the immense sadness she was feeling, as well as 
the help she had received from unexpected quarters. It later emerged 
that the young woman had recently lost her mother, but had been 




helped through her grief by her mother’s friends, whom she had not 
met until her mother’s death.  
 
Such episodes oblige the medium to a more radical letting go of 
anxiety about giving a “wrong” message, about appearing ridiculous; 
at the same time, they reinforce confidence and faith, not so much in 
oneself as much as in the source of the messages. Mediums at the 
SCH experience them as coming from outside themselves. I found 
that on the occasions when I received a message for a friend at the 
church, it usually seemed at odds with what I knew of them. 
Typically, they confirmed that the message was meaningful for 
them, without necessarily explaining why. As several of the 
mediums I interviewed reported, it is especially when clairvoyant 
impressions seem counter-intuitive that they are most likely to be 
true for those concerned, judging by their reactions. Recipients are 
often non-committal and are in no way obliged to confirm the 
messages they receive, but often their facial expression is telling and 
sometimes they confirm the message privately with the medium.  
 
With time, transmitting messages regularly leads to a certain 
spiritual autonomy for the medium in the sense that he or she now 
has at least limited access to a dimension that appeared closed to all 
but a rare few, such as Michel. For most, like myself, “flashes” of 
clairvoyant impressions begin to appear in daily life. Some report 
premonitory dreams, clairaudience46, seeing angels or other types of 
visions. Sharing some of the experiences typical of SCH mediums 
changed the course of the research somewhat, in that I was able to 
use my own subjective participation in Spiritualist religiosity as a 
tool to better understand that of others. This sharing led me to reread 
the transcriptions I had done earlier in the research and see them in a 
different light. I was also led to ask questions I would not have 
thought of otherwise. In later interviews, I asked for more detailed 
descriptions of the visions people reported: e.g., were the figures 
they saw transparent or opaque, was it like a normal image or more 
ethereal-looking? I learned to ask about the physical sensations that 
accompany giving healing, about whether they felt the strangeness of 
 
46 Hearing voices that are not audible through physical hearing. 




receiving messages for friends or family members that seem so 
different from what we normally know of them, about getting 
messages that seem so ridiculous that one is almost embarrassed to 
speak them aloud, and which turn out to be very much on the mark.  
 
I believe that “insider” experiences of visions, clairvoyance and 
healing also helped me to understand better the ones I have not 
shared; namely, direct encounters with negative entities or unwanted 
spirit presence. Typically, those who work as mediums for the SCH 
on a regular basis as well as some of the participants in the closed 
group report a whole range of other experiences that I have not 
shared; namely direct encounters with what they call negative, or 
lower, entities. On several occasions, I have picked up negative 
energies and spirit forces around other people and felt disturbed by 
them, almost a little nauseous in one case. These episodes, along 
with knowing how strong impressions of benevolent spirit presence 
can feel – as if they are all around, practically inside oneself – make 
it possible to imagine what it is like to experience negative presence.  
 
Negative Energies, Lower Entities47 
 
Virtually all of my informants, including those who work as 
mediums for the SCH, have felt unwanted spirit presence in their 
homes. Negative entities are the spirits of the dead who are at a low 
point in their spiritual evolution. They seek to control living persons 
and hold them back from spiritual development; they aid and abet 
negative behaviours, such as falling away from spiritual practice. 
Sometimes they do physical harm and try to seduce the person 
sexually (somewhat like Anais’ experience presented in Véronique 
Béguet’s chapter) so as to create a dependency. The category “lower 
entities” includes these harmful beings as well as wandering or 
‘vagabond’ spirits; the latter are dead but cannot grasp the fact and 
so continue to haunt spaces inhabited by the living. Spirits “go 
rogue” either because of sudden death, or because while alive, they 
did not believe in an afterlife. Experienced mediums sometimes form 
 
47 Here I summarize material presented in Meintel (2014). 
  




‘rescue circles’ where one medium goes into deep trance and 
incorporates the lost spirit and the others help the spirit to move 
away from the earth plane and into the next life; Michel participated 
in such a circle in the past, but none are operating at present. 
However, I witnessed one occasion where he took the “rescue 
medium” role.  
 
After an evening session in mediumship, Nancy, mentioned earlier, 
suddenly went silent and then began sobbing, eyes closed. Michel 
went to her and prayed over her, with gestures that resembled 
healing. A few minutes later, Nancy opened her eyes and asked what 
was going on, speaking in a normal voice. Michel explained that he 
had just helped a “vagabond spirit” on its way. Some weeks before 
she had had a dream about a major plane crash that was deliberately 
caused by the pilot; she recounted the dream to Michel and the group 
shortly thereafter. A few days before the events just described, such 
a crash had occurred, killing a number of people from Montreal. 
According to Michel, it was the spirit of a man who died in this 
crash and who had not yet accepted the fact that he was dead. The 
work he did, he explained, was to help the spirit on his way and 
protect Nancy from any further unwanted presence.  
 
Several members of the SCH who frequent one or another closed 
group believe their young daughters (all in early adolescence) have 
been beset by unwanted spirit presences. Some report that they have 
been personally attacked themselves by evil entities and that their 
homes have been the site of nefarious spirit activity in the past. In 
still other cases, those so attacked believe this to be the result of 
‘black magic’ employed by individuals who sought to do them harm. 
In one case, for example, a man who still frequents the SCH first 
contacted Michel many years ago because he felt that his Haitian 
mother-in-law was using Vodou against him, which Michel 
confirmed. Several others recount visions of a supremely evil being, 
whom they take to be Satan.  
 
According to Spiritualist belief, conducting mediumistic activities, 
and even meditation can leave one vulnerable to evil spirits; thus the 
importance given to saying the Our Father at the beginning and the 




end of closed group meetings, as this is seen as the paramount prayer 
for protection. Even mediums with decades of experience have 
sometimes experienced attacks by evil spirits; a typical form this 
takes is waking up at night with the feeling of being strangled. As 
mentioned, spirits considered malevolent may also approach the 
living in a sexual way, generally when they first waken from sleep. 
(See Hufford 1982; Adler 2011.) When a young woman mentioned 
such an experience in the closed group, Michel was quite concerned. 
In his view, this was the work of a lower entity, the spirit of a 
deceased person who wants to control the person he or she has 
targeted. Another such incident happened to a man who is now a 
Spiritualist minister. Early in his acquaintance with the SCH, in what 
felt to him like a waking dream, he found himself in bed with an 
extremely beautiful woman: “… she started making love to me. And 
I couldn’t stop and I didn’t want to stop. That’s the worst part. I 
didn’t want to stop …” As he sees it now, this encounter was an 
attempt to derail his new spiritual practice. Michel often reminds his 
students of the importance of praying regularly for spiritual 
protection; he often advises them to avoid ‘esoteric’ environments 
and individuals; that is, those who contact spirits outside of a 
religious framework for personal power or gain. The psychic fair 
held in downtown Montreal once or twice each year, in April and 
sometimes in October as well, he says, brings “many negative 
energies”. 
 
Many Spiritualists I have met have experienced problems with 
unwanted spirit presence in their homes (lights going on and off, 
knocks, or simply the feeling of an unwanted presence). 
Interestingly, I find no mention of such attacks on homes in the older 
Spiritualist writings I have consulted48. I should add that this 
problem is felt far beyond the Spiritualist milieu; every year, Michel 
receives hundreds of calls from people in the Montreal metropolitan 
region for help in exorcizing homes of troublesome spirits. (Michel 
 
48 I have wondered whether this might not be a by-product of secularization 
as it has occurred in Quebec over the 1960s, whereby religion is supposedly 
confined to the private sphere (Meintel 2014). 
 




does not have a website and his phone number is only available from 
people who know him personally; his reputation is mainly spread by 
word-of-mouth). Several times when I have brought up this topic in 
university lectures, students have come to see me afterward to tell 
me of how their home has been the site of disturbing spirit visits.  
 
Yet another form of invasive spirit presence concerns astral 
projection, or the capacity of living individuals to project themselves 
in spirit to another place. While this is in principle a spiritual gift, 
misuse of this ability is considered wrong. Two informants have told 
me of such experiences, both concerning individuals active in the 
SCH. Michel relates a case some years back where several people 
believed that a certain church member had projected himself into 
their homes. The man in question admitted doing so and refused to 
stop, at which he was expelled from the SCH and joined a different 
Spiritualist congregation.  
 
It is somewhat perplexing that I have had no direct knowledge of the 
negative spirit phenomena I have just described, even though I have 
shared a number of other kinds of mediumnic experiences. When I 
told Michel that I had never directly felt the intervention of negative 
spirits (though I have felt them around others), his response was, 
“They can be very subtle.” In any case, negative spirit encounters are 
not something Spiritualists welcome and it would make even less 
sense that a researcher seek them. However, this lacuna in my 




Classic methodology textbooks present intersubjectivity as an 
element of reliability, which, along with validity, is considered 
fundamental to the scientific method. By reliability is meant that two 
researchers similarly situated would observe the same thing. Here, 
the intersubjectivity between researchers is crucial. However, 
anthropologists have long been concerned with the intersubjectivity 
between the researcher and those studied, going back to 
Malinowski's famous chapter on fieldwork, quoted earlier. Goulet 
(2011) has analyzed three major currents in the field as to the type of 




intersubjectivity; in the structuralist tradition exemplified by Levi-
Strauss, the fieldworker creates a researcher persona that allows him 
to grasp what those he is studying cannot apprehend; the interpretive 
tradition (Geertz, for example), requires the researcher to distance 
himself from his own system of meaning to better apprehend those 
of others – but always from the outside. In the experiential current, 
the ethnographer accepts to enter more deeply into the experience of 
others; an example might be Goulet (1993) on dreams in the field.  
 
Initially, I was mostly concerned with the perspectives of other 
researchers when I first began the Spiritualist study; having never 
approached extraordinary experience as an anthropologist, I felt the 
need to have other anthropologists visit the SCH to see if their 
perspectives corresponded with mine and so invited half-a-dozen 
anthropologist friends, one man and five women, mostly in their 30s 
and 40s, to do so. That they confirmed what I was observing, 
commenting on the faith manifested by those present and on 
Michel’s impressive clairvoyance, was reassuring. At that point, I 
hoped to grasp the experience of Spiritualist mediums as well as that 
of healers and other participants but was still expecting to be situated 
as a recipient of healing and clairvoyance, and otherwise as an 
observer. Performing these activities was an unexpected 
development and led to experiences of intersubjectivity that I had not 
anticipated.  
 
The intersubjectivity at the heart of mediumship is a connection 
between individuals, whereby one sees aspects of their lives that 
normally one would not. Clairvoyance is above all, relational; not 
only does it concern other people, but the meaningfulness of a 
message derives from how it is received by the person it concerns. 
Often a kind of experiential validity for clairvoyance is established; 
the medium voices a perception that the individual confirms later as 
having been proven true in their lives. A small example: once I saw 
small dollar signs raining on the head of a woman in the 
congregation whom I knew. This signified to me a small inflow of 
money. Since I happened to know that she was in a very tight 
financial situation, I could only hope that I had seen correctly and 
had not given her false hopes. Two weeks later she told me that she 




had won the "Mini Loto" (a state-sponsored scratch ticket lottery) 
twice, for a total of several hundred dollars. Most of the time, it 
should be emphasized, confirmation is neither expected nor given. In 
another case, I saw a small flame for a woman I had met a few times 
in the past; this signified a lighthearted romance to me. This 
surprised me somewhat from the little I knew of her; months later 
she confirmed that she had had a fling while on vacation, but that it 
was not meant to last. One of the most dramatic experiences of such 
confirmation I witnessed happened in the closed group. One woman 
“saw” black tulips for another woman. We all laughed because the 
message seemed incongruous, as is often the case. At the end of the 
evening, a third woman pulled out a package from under her chair; 
they were black tulips, a birthday present for the woman to whom 
the message had been addressed. At times recipients of messages see 
them as irrelevant and not particularly accurate; Michel often advises 
them to wait and see if the message is borne out by later events. I 
have the impression that most who receive messages remember the 
ones that seemed true or were borne out by later events and they tend 
to discount any others, attributing messages that do not seem 
accurate to the medium’s level of ability or frame of mind when the 
message was given. 
 
Intersubjectivity between mediums and those to whom their 
messages are addressed may include several mediums at once. Early 
in the fieldwork, I was struck by the fact that Michel and another 
experienced medium in the closed group seemed to see exactly the 
same type of spirit around one of the male participants (Meintel 
2007: 124). As mentioned earlier, there is often a surprising 
convergence in what participants in the closed group perceive for a 
given individual. Sometimes several mediums see exactly the same 
thing or the same kind of being around the person they address. On 
the deepest level, what is shared by mediums is the experience of 
perceiving what is invisible (whether as vision, mental image or in 
some other way) and feeling it as real and meaningful. At the same 
time, mediumship as practised at the SCH is highly idiosyncratic. 
Often the same individuals receive different messages from different 
mediums; one medium may speak of the person’s home life, another 
of their financial situation. Mediums also differ from one another in 




how they perceive things, whether as bodily sensations, visions, 
mental images, sounds, words and voice, odours or a mix of these. 
Moreover, each has a certain way of presenting what they perceive, 
such that their messages are marked by their particular discursive 
style.  
 
Regarding the intersubjectivity between anthropologists and their 
research subjects, van der Geest’s (2007: 9) caveat is worth bearing 
in mind; namely that “we can never assume that the same experience 
produces the same experience” (italics in the original). In other 
words, what looks like the same experience from the outside may be 
lived very differently from one person to another. This goes for the 
comparability of experience from one participant to another, as well 
as between fieldworkers and those they study. Anthropologists are 
divided on whether their extraordinary experiences are comparable 
to those of their informants, a subject we return to at a later point. I 
have a somewhat different cultural background from most SCH 
members, having grown up in a middle-class American environment, 
with English as my first language; yet we all live in the same 
metropolitan setting and like almost all of them, I grew up Catholic. 
My exchanges with Michel and other SCH mediums over the years 
leads me to feel that extraordinary experiences I have had in the 
Spiritualist context are comparable to theirs; that is, situated on the 
same continuum of possibilities.  
 
However, verbal exchange is not the only path to intersubjectivity in 
such a context; Spiritualist religious activities include a great deal of 
silent co-participation, most clearly exemplified in the healing 
service where there is virtually no verbal exchange between healers 
and recipients. The closed group meetings include two periods of 
silence: one for a guided meditation of about 15 minutes’ duration 
and the other for a clairvoyance exercise that usually takes 5-10 
minutes. Though no words are exchanged, a powerful sociality is 
created, a communitas that includes all present, no matter what their 
role. I return to the question of non-discursive intersubjectivity at a 
later point. First, however, we turn to the question of skepticism. 
Given that researchers are trained to be skeptical of all that cannot be 




verified by observation, how can they apprehend the experience of 
the invisible by others – or by themselves for that matter? 
 
Skepticism and Doubt 
 
Spiritualism developed as a movement beginning in the late 1840s 
(Braude 1989) and as Bowie (2014), Hunter (2014) and others have 
shown, Spiritualists have engaged in dialogue with scientists almost 
from the beginning. Indeed, a number of late nineteenth century 
scientists were favourably disposed to the new movement (Ferguson 
2012). Conan Doyle held that Spiritualism was a science (2010), and 
even today one of the most important Spiritualist groups in Montreal 
is called the “Spiritual Science Fellowship.” Older Spiritualist 
writings are replete with references to skeptics and not necessarily 
disparaging ones; Marryat (1920: 50), for example, wrote that she 
did not object to skeptics, just those who came to séances with the 
aim of proving the mediums fraudulent. Scepticism, as Bowie (2014) 
has pointed out, is traditionally a hallmark of scientific thought, and, 
as she notes, often takes an ideological form that is resistant to 
examining anomalous forms of evidence; in other words, skepticism, 
by ignoring what cannot be easily explained in objectivist fashion, 
may preclude the reflexivity and critical analysis, not to mention 
accumulating case studies that might lead us to new ways of 
understanding, that are at the heart of science. Affirming one’s 
skepticism is often an elliptical claim to scientific legitimacy. 
Moreover, such claims have weight far beyond academe, as Giddens 
(1990) and others have pointed out. The hegemony of objectivist 
science that finds expression in entrenched skepticism affects even 
those who themselves experience extraordinary phenomena.  
 
I read Michele Hanks’ contribution to this volume with a keen sense 
of empathy for the paranormal investigators she describes. When the 
investigators, who see themselves as representing a scientific 
approach, actually see a spirit themselves, they are at a loss to 
explain it. When I began the Spiritualist research, I was convinced 
that some exceptional individuals like Michel were able to perceive 
invisible entities and were capable of apprehending past and future 
events for which they had no ordinary means of knowing; indeed 




there is now a substantial scientific literature on the subject (Bowie 
2014: 35). To find myself having such perceptions was far more 
difficult to comprehend. I suspect that when cultural distance does 
not separate us from those who have extraordinary experience, we 
are likely to create other forms of imaginary distance, as I did 
initially when thinking of clairvoyance as something reserved a 
select few, very different from myself.  
 
The intersubjectivity that is classically invoked as the basis of 
scientific reliability becomes strangely inoperative when one is 
talking about experiences that common sense in our society 
considers unreal. Even in the cases where I have perceived the same 
invisible entity or situation as another medium, I would be uneasy 
affirming the factuality of what we saw. Here the self-doubt of the 
researcher echoes that of mediums and shamans who recant their 
previous accounts of such experiences only to reaffirm them later; 
e.g., the shaman interviewed by Lévi- Strauss, Quesalid (Crépeau 
1997) and the Spiritualist founder Margaret Fox (Stuart 2005). I 
understand all too well how – in the face of “science”, as represented 
by researchers or merely by self-appointed skeptics – one would be 
tempted to discount one’s own perceptions. As mentioned earlier, we 
are all, Spiritualists included, influenced by the prevailing logic of 
scientism. Furthermore, Spiritualists also have to contend with the 
fact that their religious practices are sometimes condemned as 
“Satanic” by those around them (usually Evangelicals or 
traditionalist Catholics). 
 
Scepticism and self-doubt are familiar to Spiritualist mediums 
themselves. I have been told of a case of an experienced, well-
reputed Spiritualist medium who abruptly stopped believing in 
contact with the world of Spirit and ceased to practise immediately 
because she would have felt dishonest otherwise. Moreover, even 
among those who work as volunteers for Spiritualist church services, 
skepticism is sometimes expressed about the claims of other 
Spiritualist mediums (usually those practicing in other churches). 
For example, a medium in another congregation whom I will call 
“Roseline,” believes that she channels the Vgin Mary, a claim that is 
often disparaged by members of the SCH. Nonetheless, even her 




critics concede that she is a very gifted medium. I return to her case 
in the next section.  
 
Scepticism, Intersubjectivity and the Extraordinary 
 
The capacity to step back and question the perceptions and 
interpretations of others, whether they be scholars or our own 
informants, is indispensable to the process of research. Typically, 
this is associated with analytical and sometimes social and cultural 
distance. Yet at the same time, the fieldworker seeks at least some 
degree of intersubjectivity with those studied. We want others to 
understand what we seek to learn and we want to understand what 
they are telling us, by word or deed. This intersubjectivity obliges us 
to inhabit, at least imaginatively, subjective realities that may be new 
to us. Some authors have looked at intersubjectivity in cognitive 
terms, emphasizing language (e.g., Bloch, cited below; see also 
Verhagen 2005). New approaches on the horizon pay greater 
attention to the intersubjectivity that is created by embodied co-
presence that is often emotionally charged, and generally felt as 
deeply meaningful by participants. In what follows, I will look at 
some of these different approaches; I will try to show how those that 
deal with embodied intersubjectivity almost require deep subjective 
participation by the researcher while also opening up possibilities for 
entering lifeworlds that can be described as being, for us, something 
of a new “locality” (in Appadurai’s sense). I also question to what 
extent we can presume that there is an irreconcilable cultural divide 
between our experience and that of those we study, such that our 
experience is inevitably incommensurate with theirs.  
 
Maurice Bloch (2007: 68) holds that “mutual mind reading … an 
empirical phenomenon of mutual interpenetration” is what makes 
communication between human beings possible and supports his 
position with evidence from neurological studies. In the same essay, 
Bloch presents an interesting discussion of the lack of absolute 
boundedness between individuals as exemplified in extreme form by 
witchcraft, Sufi mysticism and more generally, in religious ritual. 
While Bloch focuses more on interpenetration in the form of 
linguistic communication, others have explored the kinds that can be 




produced by nonverbal co-participation as, for example, in Ashtanga 
yoga (Bouchard 2013), Vipassana meditation (Pagis 2009, 2010), 
and the dancehall scene in Jamaica (Henriques 2010). In such cases, 
emotions (not always the same ones from one person to the next) are 
experienced together; more than this, “entangled processes” of affect 
that go beyond the discourse of feelings and emotions link the 
participants who are no longer separated from each other by the 
bodies in the usual way (Blackman and Venn 2010: 10).  
 
Studying embodied experience in activities that call for holistic 
engagement (for example, yoga, martial arts, various forms of 
meditation and healing activities, as examples) is likely to open the 
way to new forms of perception for the researcher as much as for 
other participants. Such activities generally call for reflexive 
dwelling in the body-mind and kinesthetic sensitivity to others (cf. 
Schutz’ [1964] essay “Making Music Together”). Sometimes 
subjectively engaged participation is required for the research to 
continue, as Goulet (1998) found and as was my own case. I could 
have refused Michel’s invitation to participate in the closed group, 
but it would have put a low ceiling on my understanding of 
Spiritualists’ religious experiences. Inhabiting the same space and 
time frame in such a context of intense mutual awareness is rich with 
promise for intersubjectivity, but it sometimes means letting go of a 
research programme or interview schedule, at least momentarily. 
This, I would hazard, is a down-to-earth version of the 
“phenomenological epoché” as proposed by Jackson (1996).  
 
Given our usual reliance as researchers on our perceptions of what is 
externally visible and articulated linguistically, such embodied, 
largely nonverbal participation can have a powerful impact on our 
analyses. When it does, abstracting out one’s experience from 
ethnographic description would be somewhat dishonest and, in any 
case, impoverishing. Withholding the truth of our own fieldwork 
experiences from our representations of those we study effectively 
confers a false exoticism on the perceptions of the extraordinary and 
thus impoverishes our understanding of such phenomena. Extracting 
ourselves analytically from the lifeworlds we are studying deforms 
the description of it that we are likely to be able to render. Moreover, 




I would suggest that, to whatever degree we can inhabit the 
intersubjective lifeworld of others; that is, share the perceptions of 
what is real for them, our attitude toward even what we do not share 
of the vision of reality is affected. The sense of being attacked by 
evil forces is not something I have direct knowledge of, but seeing 
negative presences around others and feeling the presence of 
benevolent beings gives me, at least indirectly, a sense of what it 
must feel like to be under spirit attack. To qualify what I have just 
said, there are some beliefs that Spiritualists have expressed in my 
hearing that I do not hold (e.g., the idea that everyone reincarnates 
after the present existence). However, these are not central beliefs to 
the spiritual experience. Given what I myself have experienced since 
beginning fieldwork at the SCH, I am inclined to fully believe what 
they claim has happened to them (e.g., assault by negative entities) 
even when I have had no similar experience. 
 
Several researchers explore cultural differences in extraordinary 
experience, a valid and revelatory line of analysis (e.g., Cassaniti and 
Luhrmann 2011; Luhrmann 2004). In the same vein, Desjarlais 
(1992) sees the trance he experienced in his shamanic apprenticeship 
in Nepal as quite different from that of his informants. However, 
cultural difference in extraordinary experience should not be 
overstated. As Dubisch has argued in regard to energy systems of 
healing such as Reiki and Jin Shin Jyutsu, spiritualities often involve 
what the author terms “cosmologies of connectedness” (2008: 225). 
They are to some degree like cultures in themselves, in that any 
participant enters into new ways of perceiving self, the body, nature 
and so on. Just as cultural homogeneity in religious experience 
should not be overstated49 we should not overstate cultural 
impermeability in the domain of relations with what is normally 
invisible. Indeed, the accounts such as those already mentioned by 
Jean-Guy Goulet (1998) and Edith Turner (1994) show that cultural 
boundaries are far from absolute when it comes to experiences of the 
spirit realm. In this regard, I note an interesting convergence 
 
49 Cf. Victor Turner (1975: 28-29) on the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of 
participants in the rituals he studied, “each with a style and soul of his own”. 
 




between Spiritualist “thought forms” and the Thai notion of what the 
authors term the “supernatural”, making allowances for some 
nuances that differ. For the Thai, the actions of the mind, “usually 
the mental action of other minds intermingling with one’s own” 
create a sort of ghost (Cassaniti and Luhrmann 2011: 40). When the 
mind is not focused, an active, footloose energy is created, “a kind of 
personified ‘wits’” (p. 41), as in “losing one’s wits”, in the authors’ 
words. Similarly, thought forms are non-physical entities, a kind of 
crystallization of human mental energy, as was seen earlier in the 
case of the jealousy around Nancy, as Michel interpreted it.  
 
We need not adopt the interpretations of our informants to describe 
the world in which they dwell, peopled as it may be with invisible 
beings and forces. It is not essential, as I see it, to pronounce on the 
reality or unreality of what they (and sometimes, we) perceive. It 
would be wise to at least allow such beings and forces to have what 
some call “methodological” reality; that is to acknowledge the status 
as actors in the dynamics that implicate human beings. This was 
clear to me long before I ever studied religion; fieldwork on racial 
ideology in Cape Verde entailed studying popular saints’ feasts, 
where the colour hierarchy was represented vividly in ritual practice. 
The feasts and the organization, a costly if prestigious enterprise, 
made no sense unless one included the saints as a social agent.  
 
Bowie (2014: 24) makes an important point when she argues that 
“bracketing out” questions of truth or reality may signify a refusal to 
seriously engage with another’s reality. Perhaps for this reason, I 
find Jackson’s statement that “witchcraft beliefs have no reality apart 
from the people who make use of them” (1996:11) a bit unsatisfying; 
sometimes one can be drawn into the vortex of others’ beliefs simply 
by being present. (See Mossière in this volume.) Moreover, I suggest 
that we should not necessarily exclude actors’ interpretations of 
extraordinary perceptions; sometimes they may offer explanations 
for things that science, at this point, does not illuminate. When I 
went to a service at the congregation led by Roseline, mentioned 
earlier, I did not believe that she was channelling the historical 
mother of Jesus as she claimed, and this does not make sense to me 
now. Yet during the service, I had a vision of the Vgin Mary in 




profile, rather like a medallion, next to Roseline. Science does not 
explain why I saw what I did. However, taking the image of Mary 
that I saw as a thought form (i.e., interpreting it in Spiritualist terms) 
suggests to me that Roseline’s devotion to the Virgin is genuine. 
This explanation cannot be verified by conventional scientific 
methods at this time, yet it makes experiential sense in that it 
corresponds to what I saw in her behaviour that evening and on 
several other occasions. “Trying on” the interpretations and 
explanations of our informants goes a step further than suspending 
our usual beliefs about reality and “bracketing out” the questions that 
arise from sharing the kinds of extraordinary experience that are 
familiar to them. It implicitly recognizes that those we study may 




Intersubjectivity between anthropologists and those they study is a 
sine qua non for fieldwork and indeed for any form of 
communication between human beings (Bloch 1977, 2007). In fact, 
our very subjectivity is constructed in relationship with others 
(Desjarlais and Throop 2011). Discussions of intersubjectivity in 
anthropology have focused mostly on linguistic communication 
verbal dialogue and cognition, whereas the intersubjectivity 
emerging from bodily copresence has been somewhat neglected, 
Pagis’ (2009, 2010) work being an exception. Quite possibly, the 
nonverbal communication that occurs through copresence is more 
challenging to classic notions of the anthropologist as somehow 
understanding the other (cognitively) yet emotionally removed from 
them, and unaffected by the dangers (such as sorcery, witchcraft, 
evil spirits) that beset them because of the immunity conferred by 
cultural distance and a rationalist mindset. Wikan reminds us that 
language is just one means to intersubjectivity, recalling her three 
months’ sojourn as a “languageless” person in Bhutan with her 
husband Frederik Barth. Despite minimal linguistic communication, 
the couple was able to take in a “wealth” of information (1992: 468). 
I would argue that reflexive, embodied copresence is indispensable 
for fieldwork on most contemporary religious currents, which tend to 
be experience-focused in any case, and where, no matter how 




expressive some of these currents may be, much of what participants 
deem important is, for them, beyond words.  
 
In much fieldwork, a good deal of intersubjectivity probably 
develops by osmosis. After eight months on a remote island in Cape 
Verde, I noticed that a young American woman who had just arrived 
was commenting on many things I had long ceased to notice (e.g., 
social strictures on acceptable female behaviour). When it comes to 
extraordinary phenomena, the experience of intersubjectivity seems 
perhaps more dramatic and striking, but is not necessarily of a 
different order than that which is part of all human communication. 
However, there are some differences. 
 
In my work on the Spiritual Church of Healing, co-participation led 
to not only to feelings of empathy and unconscious normalization of 
local norms, but also to perceptions and experiences that I had no 
pre-existing template for, at least not as a researcher. Moreover, I 
was not, in sociological terms, more an outsider than other 
participants. Most were socialized as Catholics and identify as such, 
seeing the SCH as a “spiritual” resource. Many keep some 
connection with the Catholic Church. Spiritualism as practiced in the 
SCH is more centred on experience than on any boundary between 
insiders and outsiders, unlike many Christian religions. Thus, there 
were no boundaries to negotiate as would have been the case if I had 
studied, say, an Evangelical group. And so, I was free to “play 
along”, in Drooger’s (1996) phrase, as much as I wished; any 
limitations I felt came less from my religious affiliation50 than from 
considerations of professional ethics regarding my participation. 
While I was able to justify my participation in intellectual terms, as I 
did some time ago (Meintel 2011a), I now realize that I was also 
influenced by my respect for the ethics that Michel teaches regarding 
the messages that mediums in the SCH receive and transmit, a 
subject I plan to address in another context. I felt no obligation to 
change my religious identity and was not moved to do so. (I should 
 
50 I was interested to read Edith Turner’s (2006) autobiography, where one 
finds no conflict whatsoever between her Catholic identity and practice and 
her fieldwork participation in healing rituals in Africa and in Alaska. 




add that very few of those who are active in the SCH as mediums or 
healers identify themselves as “Spiritualists”.) However, my intimate 
contact with both the Catholic religion and this group of Spiritualists 
has led me to see that Spiritualism can offer a kind of religious 
“savoir faire” about extraordinary experience that is much less 
available in Catholicism. As Justine Louis (2007: 185) observes, 
phenomena such as visions, spiritual healing, glossolalia, prophecy 
and clairvoyance are generally regarded with suspicion within 
Catholicism.51 In fact, a Catholic bishop once consulted Michel 
because he was suddenly having premonitions and prophetic visions 
and wanted help for how to deal with them. 
 
With this in mind, we might look at extraordinary experience we 
may have in the fieldwork context as an element in how our research 
results are constructed, and by the same token, a valid, even 
necessary, element of any account we give of them. Moreover, 
including such experience in our accounts will surely allow us to 
better understand the processes of intersubjectivity that are at the 
heart of our enterprise and to begin a dialogue about domains we do 
not yet understand and whose parameters are still elusive.  
 
Our research alone may not determine the ontological status of the 
extraordinary phenomena we study, even those we ourselves might 
experience. However, I have argued here, it may sometimes be 
fruitful to “try on” our informants’ modes of interpretation, to see if 
they help us make sense of our shared realities. The idea is not to 
become a Spiritualist or convert to whatever current we are studying, 
though this may be an authentic development for one or another 
researcher; to me, this “trying on” is part of learning from, as well as 
learning about – what Robbins is urging us to do when he urges 
anthropologists to radically “recommit to finding real otherness in 





51 Nonetheless, all are present in the Catholic Charismatic Renewal. This is 
an issue I hope to explore in the future. 
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Epilogue: Three (Ir)Rational Ways of Being  
an Anthropologist in the Field 
 




The contributors to Extraordinary Experience in Modern Contexts 
demonstrate again and again that epistemological assumptions 
inform the way in which fieldwork is conducted, determine the 
definition of what counts as data or finding in the course of one’s 
research, and shape the manner in which the results of one’s 
investigation are communicated in the advancement of knowledge. 
Whatever the object of a researcher’s interest, this object does not 
present “itself in a state of original purity ready to submit to the 
work of the observing subject” but “is constructed at the same time 
as his knowledge is articulated”52 (Affergan 1999: 7). In other 
words, what is described or posited as the object of one’s 
investigation emerges within a process of knowing. Disciplines and 
the objects of interest are mutually constitutive – the one never 
existing independently and prior to the other. 
 
In this epilogue I propose to show how the originality of this 
collection of essays is best seen when compared to three approaches 
to the acquisition of knowledge and experience within the discipline 
of anthropology.53 Each approach is seen by its proponents as 
 
52 My translation from the original in French, as is the case with all other 
quotes from French sources in this Epilogue.  
53 The structure of this epilogue and part of its content originate in a paper 
entitled, “To Become Different to Know Another?,” presented in the 
international workshop “Ethnographic Fieldwork and the Production of 
Knowledge” organized by the Département d’anthropologie, Université de 
Montréal in Montréal, Québec –September 25-28, 2008. The 2008 paper 
was developed and published as « Trois manières d’être sur le terrain : une 
brève histoire des conceptions de l’intersubjectivité» in Anthropologie et 
Sociétés (Goulet 2011). My gratitude to Bob White and Kiven Strohm who 
have translated that article, parts of which are revised to accompany new 
material written for the purpose of this book. Finally, my appreciation to 




rational and the best avenue to produce valid anthropological 
knowledge. Each approach, however, is seen by its critics as linked 
to an irrational fear of exploring phenomena excluded from its 
purview. Hence, in the following pages, we move from a view of 
anthropology as a science (in search of laws and explanations), to 
one of anthropology as an interpretive discipline (in search of 
subjective meanings),54 to experiential anthropology (in search of 
knowledge gained through ecstatic moments that take the 
anthropologist to the heart of the lifeworld he or she is 
investigating). As will be shown in the last section of this epilogue, 
ecstasy in fieldwork is not “a kind of behaviour” one engages in, but 
a “quality of human action and interaction-–one that creates a 
common ground for the encounter” with the Other—in his homeland 
(Fabian 2000: 8).   
 
Prior to exploring how each of these approaches understands the 
status of fieldwork and the goal of anthropology I proceed with a 
brief examination of accounts of extraordinary experiences presented 
in this book in the light of two concepts, membershipping and 
reflexivity, as defined in ethnomethodology. 
 
In ethnomethodology “reflexivity” refers to this mutually 
constitutive relationship between the description of an object or 
setting and the object or setting described.55 As defined by 
ethnomethodologists Anderson and Lee, 
 
Deirdre Meintel for her judicious comments on an earlier draft of this 
manuscript. 
54 “Verstehen (interpretative understanding) and erklären (law-governed 
explanation) are two ways to make scientifically respectable sense of a 
phenomenon. The scientist who engages in erklären tries to make 
explanatory sense of the phenomenon by finding the laws that govern it, 
whereas the scientist who engages in verstehen tries to make empathetic 
sense of the phenomenon by looking for the perspective from which the 
phenomenon appears to be meaningful and appropriate.” (Bransen 2001: 
16165, italics in original). 
55 See Watson and Goulet (1992 and 1998) for an analysis in the light of this 
concept of fieldwork data I gathered among the Dene Tha of northwestern 
Alberta. My gratitude to Graham Watson for introducing me to 




Membershipping represents a way by which persons in social 
settings categorize objects of knowledge, incidents, events, and 
other members. It is therefore revealed in the accounts and 
descriptions that persons in the world furnish, and is thus 
constitutive of the objects of the orientation. It represents the 
results of the sense-assembly methods as they utilize 
conventional rules and procedures in practical settings, in order 
to know the way around, and instruct others as to how to see the 
world correctly. It is the sense in which members of a culture deal 
with contingent events, and rend them into categories such that ‘this’ 
may be found to be ‘another case of’, or ‘similar to’, or ‘the same 
situation as’, ‘that’. (Anderson and Lee 1982: 290, my emphasis.) 
 
This reflexivity is found in all accounts of an event, a person or an 
object, whether the account is personal, professional, or a 
combination of both.  
 
Consider for instance Hufford’s report of an intellectual break in his 
life that occurred in 1970, in the midst of his doctoral fieldwork in 
Newfoundland. The “Old Hag” tradition he found there 
corresponded exactly with the extraordinary experience of a night 
visitor he had unexpectedly lived through at his home in 1963, 
“complete with footsteps, evil presence, and so on”. From then on, 
he could no longer believe what his professors had taught him, 
namely that “the spirit world is a cultural fantasy arising from 
tradition.”56 Hufford does not ponder different ways of 
understanding his experience; he readily defines it as the same as 
those described by Newfoundlanders. On that day, Hufford writes, “I 
lost my modernity.”  
 
With these words Hufford not only memberships himself as different 
from what he used to be, he creates the grounds upon which to write 
against the Cultural Source Hypothesis (CSH) of beliefs in spirits 
 
ethnomethodology when we were colleagues at the University of Calgary 
from 1988 to 1997. 
56 Hufford adds that if for decades he kept his experience of the “Old Hag 
attack” to himself, it was “because I knew that ironically it would harm my 
academic credibility.” 




predominant in anthropology. Against this view Hufford proposes an 
Experiential Source Hypothesis (ESH), to rationally explore if 
“some ‘supernatural beliefs’ arise from experience in a rational 
manner.” As expressed by Béguet, although “considered cultural 
constructs in the eyes of the anthropologist,” people’s accounts of 
extraordinary experiences might in fact be about “empirical 
phenomena of the real”. If the authors draw on different intellectual 
traditions to argue the case for an open-minded approach to 
extraordinary experiences in modern, urban contexts, they all ask: do 
we really understand what our subjects are talking about when they 
share the accounts of extraordinary experiences, including that of 
encounters with spiritual beings? 
 
These brief references to the first two chapters in this book bring to 
light the theme of the collection of papers as a whole expressed in its 
title: Extraordinary Experience. If all the authors focus on 
extraordinary experiences, Hufford, Béguet and Habkirk are the 
three authors who explicitly engage with modernity or modern as the 
intellectual perspective inhospitable to the data (extraordinary 
experiences) they either lived or were told about in the context of the 
fieldwork. Other contributors to this book are also keenly critical of 
a strict scientific approach that dismisses people’s belief in spirits or 
other entities because it cannot be validated through empical 
methods of investigation.  
 
In this respect it is noteworthy that all authors mention spirit, 
spiritual and spiritualities in the description of the extraordinary 
experiences they analyze in the work. Meintel, Hanks and Habkk, 
however, specifically focus on mediums and mediumship. Amongst 
them, only Meintel offers a first-hand, personal account of how she 
became a medium. Hers is the contribution that explicitly draws on 
an understanding of intersubjectivity as defined by Alfred Schutz 
(1899-1959) in his Phenomenology of the Social World (1967), a 
perspective on different forms of knowledge which he associates 




with different cognitive styles characteristic of various domains of 
human activity, dreaming, theatre, ritual, sports, or science.57 
 
Intersubjectivity of the Lifeworld 
 
Schutz and Luckmann define lifeworld as “this realm of reality that 
from the standpoint of common sense normal conscious humans take 
for granted” (1973: 3; in Goulet 2004: 110). This world into which 
we are born and die presents itself to adults as the world. In this 
world, people are interested in persons or objects insofar as they 
limit or enhance the ability to meet the objectives according to the 
interests. A defining feature of the lifeworld is that it is experienced 
as intersubjective. We constantly engage in it, postulating that others 
are similar to us, that we live with them “like men among men, 
undergoing the same influences and working as they do, 
understanding others and being understood by them” (Schutz 1967: 
16). All social interaction rests upon a “practical faith: we believe in 
the existence of the Other because we act with him and on him” 
(Laoureux 2008: 170). 
 
Understanding someone else involves a risk, that of “placing oneself 
insidiously in the place of those we think we understand and 
attributing to them something more or less different from what they 
think” (Lévi-Strauss 2000: 720). To avoid this danger Bourdieu calls 
upon social scientists to engage in “participant objectification,” a 
practice that “enables the social analyst to grasp and master the pre-
reflexive social and academic experiences of the social world that he 
tends to project unconsciously onto ordinary social agents” such as 




57 See Barber (2016) for an extensive presentation of Schutz’s career, 
publications and influence on this history of social sciences. In the literature 
Schutz sometimes appears as Schütz. In this Epilogue, following the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, I have opted for the former spelling. 
 




Bourdieu’s notion of “participation objectivation” is related to a 
second meaning of “reflexivity” in the social sciences, a meaning 
introduced by Scholte in Toward a Reflexive and Critical 
Anthropology (1969), where he referred to the self-critical duty of 
the anthropologist to not contaminate social phenomena observed 
and analyzed with one’s own preconceptions (unwarranted beliefs) 
and biases (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Marcus and Fisher 1986). 
It is in this sense that Hufford, Mossière, and Meintel use the word 
reflexivity. 
 
Throughout this book, from chapter to chapter, one observes that key 
terms take different, often overlapping, connotations. This is the case 
for the concept of spiritualities. For Béguet, they are “ways of being 
in the world” that arise and are sustained outside religions or 
spiritual groups. These spiritualities, she writes, posit a “world 
[which] is imbued with invisible forces, eventually inhabited by 
invisible, sentient entities. Those forces and entities, although unseen 
and intangible, are as significant, if not much more, than the 
materialistic dimension of the world for tenants of those currents.” 
Hence, these ways of being in the world are best understood not 
according to classical notions of worldview or cognitive system, but 
as ontology, a statement “about the nature of the real.”   
 
In contrast Hufford stresses that spiritualities are parts of local 
knowledge about spirits that we ought not to dismiss “without 
argument and evidence” and that we ought to keep an open mind to 
the possibility of “finding our subjects’ beliefs well founded.” This 
approach sympathetic to local spiritualities “raises the ontological 
implications of possibly finding a belief rationally and empically 
superior to the available modern alternatives.” Hufford further notes 
that, “the tendency for modern religion to avoid spirits is often a 
reason for moderns to prefer spirituality to religion.” In this way the 
“‘spiritual but not religious’ tradition preserved belief in spirit, 
especially among intellectuals, against modern theological and 
philosophical dogma.”  
 
Mossière does not oppose religion and spirituality as Hufford does. 
In the course of her investigation of religious diversity in Montreal, 




she came across a Muslim religious tradition that supports, rather 
than shun, the quest for extraordinary experiences. She heard 
“Muslim believers oriented toward spirituality argue that their 
tradition cannot be learned by cognitive means, it has to be absorbed 
through contact with and dedication to a spiritual master (cheikh).” 
In the end, like Béguet and Hufford, she argues that, “integrating 
extraordinary experiences into the construction of scientific 
knowledge…raises ontological questions in terms of ways of being 
in the world experienced by social subjects, but also by academics 
who write about them.”  
 
The chapters in Extraordinary Experience in Modern Contexts, 
along with similar publications mentioned in the introduction and 
this epilogue, reflect an understanding of what it means to become 
an anthropologist and do anthropological work. Differences at this 
level determine the type of interaction sought in the field to achieve 
one’s research goals and define the kind of original knowledge 
produced and brought to the attention of one’s peers and the public 
at large. This is well exemplified in the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
Marc Augé and Johannes Fabian. The discussion of the ways in 
which they differ in defining the objective of their profession offers 
an illuminating context in which to comment on specific aspects of 
chapters in this book. 
 
The Structuralist Approach 
 
In Tristes Tropiques, presented by the book’s editor as the 
“confessions of an ethnologist”, Lévi-Strauss refers to fieldwork as 
the “negative aspect of our trade”, a time of “deprivation and 
nauseating weariness” devoted to “the collection of an unknown 
myth, a new rule for marriage, a complete list of kinship terms” 
leads to the “truths that we go so far away to find” (1955: 13). Here 
we are confronted with a vision of the field as an experience that 
uses up precious time: the time it takes to arrive to the field site and 
to return home in order to write and eventually publish; the time it 
takes to negotiate access to a territory, to a group and to people with 
privileged information; the time it takes to bring home truths about 
the life of the Other. Seen in this light “adventure has no place in the 




profession of the ethnographer; it is nothing more than servitude, 
weighing in on the efficiency of work with the burden of weeks and 
months lost along the way” (1955: 13). 
 
From this point of view, the encounter with the Other is merely 
instrumental. If we spend time with the Other, it is only because he 
possesses information that we are missing with regards to his 
thought, his mythology, his social organization, his history. The 
researcher spends enough time with a local population that he can 
advance his understanding of his area of study and meet the 
expectations of the scientific community, which seeks objective 
knowledge about matters of shared interest. When he writes, not 
confessions but a work of scholarship, the researcher disappears 
from the text, as do the individuals who are the sources of his 
information. In contrast, all the authors appear in the chapters in this 
book as researchers and as intellectuals discussing what status to 
grant to extraordinary experiences, their own or those reported to 
them in the field. 
 
The conception of research espoused by Lévi-Strauss is evident in 
his 2002 review of the thirteenth Handbook of American Indians, 
whose topic is the Plains Indians. In this review he calls attention to 
what he considers an important weakness in the handbook:  
 
Instead of seeing each culture as a unique object endowed with its 
own reality, culture is now presented as a passing moment, part of a 
historical process which otherwise continues uninterrupted in time. 
The Handbook thus distances itself from a classical ethnographic 
perspective. It substitutes this perspective with a vision that living 
people can have of their past. It should be noted that this change in 
perspective coming from the United States and Canada is due in part 
to the recognition of rights coming from first inhabitants and the 
place that their descendants claim. (Lévi-Strauss 2002: 169) 
 
Lévi-Strauss regrets the digression from anthropological interests (as 
he understood them at the time). From the perspective of classical 
ethnology, the experiences of the researcher in the field as well as 
the historical transformations experienced by the people studied by 
the anthropologist are outside of the realm of data one has a 




professional duty to seek and find in order to validate a given 
theoretical framework. 
 
It is revealing that Lévi-Strauss wrote of himself that he is “probably 
more faithful to the Durkheimian tradition than any other” (1955: 
64). Durkheim advocated and attempted to elaborate a science of 
society, setting out to identify a series of laws or patterns that would 
explain social facts through the rigorous application of scientific 
method. For Durkheim, society is a natural phenomenon subject to 
the laws of nature, according to which all beings, including those of 
human societies, go from a simple social organization to one that is 
more complex, leading to increasing interdependence between the 
different specialized parts that make up the whole.  
 
Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Durkheim 1994 [1912]) 
and Structures élémentaires de la parenté (Lévi-Strauss 1949) share 
a common thread based on the profound conviction that the “first 
and most fundamental rule is to treat social facts as things” 
(Durkheim 1963 [1895]: 108).58 Lévi-Strauss agrees with this vision 
when he writes: “My thought is itself an object. Being ‘of this 
world’, it participates in a nature that is one and the same (1955: 60). 
On this subject, Kerk (2005: 208) reminds us that at the beginning of 
La Pensée Sauvage (1962), Lévi-Strauss refers to Balzac in the 
following manner: 
 
For does not society modify man, according to the conditions in 
which he lives and acts, into men as manifold as the species in 
zoology? The differences between a soldier, an artisan, a man of 
business, a lawyer, an idler, a student, a statesman, a merchant, a 
sailor, a poet, a beggar, a priest, are as great, though not so easy to 
define, as those between the wolf, the lion, the ass, the crow, the 
shark, the seal, the sheep, etc. Thus, social species have always 
existed, and will always exist, just as there are zoological species. 
(Balzac 1940-1950: I, 4, in Lévi-Strauss 1962: 221) 
 
60 Fournier notes that Durkheim’s work “lends itself to different, even 
contradictory readings: from functionalism to structuralism through 
interactionism, ethnomethodology and pragmatic sociology” and concludes 
by asking, “Which is the real Durkheim?” (Fournier 2007: 10). 





All these species are awaiting the work of the analyst who will 
classify them, identify their specific features and structures, which 
unbeknownst to their bearers enable them to live, if not thrive in the 
world.  
 
In the same way, in the realm of socio-cultural realities, speakers of 
a language cannot identify and define the phonemes that the 
linguist—from outside of the language—is able to determine thanks 
to a particular method of analysis. Lévi-Strauss indeed elaborates 
models whose mechanics “are set in motion outside of the 
consciousness of individuals” (Lévi-Strauss 2000: 714). Similarly, 
those who contemplated suicide could not help Durkheim who was 
looking for a sociological explanation of variations in suicide rates in 
different societies. His science made use of quantitative data because 
its object of study was a social and not a psychological fact. 
Following Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss’s “anthropology was scientific 
and naturalist in the sense that structural linguistics became 
scientific” (Bloch 2009: 1). As Carani affirms: “From the point of 
view of the positivist tradition to which he belongs, Lévi-Strauss 
proposes an almost normative activity whose purpose is to reproduce 
the rule (the law) by which information gathered in the field can be 
brought together and discussed as data” (Carani 1992: 150). 
 
In every intellectual pursuit, knowledge and passion are intimately 
linked. In the academic field, it is the latter which at some level 
orients the choice of a school of thought, a research topic, or an 
author: 
 
If being a student of the prestigious “école normale” in the 1950s 
meant being at the top of the university hierarchy, being consecrated 
by the institutions of higher learning during a period when 
philosophy was triumphant […] it was also true that making a 
transition from philosophy to sociology was jeter ses galons, at 
some level a form of decadence or even degradation.” (Bourdieu 
2005: 327) 
 
The transition that Bourdieu made from philosophy to sociology —
one for which he claims to have been the only one of his generation 




— did not occur naturally or directly but via an intermediary, that of 
ethnology. Why? “Structural anthropology was the best of academic 
thought and even the most arrogant philosophers were required to 
talk about anthropology” (Bourdieu 2005: 327). The ethnology that 
Lévi-Strauss had re-baptized as “structural anthropology” carried 
with it the nobility of all the sciences.  
 
Whether it be totemism, myth, or marriage, Lévi-Strauss makes 
structures appear, showing oppositional relations between units that 
belong to the same domain:  
 
Structure cannot be reduced to a system, a whole made up of 
interrelated elements and relations. In order to be able to speak of a 
structure, there must be a certain number of invariants between the 
elements and relations in such a way as to be able to go from one to 
another through some form of transformation. (Lévi-Strauss and 
Eribon 1988: 159) 
 
 Lévi-Strauss therefore writes that he has 
  
attempted to reduce the complex multiplicity of rules relating to 
kinship and marriage, which are unintelligible, to a small number of 
types, each one endowed with some explanatory value; to show that 
from these simple types we can deduct more complex types; that 
between all these types there are transformational relations. (Lévi-
Strauss 2000: 717) 
 
In his afterword to the special issue of L’Homme dedicated to fifty 
years of kinship studies, Lévi-Strauss specifies that contrary to a 
misinterpretation of his work, he had never “decreed that men were 
the subjects and women the objects of exchange” (2000: 217), but 
had simply noted that the ethnographic facts “taught him that, in the 
vast majority of societies, men act or perceive in this way and that 
due to the prevalence of this idea, the situation it refers to suggests a 
fundamental pattern” (2000: 717-718). It is as a scholar that Lévi-
Strauss addresses his colleagues in order to correct the interpretation 
of his thought and to affirm the validity of his particular form of 
structuralism. 
 




To paraphrase Lévi-Strauss, contributors to this book recognize that 
in the vast majority of societies, including modern and urbanized 
ones, people report “vivid dreams, visions, hearing voices, 
premonitions, kinesthetic sensations, relationships with invisible 
entities” (Introduction to this volume). Is it not appropriate, then, to 
suggest that the prevalence of such ideas suggest a universal insight 
into the ‘real’? To raise this question is not to voice an opposition to 
science and the pursuit of scientific knowledge, it is simply to ask 
that we pay close attention to ethnographic facts and determine as 
best as we can what they teach us.  
 
The Interpretative Approach 
 
In Islam Observed, Geertz uses “The struggle for the real” as the 
subtitle leading to his discussion of the enduring tension between 
religion and science:  
 
Even if they are not direct antitheses, there is a natural tension 
between the scientific and the religious ways of attempting to render 
the world comprehensible, a tension…which is chronic, and 
increasingly intense. Unless the importance of this ‘struggle for the 
real’ is recognized and not passed off with easy pieties on either 
side, the history of religion, Islam or any other, in our times is, 
scientifically anyway unintelligible.” (Geertz 1968: 103-104, my 
emphasis) 
 
What religion and science share is the recognition “of the 
insufficiency, or anyway the felt insufficiency, of common sense as a 
total orientation toward life…” (Geertz 1968: 95). Both religion and 
science express the human tendency to find and relate to the 
invisible behind the visible. 
 
With this notion of struggle for the real in mind, we may come back 
to Lévi-Strauss and his experience as an ethnographer. 
Notwithstanding his epistemological preferences that led to the rise 
of structural anthropology, in the field Lévi-Strauss is confronted 
with what happens in the minds of the Nambikwara with whom he 




spends three months during the dry season of 1938.59 He gives them 
“paper and pens with which they did nothing at first”, but with 
which they eventually begin to “trace wavy horizontal lines” (Lévi-
Strauss 1955: 339). In the eyes of Lévi-Strauss, for whom this fact 
has no ethnographic value, the Nambikwara are imitating an art form 
that they do not understand. They do, however, grasp the value of 
symbols. This is why the band chief asks him for a notebook that he 
begins using as well.  
 
In this request, we may recognize the chief’s attempt to render his 
altered world comprehensible. As he struggles for the real, he takes 
on the status of writer and thus transforms the work of the 
anthropologist into a collaborative effort. He no longer answers the 
questions of Lévi-Strauss directly; he now presents the lines he has 
traced in his notebook and he waits for Lévi-Strauss to read them. 
The chief cannot read what Lévi-Strauss writes in his notebook, but 
neither can Lévi-Strauss understand what the chief has written in his. 
Thus, the chief creates a situation of interdependence. From then on, 
writes Lévi-Strauss, “we are equipped in the same way when we 
begin working together” (2000: 340). The chief answers Lévi-
Strauss’s questions by deciphering what he has written in his 
notebook, as if they were both scholars: an intellectual in search of 
knowledge that will be transmitted to him in a new form (Wilcken 
2010: 102-103). It is this type of interaction, of little or no interest to 
the author of a ‘classical’ ethnography, that will be of great interest 
to anthropologists who, beginning in the 1970s, adopt an 
interpretative stance (Geertz 1973). 
 
 
59 How did Lévi-Strauss end up meeting the Nambikwara in Brazil? 
Consider the following account of the conversation that determined his life-
long career: “My career was decided one day in the autumn of 1934, at nine 
o’clock in the morning, by a telephone call from Célestin Bouglé, who was 
then head of the École normale supérieure. […] He asked me bluntly, ‘Do 
you still want to study anthropology? – ‘Most certainly’ – ‘Then apply for a 
post as a teacher of sociology at the University of São Paulo. The suburbs 
are full of Indians, whom you can study at the weekends. But you must give 
George Dumas a firm answer before midday.” (Lévi-Strauss 1973: Part 2, 
Section 5) 




Anthropological narratives are of two orders: personal and 
professional. Both types of narratives draw upon and/or challenge 
“the socially available ‘systems of significance’–beliefs, rites, 
meaningful objects–in terms of which subjective life is ordered and 
outward behaviour guided” (Geertz 1973: 95).60 At the personal 
level, the life of those encountered by the anthropologist during 
fieldwork always seems less real than the one that she lives in her 
country of origin. This is the place of her work, her lovers, her 
parents and friends, in short everything that according to Schutz 
constitutes the lifeworld. This is the world to which one usually 
returns to resume the pursuit of one’s personal interests. Within as 
well as outside of one’s profession, “the individual experiences his 
own identity only within and through his relationship to the other,” a 
relationship that is always constructed according to “rules that have 
always pre-existed him” (Augé 2006: 37). 
 
Marc Augé, who works in the interpretive tradition, draws upon 
notions such as narrative, fiction and interest to think about the 
relation between the anthropologist and the people encountered 
during fieldwork.61 First he asks the following question: 
 
Does the real life we live and of which we are witnesses every 
day—whether we are ethnologists or not, psychologists or not, 
hermeneutist or not—not present itself as a tracery of stories, 
intrigues, and events that involve the private and the public sphere? 
(Augé 2004: 32).  
 
These stories “which we tell each other with greater or lesser talent 
and conviction” (p. 32) are “constructed as fiction in the broad sense 
(not as fiction opposite to the truth of the narrative the historians 
 
60 Readers familiar with Geertz will recognize here his semiotic definition of 
culture, a key anthropological concept, despite the suggestion that 
anthropologists ought to forego its use altogether (Kuper 1999).  
63 On the question of fiction in ethnography see Simon and Bibeau (2004), 
Flahaut and Heinick (2005) and Fassin (2014). 




claim to be “true,” but as narration, scenario that obeys a certain 
number of formal rules)” (p. 34).62 
 
This feature of narration is highlighted by Mossière in her analysis 
of the eighty interviews of converts to Islam in both Québec and 
France. She quickly noticed that “convert narratives were 
standardized and hinged on a few redundant issues (gender 
relationships, the veil, Islam and public spaces…), and that converts 
followed a pattern that circulates on the Internet.” This led her to 
conclude that the experience of the people she interviewed was 
probably shaped by how they thought about that experience in the 
first place: “As experiences structure the modes of expression, it is 
likely that the patterns of expression that are available or culturally 
valued also govern the experiences that individuals may live 
through, and their awareness of those experiences.” Hanks found the 
same while “examining how paranormal investigators manage their 
own commitments to scientific evidence and personal embodied 
experience.” She observed that “for their own self-imagining”, self-
identified investigators of the paranormal drew on popular cultural 
images that defined who they were as amateur scientists and what 
the evidence they were looking for would look like. The television 
series Most Haunted as well as Internet sites provided many of the 
scenarios for this shared social imaginary. What Mossière and Hanks 
see in accounts of people they spoke with is reflexivity in the 
ethnomethodological sense, the mutually constitutive back and forth 
process between what people describe (and live) on the one hand, 
and the description itself, on the other hand.  
 
According to Augé, as anthropologists we may encounter the Other 
in his lifeworld without forgetting our own fictions: “If we define 
others as living a kind of fiction (in which, let us not forget, a 
multiplicity of strange characters appear: gods, spirits, sorcerers … ), 
we thereby define ourselves as objective observers, at the very 
most, careful not to let ourselves be carried off into the stories of 
 
64 On the constitution of the self through narratives that we recount to 
others, and ourselves, see Ochs and Capps (2001) as well as Collins (2003; 
2010).  




others, not to let a role be imposed upon us; in doing so we do not 
think of the fictions we ourselves our living” (Augé 2004: 34, my 
emphasis).  
 
With Schutz we can acknowledge that we do not think of our lives as 
fictions because we pursue the objectives that define our 
professional life as if they were naturally rational ones, to be taken 
for granted because they are shared and structure our personal and 
collective lives. One’s professional life is indeed structured 
chronologically and ritually around events that are unavoidable, such 
as attending and contributing to conferences, publishing on a regular 
basis, applying for grants, etc. Introducing oneself in day-to-day 
affairs or presenting one’s work in academic settings involves 
mastering the established codes of verbal and non-verbal 
communication—conscious and unconscious—generally accepted 
within a given interpretative community. It is through this mastery 
that we come to feel that our professional lives are real, grounded in 
a social endeavour that is shared with others. 
 
Choosing an intellectual orientation or research topic always 
involves taking distance from others with whom these are not 
shared. Within disciplines, sub-groups form and each nourishes itself 
with compelling discoveries and stories that it uses to distinguish 
itself from others. In other words, as highlighted in the introduction 
to this book and in many chapters that follow, depending on the 
historical period in which professional choices are made, some are 
perceived of as more legitimate and prestigious than others.63  
 
What are we to think and what are we to do as anthropologists when 
faced with phenomena or “extraordinary experiences” like those 
presented in this book that at first glance seem bizarre? According to 
 
65 According to Lévi-Strauss, if the social sciences have eclipsed philosophy 
in the 1950s, it reclaims its place by the end of the century: “whether we will 
rejoice in it or worry, philosophy will again come to the front of the 
anthropological scene. No longer our philosophy, which my generation had 
asked exotic peoples help to undo, but, by a striking turn of events, their 
own” (Lévi-Strauss 2000: 720). 




Augé, the anthropologist’s response should consist in becoming “the 
observer [who] is recording “fictions,” “narrations” that are quite 
foreign to him, but the reasons of which he can penetrate” (Augé 
2004: 44).64 Thus, continues Augé, “The expression ‘participatory 
ethnology’ has no other meaning and presupposes no kind of 
mystical fusion with others. One can enter into the reasons of an 
individual or a collectivity without confusing oneself with them” 
(1973: 13). In sum, in the tradition of Schutz and Weber, Augé and 
Geertz correctly argue that whoever we are and wherever we find 
ourselves, it is through the mastery of “socially available” codes that 
we understand each other.  
 
In order to specify what he means by “participant ethnology”, Augé 
writes that  
 
When, with regard to acts of ‘sorcery’, Evans-Pritchard confessed 
that he had managed to reason in the terms of his Ashanti 
interlocutors, he was doing nothing other than designating his 
familiarity with a specific rhetoric and grammar and his 
understanding of tales that implemented them. (1973:13) 
 
 I agree with Augé on this point. Among the Dene Tha of 
northwestern Alberta, with whom I lived for six months out of the 
year from 1980 to 1985, I did what Evans-Pritchard did among the 
Azande. At the end of my first fieldwork I was satisfied with the 
progress I had made with the local language and I had become 
familiar with several families in this community of 1500 inhabitants. 
Nonetheless, through a linguist who was also working in the 
community I was told that a local healer held that I and another elder 
whom I often visited were taking away his power to heal. The 
 
66 Augé’s position is identical to that of Geertz who writes, “We are not, at 
least I am not, seeking either to become natives (a compromised word in any 
case) or to mimic them. Only romantics or spies would seem to find point in 
that. We are seeking, in the widened sense of the term in which it 
encompasses very much more than talk, to converse with them…” (Geertz 
1973: 13). For an in-depth exploration of the dialogical nature of 
anthropological knowledge see Dwyer (1977, 1979, 2010); D. Tedlock 
(1995); Calame (2010) and Collins (2010). 




transmission of a message by a third party is completely consistent 
with Dene Tha interpersonal communication, but this situation took 
me off-guard. I was identifying myself as a researcher, while I was 
being identified as an accomplice in a nefarious plot. 
 
Several days after learning of this, I was invited to participate in a 
sweat lodge ceremony in a neighbouring village. It was in this 
context that I expressed my concern with the accusation, not 
knowing where it came from or what it meant. After hearing what I 
had to say, the elder who was presiding over the ceremony told me 
this: 
 
It is simple. He is accusing you of taking away his power because he 
does not feel his power as often as he used to; he doesn’t feel it as 
often as before because fewer people come to see him as a healer; 
fewer people see him as a healer because more of them go to the 
elder with whom you work the most; more of them go to see him 
with their ailments because he has more prestige; he has more 
prestige because you spend almost all of your time with him and his 
extended family. (Goulet 1998: 18) 
 
I needed this very concise sociological analysis to understand the 
seriousness of the accusation and to figure out how to respond: by 
reducing the number of visits to the elder with whom I was spending 
most of my time and redistributing my time more or less equally 
among all the clans so that the elder of each clan would not feel 
slighted and undermined as a healer. And this is what I did during 
my second period of fieldwork, after which I never again heard this 
type of accusation. In this situation I was able to reason and act 
according to the terms of my Dene Tha interlocutors by depending 
on the interpretive capacity essential to carrying out, what Augé 
refers to as “participatory ethnology”.  
 
The Experiential Approach 
 
Participatory ethnology can, however, be understood in a broader 
sense, as a process of initiation in novel ways of experiencing 
oneself, because of and through interaction with others in their 
lifeworld. According to Ewing (1994: 571), the interpretive approach 




to research is linked to the desire to protect oneself at all costs from 
“the possibility of entering or believing in the world of the people 
they meet during fieldwork.” When she began her work with Sufis in 
Pakistan she was immediately confronted with the view that “true 
understanding is not separable from first-hand experience and true 
belief” (1994: 572). In the terms of one Pakistani: “It's too bad you 
couldn't have actually had the experience of sufism yourself — like 
having champagne rather than just a coke” (1994: 575). So, she 
joined the school of a local saint (pir) who was known for his 
spiritual power (baraka). Much to her surprise, he appeared to her in 
a dream just as he had predicted. Writing about Ewing’s experiences, 
Marranci (2008: 77) notes that, “she experienced the saint as many 
of her informants did because she had become part of the community 
of emotions her informants shared.”  
 
A number of authors in this book describe the process through which 
they became part of such a community of emotions. In her February 
22nd, 2004, journal entry, following her dancing and singing with 
Congolese Pentecostals in their weekly service, Mossière notes that 
she “eventually experienced some states of true joy and grace, 
sometimes a feeling of communion with members of the church, as 
well as spontaneous sensations of love and bliss.” Being with them 
in the midst of their gathering, Mossière developed “a new grid of 
perception of the self and of the others, that is a new sense of 
belonging and different relationships with participants.” As 
described below, we shall see that in his investigation of belief in 
ghosts in Taiwan, Habkirk also ended up not only sharing in their 
emotional experiences of what is locally known as a hungry ghost 
(gui), but also acting on the strength of that belief to resolve an 
unanticipated disturbance in his apartment. 
 
Fabian argues that to advance ethnographic knowledge, 
understanding other people’s reasoning is not enough: “much of our 
ethnographic research is carried out best when we are ‘out of our 
minds,’ that is, while we relax our inner controls, forget our 
purposes, let ourselves go. This is precisely what Carole Laderman 
did when she decided to become an apprentice to a Malay shaman. 
She did so following her publication of Wives and Midwives: 




Childbirth and Nutrition in Rural Malaysia (1983), a rigourous 
quantitative study that led her to conclude that indigenous ways of 
healing were valid alternatives to Western medicine (Davis-Floyd 
and Rapp 2010: 42).  
 
Laderman asked the Malay shamans she approached what they were 
referring to when they talked of the “Inner Wind” experienced in 
their trance states. In response, they insisted that, “the only way I 
could know would be to experience it myself” (Laderman 1988: 
805). Eventually she underwent a shamanic ritual in which she 
entered a trance state. “At the height of my trance, I felt the Wind 
blowing inside my chest with the strength of a hurricane.” When she 
described her sensation to her Malay hosts they said: “Why did you 
think we call them Winds?” (Laderman 1988: 806; in Young and 
Goulet 1994: 101-102) 
 
In brief, fieldwork has an ecstatic side that is a condition of 
knowledge production. It follows that “critically understood, 
autobiography is a condition of ethnographic objectivity” (Fabian 
2001: 13). This is precisely what Victor Turner advanced when he 
encouraged researchers to experience rituals “in co-activity with 
their enactors” so as to distance themselves as far as possible from 
their usual habits, “in order to have sensory and mental knowledge 
of what is really happening around and to them” in what is a new 
context” (Turner 1985: 205-206; in Goulet 1994: 26). If this is so, it 
follows that “autobiography is a condition of ethnographic 
objectivity” (2001: 12). Experiential ethnographers know this is the 
case. They reflect upon the processes whereby they enter the field 
and associate with others who become their hosts and mentors in 
multiple settings in their social world.  
 
Fabian argues that if early explorers, and after them ethnographers, 
who espoused a positive and interpretive view of their activity, 
“seldom ever sang, danced or played along” with their companions 
and hosts, it is because “their ideas of science and their rules of 
hygiene made them reject singing, dancing, and playing as source of 
ethnographic knowledge” (Fabian 2000: 127). This rejection leads to 
impoverished ethnographic knowledge. By shedding light on the 




ecstatic dimension of ethnographic fieldwork, Fabian rejects “the 
current meaning of ecstasy as nonrational, erratic, escapist, 
enthusiastic behaviour (such as that described, say, in studies of cults 
and movements)” (2000: 8). 
  
Ecstasy is not one among many other possible research methods, 
“something to pursue in the practice of ethnography–getting drunk 
or high, losing one’s mind from fatigue, pain and fever-induced 
delirium, or working oneself into a frenzy” (2000: 281). Ecstasy is 
not “a kind of behaviour” one engages in, but a “quality of human 
action and interaction-–one that creates a common ground for the 
encounter” with the Other, in his homeland (2000: 8). “Ecstasy, in a 
nontrivial understanding of the term, is (much like subjectivity) a 
prerequisite for, rather than an impediment to, the production of 
ethnographic knowledge” (2000: 8). If this is so it follows that 
“autobiography is a condition of ethnographic objectivity” (Fabian 
2001: 12). Experiential ethnographers know this is the case. They 
reflect upon the processes whereby they enter the field and associate 
with others who become their hosts and mentors in multiple settings 
in their social world.  
 
Initiates into other lifeworlds, such as Laderman and Ewing, are able 
to understand what their hosts say and experience to the extent that 
they themselves consent to all aspects of their learning process. As 
anthropologists they live the experience of immersion in the world of 
others. By letting go of their prior knowledge of themselves and the 
world, they demonstrate that, while in the field, ecstatic moments (in 
the sense proposed by Fabian) enable them to experience a social 
reality that was previously foreign to them. In this book, we argue 
that the ethnography that is the result of this research does not suffer 
in terms of objectivity. Rather, through intersubjective lived 
experiences, ethnographers shed new light on what the people they 
encounter in the field are actually doing and saying. This is at the 
heart of this collection of eight original essays. 
 
The experiential approach that is evoked in these examples of 
initiation is also used by researchers who become apprentices in 
other social and cultural contexts (Harris 2007). As demonstrated in 




a recent special issue on the transformative aspects of ethnographic 
fieldwork (Goulet 2011), researchers who benefit from the ecstatic 
aspect of fieldwork engage in new forms of writing that call for the 
inclusion of the anthropologist in the ethnography. Elizabeth Bird, 
for instance, notes that if “(Goulet) developed a ‘narrative 
ethnography,’ creating ethnographic tales through mutual experience 
with the Dene” (2003: 16), he did so in response to the Dene Tha 
insistence that true knowledge is obtained not through interviews but 
through personal, first-hand experiences of topics one is interested 
in.  Narratives of this kind emphasize “not only the experiences of an 
author living in a foreign setting but the mutual interaction between 
author and the host community, illuminating the Other as much as 
the self” (Gottlieb 1995: 571).  
 
To take ecstasy on board in one’s ethnographic work is a 
transformative personal and professional experience. Ewing, 
working among the Sufis of Pakistan, Laderman working among 
villagers of Malaysia, Habkirk doing research among the Taiwanese, 
Meintel becoming a medium in Montreal, and so many other 
ethnographers in this and in other books, affirm that they could not 
wish away the transformative events lived with others in their world. 
Their hosts expected them to take seriously what they have lived 
locally. In other words, the expectation was that they would rise to 
the challenge of effective and respectful cross-cultural 
communication. They were called upon to transcend their own 
ethnocentrism and to explore forms of knowledge production and 
knowledge dissemination that serve the best interests of their hosts 
and, I would argue, of their profession. 
 
From the above it is clear that the positivist separation between 
researcher and object of study, or the interpretive distance between 
the foreign interpreter and local actors, leaves little space for the 
intercultural and intersubjective that is characteristic of a more 
narrative anthropology. In this discussion it is noteworthy that in the 
course of his career, Lévi-Strauss distanced himself from his earlier 
presentation of fieldwork as the “negative aspect of our trade” (1955: 
13). In 1976, Lévi-Strauss shed light on a significant aspect of 
fieldwork which he noted is “not the goal of his profession, or a 




completion of his schooling, or yet a technical apprenticeship — but 
a crucial stage of his education, prior to which he may possess 
miscellaneous knowledge that will never form a whole.” “Where 
relations between individuals and the system of social relations 
combine to form a whole,” writes Lévi-Strauss, the anthropologist 
“must not merely analyze their elements, but apprehend them as a 
whole in the form of a personal experience—his own” (1963: 272, 
in Goulet 1994: 25 and Goulet 1988: 247, my emphasis). 
 
Taking stock of the ecstatic aspect of fieldwork means pursuing as 
much as possible this apprehension of the whole range of 
experiences our interlocutors ask us to pay attention to. To engage in 
this personal apprehension is to refuse to distance one’s life and 
one’s work from the transformative events that are experienced 
within the lifeworld of the Other. It is then that the idea of 
“participant ethnology” takes on a new meaning without denying the 
inherent difficulty of developing as it were “a kind of doubling of 
consciousness that is arduous to sustain” as one strives to be “both 
subject and object, the one who acts and the one who, as it were, 
watches himself acting” (Bourdieu 2003: 281).  
 
Our hosts, wherever they may be, expect us to take seriously what 
we learn by living with them. They expect us to be able to respond to 
the challenges that are part and parcel of intercultural and 
intersubjective communication. Anthropologists who respond as best 
as they can to these expectations share a deep interest “in leaving 
behind the old detached observer and plunging into the thick of 
things” (Carter 2013: 13). Doing so, experiential ethnographers go 
beyond “a willingness to listen to Indigenous understandings of self, 
place, and existence” to grant them “the respect we show our own 
ontologies” (2013:13).  
 
Writers and readers sympathetic to this perspective must, however, 
keep in mind Hanks’ reminder that while “evidence and experience 
are longstanding categories of thought in intellectual, as well as 
popular, traditions”, it is also the case that these terms have many 
meanings, that are at times contradictory. The investigators of 
paranormal experiences she discusses who have encounters with 




spirits never found the evidence they required to construct “new 
knowledge of the past or the nature of spirits.” Despite the fact that 
they relished “their ability to experience the spirits of the dead”, such 
encounters always generated “heated anxiety and uncertainty.”  
 
Hanks gives the example of a pro-science investigator she met 
during her research who “thought she might be able to ‘develop’ as a 
medium.” This woman whom she identifies as Ginny therefore 
began to interact with mediums in the paranormal community. Doing 
so, she soon “found that many of the things she was ‘picking up’ on 
investigations, such as dates and names, turned out to correspond to 
knowledge about the sites in the historical record.” Ginny then 
wondered at the significance of this correspondence. Was she really 
turning into a medium? Should she accept the view that 
“mediumship is an inherent feature of these people and that it only 
requires nurturing to blossom”? In the end she is unconvinced. As 
she told Hanks: “I don’t know what it is. I pick up on things, I do. 
But I don’t know how. I don’t even know if it’s real. I don’t know. 
It’s frustrating.”  
 
Percy, another investigator of the paranormal explained “the 
difference between ghost hunters and paranormal investigators to 
me. He remarked that, ‘well, with ghost hunters, they want an 
experience. For them, it’s an experience they’re after. And that’s 
fine, I guess, but that’s not what we do. We want evidence.’” As it 
turns out no evidence is clear enough to convince the investigators 
Hanks met with that visits from ghosts are real events. Contrast this 
conclusion with that reached by Habkirk in the course of his 
investigation of in ghosts among Taiwanese. Habkirk ends up 
sharing in their emotional experiences of what is locally known as a 
hungry ghost (gui).  
 
The unsettling experience begins in his apartment when, apparently 
on its own, his TV turns on. Soon after turning it off, just as he 
begins to fall asleep, the TV turns itself on again. Habkirk then “got 
a brief visual image of a young boy” standing beside his bed looking 
down at him, “like he wanted something.” Taiwanese who are 
visited by ghosts customarily give them offerings of food for them to 




consume, after which they leave the person they were visiting. 
Habkirk therefore decides to leave a few biscuits for the boy, after 
which the TV remains off for the remaining of the night. After this 
first event, however, the interference with the TV followed by 
offerings of biscuits repeats itself for five consecutive nights. 
Habkirk decides to consult a local temple attendant who tells him the 
boy-ghost will not leave before he is given candies. Habkirk obliges 
and thereafter his TV remained silent. As he notes, “The statistical 
improbability of these occurrences and the effective solution that the 
Taiwanese spiritualists gave me led me to believe that maybe their 
beliefs are based on an intersubjectively human, spiritual reality” 
that does not belong to the Taiwanese culture but to what following 
Hannerz (1997) and Sahlins (1999) we might refer to as “our Culture 




In their ambition to understand human social life in all its diversity, 
anthropologists have always privileged field-based inquiry. This 
epilogue demonstrates that throughout history, researchers differ 
from one another in terms of what they consider the best possible 
and credible outcome of fieldwork. We have presented and discussed 
three (ir)rational ways of being in the field. In the structuralist or 
positivist tradition, the researcher constitutes a scientific self in order 
to apprehend what he observes that may escape the people he meets 
in the field. In the interpretive tradition, the researcher successfully 
completes his fieldwork to the extent that he is able to create a thick 
description of the Other in his lifeworld, according to his own logic. 
Moving beyond the positivist and interpretive stances in 
anthropology, as argued in this book, is not only possible and 
legitimate, but also productive of new insights in the multi-
dimensional reality of human experiences. As Béguet maintains, at 
times, “one must also transport oneself into a world replete with the 
spiritual, not as a cultural product (or that of a popular subculture), 
but as an empirical phenomenon.” 
 
In this relatively novel stance, the search is still for valid and 
valuable ethnographic knowledge. In the experiential tradition, 




however, knowledge about the Other is generated by radical 
participation in the lifeworld of the Other. The researcher who 
willingly consents to living a deep intercultural experience 
underscores the ecstatic aspect of her fieldwork. Being open to the 
advantages associated with the ecstatic aspect of fieldwork or with 
the deep involvement with others in the pursuit of knowledge 
through co-participative research, does not exempt the researcher 
from having clear research objectives and from needing to master 
traditional ethnographic techniques like the learning of local 
conventions in various settings, including those of rituals. The 
experiential approach requires that the ethnographer stick “with 
ethnography through thick and thin” while participating in the efforts 
of many anthropologists “to write one’s way out of a tradition that 
one wants both to preserve and change” (Marcus 1998: 231, 234, in 
Goulet and Miller 2007: 1).  
 
Experiential ethnographers want to preserve the tradition of intensive 
fieldwork, at home or abroad, which is seen as a condition for the 
advancement of anthropological knowledge. This advancement, 
however, is only possible if researchers challenge the classical ideal 
of the investigator’s exclusion of the researcher from ethnographies, 
especially when it comes to events or experiences that question the 
epistemological, ontological and ethical assumptions that underlie 
established approaches in the discipline. Thus, analyzing and 
reflecting upon key moments of a transformation experienced in the 
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